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Public authorities frequently mandate public or private agencies to manage 
their renewable natural resources. Contrary to the agency, which is an 
expert in renewable natural resource management, public authorities 
usually ignore the sustainable level of harvest. In this note, we first 
model the contractual relationship between a principal, who owns the 
renewable natural resource, and an agent, who holds private information 
on its sustainable level of harvest. We then look for the Pareto-optimal 
allocations. In the situation of an imperfect information setting, we find 
that the Pareto-optimal contracting depends on the probability that the 
harvesting level stands outside the sustainability interval. The information 
rent held by the agent turns out to be unavoidable, such that stepping 
outside the sustainability interval implies the possibility of depletion of the 
renewable natural resource. This, in turn, compromises the maintenance of 







States, regions and municipalities frequently mandate 
public or private agencies to manage their renewable 
natural resources [4,11]. The following note analyzes these 
principal-agent-type relationships [2,6,9].a When it comes 
a The principal-agent problem occurs when an entity called the agent 
makes decisions on behalf of an entity called the principal. The problem 
exists in circumstances where agents act in their own best interests.
to natural resource management, principals and agents 
can have diverse preferences and objectives, be it on the 
harvest rates, the investments, the provision of natural 
and environmental amenities, etc. For instance, in the 
forest-based industry characterized by the exploitation of 
biomass, renewable natural resource owners frequently 
denounce the managing agency for withholding the 
information on the sustainable level of harvesting [1]. In 
this case, what kind of properties condition sustainability?
10
Research in Ecology | Volume 03 | Issue 04 | December 2021
The prime consideration of this note is to understand 
how -- when it comes to managing renewable natural 
resources -- the agent’s private information may come into 
conflict with the objective of a principal, be it a secondary 
topic that has been neglected in the literature. We thus 
model the contractual relationship between a principal 
and an agent as regards the renewable natural resource 
management. In the situation of an imperfect information 
setting, we find that the Pareto-optimal contracting 
depends on the probability that the level of harvesting 
stands outside the sustainability interval. This puts the 
Pareto-optimal allocations in jeopardy. The information 
rent held by the agent being unavoidable, stepping outside 
the sustainability interval implies the possibility of 
depletion of the renewable natural resource. This potential 
ecological overshoot, which occurs when human demand 
exceeds the regenerative capacity of a natural ecosystem, 
puts the Earth on an unsustainable trajectory.
After this starting section, we describe the model in 
Section 2, with a focus on the principal-agent relationship 
in a perfect information setting (Subsection 2.3) and when 
the agent owns private information on the sustainable 
level of harvesting (Subsection 2.4). Section 3 concludes.
2. A Principal-agent Model in Renewable 
Natural Resource Management
We consider a principal who delegates the management 
of a renewable natural resource of stock s to an agent. 
The principal and the agent have to agree upon a quantity 
to be harvested q from the renewable natural resource 
levels owned by the principal. Stock s is considered as 
a proxy of the natural resource amenities, which are all 
non-market goods and services related to the existence of 
this resource [8]. The sustainable harvesting of renewable 
natural resources, such that the stock remains unchanged 
or 
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The prime consideration of this note is to underst nd how -
- when it comes to managing renewable natural r s urces --
the agent's private information may come into conflict with
the objective of a principal, be it a secondary t pic that has
been neglected in the literature. We thus model the
contractual relationship between a principal a d a agent as
regards the renewable natural resource management. In he
situation of an imperfect information s tting, we find that the
Pareto-optimal contracting depends on the probability that the
level of harvesting stands outside the sustainability interval.
This puts the Pareto-optimal allocations in jeopardy. The
information rent held by the agent being unavoidabl ,
stepping outside the sustainability interval implies the
possibility of depletion of the renewable natural resource.
This potential ecological overshoot, whic occurs when
human demand exceeds the regenerative capacity f a atural
ecosystem, puts the Earth on an unsustainable trajectory.
After this starting section, we describe the model in
Section 2, with a focus on the principal-agent relationship in a
perfect information setting (Subsection 2.3) and when the
agent owns private information on the sustainable level of
harvesting (Subsection 2.4). Section 3 concludes.
2. A Principal-agent Model in Renewable
Natural Resource Management
We consider a principal who deleg tes the management of
a renewable natural resource of stock s to n agent. The
principal and the agent have to agree upon a quantity t be
harvested q from the renewable natural res urc levels owned
by the principal. Stock s is considered as a proxy of the
natural resource amenities, which are all non-market goods
and services related to the existence of this resource [8]. The
sustainable harvesting of renewable natural resources, such
that the stock remains unchanged r ���� = 0 , means that the
level of harvest matches with the level of the resource’s
natural growth. Unsustainable harvesting can be envisaged in
two ways. When ���� > 0 , the scenario corresponds to the
damages issued from the resource over-stocking [3]. The
absence of implementation of a management plan is one
possible way to envisage such a context. When ���� < 0 , the
scenario implies the over-harvesting of the stock and the
depletion of the renewable natural resource. Finally, the
principal gives revenue share r to the agent for the renewable
natural resource management, harvesting included, such that���� > 0.
The principal and the agent can have different preferences
on how to conduct the renewable natural resource
management. For instance, the agent could have stronger
pre e ences for income from harvesting, while the principal
could have stronger preferences for preserving the resource’s
natural and nvironmental amenities.
In the knowledge that the renewable natural resource
harvesting must not jeopardize its sustainability, interval[�, �] defines the bounding minimum and maximum levels of
harvesting. It is the set of possible actions to be undertaken in
purpose of the sustainable resource management. In detail,
there is a maximum level of harvesting beyond which the
resource is depleted. As a result, the resource cannot be
renewed and no longer provides natural and environmental
a enities. There is also a minimum level of harvesting below
which amenities start to vanish. This can be explained by the
absence of a anagement plan. Therefore, q has to lie
somewhere within this interval. These assumptions implicitly
mean that, in a specific range of harvesting levels, resources
and natural and environmental amenities are complementary.
If we assume that the principal has stronger preferences for
the stock c servation than the agent, the objectives of the
parties sh uld differ. The principal's harvesting objective will
tend to be a low level of harvest, hence running the risk of
being below �. On the contrary, the agent will seek to harvest
beyond this level.1 The knowledge of the interval of the
sustainable levels of harvesting is crucial. The key issue of the
contract setting is the information gap as to this interval. We
will thus consider that this interval can correspond either to
common knowledge or to a private information.
2.1 The Principal: The Renewable Natural Resource
Owner
Let �� be th value function of a risk-neutral principal.
This value function is decreasing in revenue transfer r paid to
the agent. However, the effect of renewable natural resource
stock s and harvesting q on the value function is ambiguous,
since harvesting generates revenues but, at the same time,
reduces utility by diminishing the levels of natural and
environmental amenities. While the principal is willing to
harvest less than the agent, the question is whether principal's
optimal harvest level ��∗ lies or not within sustainability
interval [�, �]. The principal's value function is defined by:�� = ��(� � , �� � , � � ) (1)
where �� � represents the principal's identity function such
that:�� � ≔ ��∗ > � �����' = ���(�,�,�)�� ≤ 0��∗ ≤ � �����' = ��� �,�,��� > 0 (2)
1 The opposite assumption yields symmetric results with respect to
maximum level �.
 s that the level of harvest matches with 
the level of the resource’s natural growth. Unsustainable 
harvesting can be envisaged in two ways. When 
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the g nt's private i formation may come into confli t with
the objecti e of a principal, b it a secondary topic that has
been negl ct in the literature. We hus model the
contractual rel tion hip b tw en a princip l and an agent as
regards th renewable natural resource management. In the
situation of an imperfect information setting, we find that the
Par to-optimal contrac depends on the probability that the
level of harvesting stands outside the sustainability interval.
This puts the Pa eto-optimal allocations in jeopardy. The
information re t held by the agent being unavoidable,
stepping out ide the sustainability interval implies the
pos ibility of de le ion of the renewable natural resource.
This potential ecological overshoot, which occurs when
hum n dem nd exceeds the regenerative capacity of a natural
cosystem, puts the Earth on an unsustainable trajectory.
After this starting section, we describe the model in
Section 2, with a focus on the principal-agent relationship in a
perf ct information setti g (Subsection 2.3) and when the
age t owns priva e information on the sustainable level of
harvesting (Subsection 2.4). Section 3 concludes.
2. A Principal-agent Model in Renewable
Natural Resource Management
We consider a principal who delegates the management of
a renewable natural r source of stock s to an agent. The
principal and the agent have to agree upon a quantity to be
harvested q from the renewable natural resource levels owned
by the principal. Stock s is considered as a proxy of the
natural resource amenities, which are all non-market goods
and services related to the existence of this resource [8]. The
sustainable harvesting of renewable natural resources, such
that the stock remains unchanged or ���� = 0 , means that the
level of harvest matches with the level of the resource’s
natural growth. Unsustainable harvesting can be envisaged in
t a ���� > 0 , the scenario corresponds to the
damages issued from the resource over-stocking [3]. The
absence of implementation of a management plan is one
possible way to envisage such a context. When ���� < 0 , the
scenario implies the over-harvesting of the stock and the
depletion of the renewable natural resource. Finally, the
principal gives revenue share r to the agent for the renewable
natural resource management, harvesting included, such that���� > 0.
The principal and the agent can have different preferences
on how to conduct the renewable natural resource
management. For instance, the agent could have stronger
preferences for income from harvesting, while the principal
could have stronger preferences for preserving the resource’s
natural and environmental amenities.
In the knowledge that the renewable natural resource
harvesting must not jeopardize its sustainability, interval[�, �] defines the bounding minimum and maximum levels of
harvesting. It is the set of possible actions to be undertaken in
purpose of the sustainable resource management. In detail,
there is a maximum level of harvesting beyond which the
resource is depleted. As a result, the resource cannot be
renewed and no longer provides natural and environmental
amenities. There is also a minimum level of harvesting below
which amenities start to vanish. This can be explained by the
absence of a management plan. Therefore, q has to lie
somewhere within this interval. These assumptions implicitly
mean that, in a specific range of harvesting levels, resources
and natural and environmental amenities are complementary.
If we assume that the principal has stronger preferences for
the stock conservation than the agent, the objectives of the
parties should differ. The principal's harvesting objective will
tend to be a low level of harvest, hence running the risk of
being below �. On the contrary, the agent will seek to harvest
beyond this level.1 The knowledge of the interval of the
sustainable levels of harvesting is crucial. The key issue of the
contract setting is the information gap as to this interval. We
will thus consider that this interval can correspond either to
common knowledge or to a private information.
2.1 The Principal: The Renewable Natural Resource
Owner
Let �� be the value function of a risk-neutral principal.
This value function is decreasing in revenue transfer r paid to
the agent. However, the effect of renewable natural resource
stock s and harvesting q on the value function is ambiguous,
since harvesting generates revenues but, at the same time,
reduces utility by diminishing the levels of natural and
environmental amenities. While the principal is willing to
harvest less than the agent, the question is whether principal's
optimal harvest level ��∗ lies or not within sustainability
interval [�, �]. The principal's value function is defined by:�� = ��(� � , �� � , � � ) (1)
where �� � represents the principal's identity function such
that:�� � ≔ ��∗ > � �����' = ���(�,�,�)�� ≤ 0��∗ ≤ � �����' = ��� �,�,��� > 0 (2)
1 The opposite assumption yields symmetric results with respect to
maximum level �.
, 
the scenario corresponds to the damages issued from the 
resource over-stocking [3]. The absence of imp mentation 
of a management plan is one possible way to e v s ge 
such a context. When 
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natural resource amenities, which are all non-market goods
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two ways. When ���� > 0 , the sc nario corresponds to the
damages issued from the resource over-stocking [3]. The
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scenario implies the over-harvesting of the stock and the
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principal gives revenue share r o the agent for th renewable
natural resource man geme t, harvesting included, such that���� > 0.
The principal and the agent can have different preferences
on h w to conduct the re ewable natural resource
management. For inst nce, the agent could have stronger
preferen es fo income from harves ing, while the principal
could hav str nger preferences for pr serving he resource’s
natural and environmental amenities.
In the k owledge that the renew ble natural resource
h rvesting m st not jeopardize its sustain bili y, interval[�, �] de i es the bounding minimum nd maximum levels of
harvesting. It is the set of p s ible actions to be u dertaken in
purpose of the sustainable resource management. In detail,
there is a maximum level of harvesting beyond which th
resource is depleted. As a result, the resource cannot be
renewed and no longer provides natural and environmental
amenities. There s also a minimum level of harvesting belo
which amenities start to vanish. This ca be explained by the
absence of a management plan. Therefore, q has to lie
so ewhere wi hin this int rval. These assumpt ons implicitly
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and natural and environmental amenities ar complementary.
If w assume that the principal has stronger preferences for
the stock conservation than agent, the bjectives of the
parti s should diff r. The principal's harvesting objective will
end to be a low level of harvest, hence running the risk of
being below �. On the contrary, the agen will s ek to harvest
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contrac s tting is the informati n gap as to this interval. We
will thus consider hat this interval ca correspond either t
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2.1 The Principal: The Renewab e Nat al Resource
Owner
Let �� be the value function of a risk- eutral principal.
This value function is decreasing in rev nue transfer r paid to
the agent. However, the effect of renewable natural resource
stock s a d harvesting q on the value function is ambiguous,
since harv sting generates revenues but, at the same tim ,
reduces utility by diminishing the levels of natural and
environmental amenities. While the principal is willing to
harvest l ss than the agent, the ques ion is whether principal's
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interval [�, �]. The principal's value function is defined by:�� = ��(� � , �� � , � � ) (1)
where �� � represents the pri c pal's identity function such
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maximum level �.
,  scenario implies the 
over-harvesting of the stock and the depletion of the re-
newable natural resource. Finally, the principal gives revenue 
share r to the agent for the renewable natural resource man-
agement, harvesting inclu ed, such that 
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natural resource management, harvesting included, such that���� > 0.
The principal and the agent can have different preferences
on how to conduct the renewable natural resource
management. For instance, the agent could have stronger
preferences for income from harvesting, while the principal
could have stronger preferences for preserving the resource’s
natural and environmental amenities.
In the knowledge that the renewable natural resource
harvesting must not jeopardize its sustainability, interval[�, �] defines the bounding minimum and maximum levels of
harvesting. It is the set of possible actions to be undertaken in
purpose of the sustainable resource management. In detail,
there is a maximum level of harvesting beyond which the
resource is depleted. As a result, the resource cannot be
renewed and no longer provides natural and environmental
amenities. There is also a minimum level of harvesting below
which amenities start to vanish. This can be explained by the
absence of a management plan. Therefore, q has to lie
somewhere within this interval. These assumptions implicitly
mean that, in a specific range of harvesting levels, resources
and natural and environmental amenities are complementary.
If we assume that the principal has stronger preferences for
the stock conservation than the agent, the objectives of the
parties should differ. The principal's harvesting objective will
tend to be a low level of harvest, hence running the risk of
being below �. On the contrary, the agent will seek to harvest
beyond this level.1 The knowledge of the interval of the
sustainable levels of harvesting is crucial. The key issue of the
contract setting is the information gap as to this interval. We
will thus consider that this interval can correspond either to
common knowledge or to a private information.
2.1 The Principal: The Renewable Natural Resource
Owner
Let �� be the value function of a risk-neutral principal.
This value function is decreasing in revenue transfer r paid to
the agent. However, the effect of renewable natural resource
stock s and harvesting q on the value function is ambiguous,
since harvesting generates revenues but, at the same time,
reduces utility by diminishing the levels of natural and
environmental amenities. While the principal is willing to
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The principal and the agent can have different 
preferences on how to conduct the renewable natural 
resource management. For instance, the agent could have 
stronger preferences for income from harvesting, while the 
principal c uld have str nger preferences for preserving 
the resourc ’s tural and nvironmental amenities.
In the knowledge that the ren wable natural resource 
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 d fines the b unding minimu  and aximum 
l vels of harvesting. It is the set of possibl  actions t  
be undertak n in purpose of the sustainable resource 
management. In deta l, there is a maximum level of 
harvesting beyond which the r source is depleted. As 
a result, t  re ource cannot be renewed and no longer 
provides natural and environmental amenities. There is 
also a minimum level of harvesting below which amenities 
start to vanish. This can be explained by the absence of 
a management plan. Therefore, q has to lie somewhere 
within this interval. These assumptions implicitly mean 
that, in a specific range of harvesting levels, resources and 
natural and environmental amenities are complementary.
If we assume that the principal has stronger preferences 
for the stock conservation than the agent, the objectives 
of the parties should differ. The principal’s harvesting 
objective will tend to b  a low level of harvest, henc  
runni g the risk of being below 
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steppi g utsid th sustainabilit interval impl he
possib lity of depletion of the renewable atural resource.
This potential ecological ov rsh ot, which occurs when
uman demand exc eds th r generative capacity of a natural
osyste , puts the Earth on an unsustainabl trajectory.
After this starting section, we describe the model in
Section 2, with a focus on the principal-ag nt relationship in a
perfect inform tion se ting (Subsection 2.3) nd when the
gent ow s private information o the su tainable evel of
harvesting (Subsection 2.4). Section 3 concludes.
2. A Principal-agent Model in Renewable
Natural Resou ce Management
We consider a principal who delegates the management of
a renewabl natural resource of stock s to an agent. The
principal nd the gent have to agree up n a quanti y to be
harvested q from the renewabl atural resource levels owned
by the principal. Stock s is co sidered as a p oxy of the
natural resource amenities, whi h are all on-market goods
and services related to the existence of this resource [8]. The
sustainable harvesting of r newabl natural resources, uch
that the stock remains unchanged or ���� = 0 , means that the
level of harvest matches with the level of the resource’s
natural growth. Unsustainable harvesting can be envisaged in
two ways. When ���� > 0 , the scenario corresponds to the
damages issued from the resource over-stocking [3]. The
absence of implementation f a management plan is one
possible way to nvisage such a c text. When ��� < 0 , the
scenario implies the over-harvesting of the stock and the
depletion of the renewable natural resource. Finally, the
principal gives revenue s are r to the agent for th renewable
natural resour e management, harvesting included, such t at���� > 0.
The principal and the agent can have different preferences
on how to condu t the renewable atural resource
manageme t. F r instan e, the agent could have stronger
prefer nces for income from harv sting, while the principal
could have stronger preferences for preserving the resource’s
natural and environ ental amenities.
In the knowledge that the renewable natural resource
harvesting must not jeopardize its sustainability, i terv[�, �] defi s the bounding inimum and maximum levels of
harvesting. It is the set of possible actions to be undertaken in
purpose of th sustainable resource management. In detail,
there is a maximum level of harv sting beyond which the
resourc is d pleted. As a result, the resource cannot be
renewed and no longer rovides natural and envi onmental
ame ities. Th re is lso a minimum le el of h rvesting b low
which amenities start to vanish. This can be explained by the
absence f a management plan. Therefore, q has to lie
somewhere within this interval. Th se assumptions implicitly
me n that, in a sp cific range of harvesting level , resource
and natural and enviro mental amenities are complementary.
If we assume hat the principal has stronger prefe nces for
the stock conservation than the agent, the objectives of th
pa ties should differ. The principal's harv sting objective will
tend t be low leve of ha vest, hence running the risk of
eing below �. On the c ntrary, the agent will seek to harvest
beyond this level.1 The knowledge of the interval of the
sust inable levels of harvesting is crucial. The key issu of he
contract setting is the information gap as to this interval. We
will thus sider that this interval can corres ond ei er to
co mon knowledge r to a private information.
2.1 The Principal: The Renewable Natural Resource
Owner
Let �� be the value function of a risk-neutral principal.
Thi value function is decr asing in revenue transfer r paid to
the agent. However, the effect of renewable natural resourc
tock s and harv s ing q on the value function is ambiguo s,
since harvesting gener tes revenues but, at the same time,
reduces t lity by diminishi g the l ls of natural and
nvironmental amen t es. While the principal is willing to
h rvest less than the agent, the question s w the pr ncipal's
ptimal harvest level ��∗ li s or not within sustainability
inte val [�, �]. The principa 's value function is defined by:�� = ��(� � , �� � , � � ) (1)
where �� represents the principal's identity function such
that:�� � ≔ ��∗ > � �����' = ���(�,�,�)�� ≤ 0��∗ ≤ � �����' = ��� �, ,��� > 0 (2)
1 The opposite assumption yields symmetric results with respect to
maximum level �.
. On the contrary, 
the agent will se k to harvest b y nd th s le el.b The 
knowledg  of the interval of the sustainable vels 
of h rves i   crucial. The key issue of the contract 
setting is the information gap as to this interval. We will 
thus consider that this inter al can correspond either to 
common knowledge or to a private informati .
2.1 The Principal: The Renewable Natural 
Resource Owne
Let Vp be the value function of a risk-neutral principal. 
This value fu ction is decreasing i  revenu  t ansfer r 
paid to the agent. However, the effect of r newable atural 
r source s ock s and harvesting q on the value func ion 
is ambiguous, sinc  ha v sting g n rates revenues but, at 
the same tim , reduces tility by diminishing he levels of 
natural a d environmental ameniti s. While the princ pal 
is willing  har e t less than th  age , the question i  
whether principal’s optimal harvest lev l 
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The prime co sideration f this note is to understand how -
- when it comes to managin renewable natural sources --
the agent's private infor ti n ay c me into c nfli t with
the objective of a princ al, b t a se onda y topic tha a
b en gl c d in the iterature. We thus mod l the
contractual relationship betw n a princ pal and an gent
regards th new ble na ural res urc ma ag m nt In the
f an imperfect inf rmation setti g, we fi d th th
Pareto-optimal c tracting dep nds o the probability th th
leve of harvesting stands outsid he ustai bility int val.
This puts he Pareto-optimal locations in je pardy. The
inf rmation rent hel by the gent being unavoidabl ,
stepping outs e th sustain bi ity i terval implies the
possibil ty of d l tion f the r n wable natural resourc .
This poten ial eco ogical ov rsh ot, w ic occurs he
human demand exc ed he r gener tive capacity of a n tural
ecosystem, puts t e E rth o a u tain ble trajectory.
Af er this st rting sec ion, we d scribe the model in
Section 2 with a focus o the pr c pal-age t relation hip in a
perfec information setting (Subsection 2.3) a d wh the
agent owns rivate i f r ti on the sustain ble v l of
harvesting (Subsection 2.4). Sectio 3 concludes.
2. A Principal- gent Model in Ren wable
Natural Resource Man gem t
We consider a princ pal who delegates he managem nt of
a rene able natural re ource of stock s to an ag nt. The
princ pal and th agent have to agree pon a quantity to be
harvested q from the renewable natural esource l vels wned
by the princ pal. Stock s i considered as proxy f the
natural resource amenities, whic are all no -market goods
and services related to the existenc of this resource [8]. The
sustain ble h rve ting of r newable natural resources, such
tha the stock remains unchanged or ���� = 0 , means tha the
level of harvest matches with e l vel of the r source’s
natural growth. Unsustain ble harvesting can be envisaged in
two ways. When ���� > 0 , the scenario correspond to he
dam ges i sued from the r source over-stocking [3]. The
absenc of implem ntation of a managem nt plan is one
possible way to envisage such a contex . When ���� < 0 , the
scenario mplies the over-harvesting of the stock and the
depl tion of the r newabl natural resource. Finally, the
princ pal gives revenue share r to the gent for the renewable
natural resource mana em nt, harv ting included, such t a���� > 0.
The princ pal and the agent can have different preferenc s
on how to conduct he renewabl natural resou ce
managem nt. For instance, the agent could have stro ger
preferences for income from harvesting, while the princ pal
could have stronger p ferenc s for p eserving the resource’s
natural and environmental amenities.
In the knowledge tha the r ew bl natural resource
harvesting must not jeopardize its sustain bility, interval[�, �] defines the bou di g minimu and maximu levels of
harvesting. It is the s t of possible actions to be undertaken in
pur ose of t e su ain ble r source managem n . In detail,
there is a maximu level of harvesting beyond whic t e
resource is depl ted. As a result, the r sou c cannot be
renew d and o l nger p ovid s natural nd environmental
amenities. Th re is al o a minimu level of harvesting below
whic a enities start to vanish. This can be explain d by the
absenc of a man gem nt pl n. Therefore, q h s to lie
somewhere withi this interval. Th se assumptions implicitly
mean tha , in a specifi range of harvesting lev ls, re ources
and atural and environmental amenities ar complem tary.
If we assume th the princ pal has stronger preferenc s for
the stock onservation t an th agent, the objectives of the
parties should differ. The princ pal's harvesting objec ive will
tend to be a low level of harv st, henc runni g the risk of
ng below �. On the contrary, h agent will seek to harvest
beyond this level.1 The knowledge of the interval of the
sustainable lev ls of harvesting is cru ial. The k y issue of the
contract setting is the information gap s to this interval. W
will thus conside tha his interval can correspond either to
common k o ledge or t a private informa ion.
2.1 The Principal: The Ren wable Natural Resource
Owner
Le �� be the value function f a risk-neutral princ pal.
This value function is decr asing in revenue transfer r paid to
the agent. However, th eff ct of renew ble natural esou ce
stock s a d harvesting q n the valu fun i n is ambiguous,
since arvesting g nerat s r ven es but, at the same time,
reduces utility by dimin sh ng the l vels of nat ral nd
viron tal m niti s. While the princ pal is willing to
harvest less than the agent, th question is whet er 's
op i t el ��∗ lies or no within susta n bility
int val [�, �]. The princ pal's value function is defined by:�� = ��(� � , � , � ) (1)
where �� rep sents the princ pal's identity function such
tha :�� ≔ ��∗ > � �� ��' = ���(�,�,�)�� ≤ 0��∗ ≤ � ��' = ��� �,�,��� > 0 (2)
1 The opp site assumption yields symmetric esult with resp ct to
maximu level �.
 lies or not 
withi  sustainability i ter l 
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The prime considerati n of thi note is to understand how -
- when it comes to man ging ren w ble natural r sources -
the agent's privat in ati n ay come in c flict with
the objective of princ pal, be it a s condary topic tha has
b en neglected in th literature. thus m del the
contractual rela ionship be we a rincipal nd an ag nt as
egards t e r wable natural resource ma gement. In
situati i erf ct inf rmatio se ting, we find that th
Pareto- ptimal contracting dep nds on the proba ility hat the
l v l of rv sting stands outside the su tainability interval.
T is puts t Pa eto- ptimal a locations jeopardy. The
information rent held by th age t being unavoidabl ,
stepping outside the su tainability in erval implies the
po sibi ity of depletion of the r n wable natural resource.
T is po ential ecological overshoot, w ich o curs w e
human demand exc eds the reg n rative cap city of a atural
ecosy tem, puts he Earth on an unsu tainabl trajectory.
After this tar ing section, we describe the mod l in
Secti n 2, ith a ocus on the principal- gent relationship n
perf ct informa se ting (Subsection 2.3) and when the
agent owns private i for ati on the su tainable lev l of
harvesting (Subsection 2.4). Sect on 3 concludes.
2. Principal-agent odel in ene able
atural esource an ge ent
e consider a principal who delegates the man gement of
a ren wable natural resou ce of stock s to an gent. The
principal nd the agent have to agr e upon a quantity t be
harvest d q from the r wable natural r source l v ls owned
by the principal. Stock s is consid red as proxy f the
natural resource amenities, which are a l n -ma ket goods
and services related to the xistence of this resource [8]. The
su tainable harvesting of ren wable natural res urces, uch
that the stock remains unchanged or �� = 0 , mea s th t the
lev l of harvest matches with the lev l of the resource’s
natural growth. Unsu t inable h rvesting can b en isaged in
two ways. hen �� > 0 , the scenario co respo d to the
damages i sued from the resource over-stocking [3]. The
absence of implementation of a man g ment plan is ne
po sible way to envisage such a context. hen �� < 0 , the
scenario implies the over-harvesting of the stock and the
depletion of the ren wable natural resource. Fina ly, the
principal gives r v nue share to the ag nt for the n wable
natural resource man gement, harvesting includ , such t at�� > 0.
The principal nd the agent can have di ferent preferences
on how to conduct the ren w ble n tur l resource
man gement. For instance, the agen could have stronge
preferences for income from arvesting, while the principal
could have st ong r preferences for p es rving the r sourc ’s
natural nd environmental menities.
In the k owledge that the ren wabl natural resource
arvesting must not jeopardize i s u tainability, interval[�, ] d fines the bounding min um and maximum lev ls of
harvesting. It is the s t of po sible actions to be undertaken i
purpose of the su tainable resource man gement. In detail,
there is a maximum lev l of h rvesting beyond which th
r source is d pleted. As a result, he resource cannot be
ren ed and n longer provides natur l and environmental
amenities. Th r is also a minimum lev l of harvesting below
which a ities star to vanish. This can be exp ained by the
absence of a man g ment plan. Therefore, q has to lie
somewhere with n this nterval. These a sumptions implicitly
mean that, in a specific range of harv sting lev ls, resources
and natural nd e vironmental menities are compl mentary.
If we a sume that the principal has stronger pref rences for
the stock conservation than e ag nt, he objectives of the
arti s should fer. The principal's rvesting objective wi l
t nd to be a low lev l of harvest, nce running the risk of
b i belo �. On th contrary, the agent wi l s k to harvest
beyond this lev l.1 The knowledge of the interval of the
su tain le v ls of harvesting is crucial. The key i sue of the
contr ct se ting is the information gap as to this nterval. e
wi l thus consider that his nterval can co respond either to
com on know edge or to a private information.
2.1 The Principal: The Ren wable Natural Resource
wner
Let �� be the val e funct on of a risk-neutral principal.
This value function is decreasi g in rev nue transfer r paid to
the ag nt. Howev , the e f ct of ren wable natural resource
tock and harvesti g q n th value uncti n is ambiguo s,
si ce harvesting en rates r v ues but, at the same time,
reduces tility by diminishing the lev ls of natural and
environmen al amen ties. h le the principal is wi ling to
harvest le s th n the agent, the question is whet r principal's
optima harvest lev l ��∗ lies or not with n su tainability
i terval [�, ]. The principal's value function is defined by:�� = ��(� , �� � , � ) (1)
where �� � repres nts he principal's identity function such
that:�� � ��∗ > � ��' = ��( ,�, )� ≤ 0�∗ ≤ � � ��' = �� �,�,� > 0 (2)
1 The o posite a sumption yields symmetric results with respect to
maximu level �.
. he principal’s val e 
fu ction is defined by:
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The prime consideration of this not is to understand ho -
- when it comes to managin renewabl natu al resources --
the agent's private information may come i to conflict with
the objective of a principal, be it a seco ary topic that h s
been neglected in the literature. W thus model the
contractual relationship between a principal a d a ag nt as
regards the renewable natural resource management. In the
situation of an imperfect inf rmation setti g, we find that the
Pareto-optimal contracting depends on the probability th t t
level of harvesting stands outside the ustainabil ty int rv l.
This puts the Paret -optimal allocations in jeopar y. The
information rent held by the agent being n voi able,
stepping outside the su tainability nterval mplies the
possibility f d pl tion of the renewable atural es urce.
This potential ecol gical overshoot, ich o curs whe
human demand exc eds the regenerative capac y of a natural
ecosystem, puts the Earth on an unsustain ble tr ject ry.
After this starting s ti , we describe the m del i
Section 2, with a focus on the principal-agent r lationship in a
perfect information setti g (Subs ction 2.3) and when t
agent owns private information on the sust inabl level o
harvesting (Sub ection 2.4). Sectio 3 c ncludes.
2. l-agent od l in ewable
atural esource anage ent
e consider a principal who del g tes the manag ment f
a renewable natural resour e of stock s to a agent. Th
principal and the agent ha to agree upon a quantity to be
harvested q from the renewable natural resour e levels wned
by the principal. Stock s is consider d as a proxy of t
natural resource amenities, wh h a ll n n-market goods
and services related to the existenc of this resource [8]. The
sustainable harvesting of ren wable natural re our es, such
that the stock remains unchanged or ���� = 0 , m ans that the
level of harvest matches with the level of the r sourc ’s
natural growth. Unsustainable harvesting can be envisag d in
two ways. When ���� > 0 , the scenario corresponds to t
damages issued from th r source ov r-stocki g [3]. The
absence of implementation of a m nagement plan is o e
possible way to envisag such a context. When ���� < 0 , t
scenario implies the ov r-harvesting of the stock a d the
depletion of the renewable natural resourc . Fin lly, the
principal gives revenue sha e r to the agent for th renewable
natural resource management, harvesting included, such that���� > 0.
The principal and the agent can have different pref r ces
on how to conduct the renewable atur l resourc
management. For instance, the agent could have stronger
preferences for income from rvesti , whil th principal
could have stronger preferences for preservi g the r source’s
natural and environmental amenities.
In the knowledge that the renewable natural resource
harvesting must not jeopardize its sustainability, interval[�, �] efines the bou ding minimum a d maximum levels of
harvesting. It is the set of possible actions to be undertaken in
purpose of the sustainable resource anage ent. In detail,
there is a maximum level of harvesting beyond which the
resource is depleted. As a result, the resource cannot be
renewed and no longer provides natural nd environ ental
amenities. There is also a minimu l vel of har esting below
which amenities start to vanish. This can be explained by the
absence of a management plan. Therefore, q h s to li
somewhere within this interv l. These assumptions implicitly
mean that, in a specific r nge of harvesting lev s, r sou ces
and natur l and nvironmental ameniti s a e complem ntary.
If we assume that the pri cip l has stronger pr ferences for
the stock con ervation than the agent, the obj ctives of the
parties should differ. The principal's harvesting objective will
te d to be a low level of harvest, hence ru ning the risk of
eing below �. On the contrary, t e age t will eek to harv st
beyond this level.1 The knowl dge of the interval of the
sustainable levels of harvesting is crucial. The key issue of the
contr ct s tti g is the information gap as to this interval. We
will thus consid r that this interval can correspond eith r to
c mmo knowledge or to a private infor ation.
2.1 The Principal: The R ewable Natural Resource
Owner
Let �� be t value fun tion of a risk- eutral princ pal.
This valu functi n is decreasi g in revenue transfer r paid to
the age t. However, the effe t of renewable natural resource
stock s and harvesti g q on the alue function is ambiguous,
since harvesting generates r venues but, at the ame time,
reduces utility by diminishing the levels of natural and
environmental amenities. Whil the principal is willing t
harvest less than the agent, the question is whether principal's
op imal harvest level ��∗ li s or not within sustainability
interval [�, �]. Th ri c pal's value function is defined by:�� = ��(� � , �� � , � � ) (1)
where �� � represents the principal's identity function such
that:� ≔ ��∗ > � �����' = ���(�,�,�)�� ≤ 0��∗ ≤ � �����' = ��� �,�,��� > 0 (2)
1 The opposite assumption yields symmetric results with respect to
maximum level �.
 (1)
where Ip(q) represents the principal’s identity function 
such that:
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Th prime consid ration f this ote is to und rstand h w -
- hen it comes to managing ren wable n tural re ources --
th agent's private nformatio may come into c nflict with
the obj ctiv f a principal, be it a se ondary topic that has
been eglected in the literature. We thus model t
con ractual relationship between a principal and a agent as
regards the ren wable atural re ource ma ageme t. In the
situation of an imperfect information setting, we find that the
Pareto-o tim l contracting de ends on the pr bability that the
lev l of harvest ng s ands outsid the sustainability interval.
Th s puts the P eto-optimal allocatio s in jeopardy. The
informatio rent held by the ag nt being unavoidabl ,
steppi g outside the sustainability interval implies the
possibility of d p ti n of th r newable natural resour e.
This potential ecological vershoot, which occurs when
human d mand xceed he regen rative capacity of a natural
ec system, puts the Earth on an unsustainable trajectory.
After this starting section, we describe the m del i
Section 2, with a focus he pr nci l-agent relationship in a
perf ct information setti g (Subsection 2.3) and when th
agent owns private information on the sustainable level of
harvesting (Subsection 2.4). Section 3 concludes.
2. A Principal- gent Model in Renewable
Natur l Resource Management
W consider pri cip l wh del gate th manag ment of
a r newable atural resource of stock s t an agent. The
p incipal nd the agent have agre upon quantity t be
ha vest d q f om the r n wab e natu al resourc levels owned
by the princi al. S ck s i c sid red s a p oxy of t
n tural resou ce amenitie , which ar all non-ma k t goods
and serv ces related to the existence of this re ource [8]. The
sustai able harvesting of ren wable natur l resources, such
that the stock remains unchanged or ��� = 0 , means that the
l v l of harvest matches with the level of the re ource’
natural growth. Un ustainable harvesting can be envisaged in
two way . Whe ��� > 0 , the scenario corresponds to the
damag issued from t resource ov r- to king [3]. The
bse ce of im ementa ion of a management plan is o e
p s ible way to envisage such a context. When ��� < 0 , the
sc nario implies the over-harvesting of the stock and the
depletion of the renewable n tural resour e. Finally, the
principal giv s revenue s are r to the age t for the renewable
natural reso c ma agement, harves ing included, such that��� > 0.
Th pri cipal and th agent can have different preferenc s
on how to conduc the renewable natural resou ce
ma agement. For instance, the a nt could have stronger
pr feren s for income fro harvesting, whil the principal
could a e s rong r pref r nc s for preservi g the resource’s
n ral a nviro mental amenities.
In th k o ledge that th r newa le atural reso rce
r st mus not jeopardiz its sus ainabili y, interval[�, �] fi es the bou ding inimum and maximum levels of
ve t ng. It is th set of possible actions to be undertaken in
purpos of the sustainable reso rce manag ment. I d tail,
th r is max mum lev l of harvesting beyo which the
re urc is epl t d. As a result, th r sourc can ot be
new a d o ger provides atural and enviro mental
am it es. Th re is lso a minimum level of harvesti g bel w
i h am n ties st rt to v nish. Thi c n be xplained by the
absenc f manage e t plan. Theref re, q has to lie
somewh e within this i terv l. These assumptions implicitly
mean t, in a p ific range of rvestin lev ls, resources
a d n tural and environ tal amenities are complementary.
If we ssum that the pri cipal as stronger pref re ces for
the st ck conser ation t an the agent, the objectiv s of the
parties should diff r. The pri cipal's harvesting jective will
t nd to be a low l vel of harvest, hence running the risk of
being below �. On t e con rary, the agent will seek to harvest
b yo d this level.1 The knowledge of t e i terval f th
sustai able levels of harve ti g is crucial. Th key issue of the
contr c s ting is the infor ation gap as to this interval. We
will thus c nsider th t this interval can c rrespond either t
c mmon knowledge r to a private information.
2.1 The Principal: The newable Natural Resource
Owner
Let �� be t e value fun i n of a risk-neutral pri ipal.
This val e fu ction is dec ea ing in revenu transf r r paid to
th a nt. Howeve , t effe t of r wable natur l r so rce
stock and harv stin q on the val e fu ctio is mbiguous,
since harvesti g generat s rev ues but, at the same time,
reduces utility by dimi is ing t e levels of natural nd
nvironmental amen ties. Whi e t principal is willing t
harv t less tha the age , the question is w ether principal's
ptimal ha ve t level �∗ lies r not within sustainability
int val [�, �]. Th pr ncipal's value function is defined by:�� = ��(� � , �� � , � � ) (1)
w re �� � represe the principal's identity function such
that:�� � ≔ ��∗ > � �����' = ���(�,�,�)� ≤ 0��∗ ≤ � �����' = ��� �,�,��� > 0 (2)
1 The opposite assumption y elds ymmetric results with respect to
maximum level �.
 (2)
b The opposite assumption yields symmetric results with respect to 
maximum level 
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The prime consideration of this note is to understand how -
- when it comes to managing renewable natural resources --
the agent's private information may come into conflict with
the objective of a principal, be it a secondary topic that has
been neglected in the literature. We thus model the
contractual relationship between a principal and an agent as
regards the renewable natural resource management. In the
situation of an imperfect information setting, we find that the
Pareto-optimal contracting depends on the probability that the
level of harvesting stands outside the sustainability interval.
This puts the Pareto-optimal allocations in jeopardy. The
information rent held by the agent being unavoidable,
stepping outside the sustainability interval implies the
possibility of depletion of the renewable natural resource.
This potential ecological overshoot, which occurs when
human demand exceeds the regenerative capacity of a natural
ecosystem, puts the Earth on an unsustainable trajectory.
After this starting section, we describe the model in
Section 2, with a focus on the principal-agent relationship in a
perfect information setting (Subsection 2.3) and when the
agent owns private information on the sustainable level of
harvesting (Subsection 2.4). Section 3 concludes.
. A Principal-agent Model in Re ewable
Natural Resource Management
We consider a principal who delegates the management of
a renewable natural resource of stock s to an agent. The
principal and the agent have to agree upon a quantity to be
harvested q from the renewable natural resource levels owned
by the principal. Stock s is considered as a proxy of the
natural resource amenities, which are all non-market goods
and services related to the existence of this resource [8]. The
sustainable harvesting of renewable natural resources, such
that the stock remains unchanged or �� = 0 , means that the
level of harvest matches with the level of the resource’s
natural growth. Unsustainable harvesting can be envisaged in
two ways. When �� > 0 , the scenario corresponds to the
damages issued from the resource over-stocking [3]. The
absence of implementation of a management plan is one
possible way to envisage such a context. When �� < 0 , the
scenario implies the over-harvesting of the stock and the
depletion of the renewable natural resource. Finally, the
principal gives revenue share r to the agent for the renewable
natural resource management, harvesting included, such that�� > 0.
The principal and the agent can have different preferences
on how to conduct the renewable natural resource
management. For instance, the agent could have stronger
preferences for income from harvesting, while the principal
could have stronger preferences for preserving the resource’s
natural and environmental amenities.
In the knowledge that the renewable natural resource
harvesting must not jeopardize its sustainability, interval[�, �] defines the bounding minimum and maximum levels of
harvesting. It is the set of possible actions to be undertaken in
purpose of the sustainable resource management. In detail,
there is a maximum level of harvesting beyond which the
resource is depleted. As a result, the resource cannot be
renewed a d no longer provides natural and environmental
menities. There is also a minimum lev of harvesting below
which ame ties start to vanish. This can be explained by the
bsence of a management plan. T erefore, q has to lie
somewhere wi hin this int rval. These assumptions implicitly
mean th t, in a specific range of harvesting lev l , resources
and natural and environmental amenities are comple entary.
If e assu e that the principal has stronger preferences for
the stock conservation than the agent, the objectives of the
parties should differ. The principal's harvesting objective will
tend to be a low level of harvest, hence running the risk of
being below �. On th c ntr ry, the agent will seek to harvest
beyond this lev l.1 The knowledge of the interval of the
sustainable levels of harvesting is crucial. The key issue of the
contract setting is the information gap as to this interval. We
will thus consider that this interval can correspond either to
common k owledge or to a private information.
The Pr cipal: The Ren wable Natural Reso ce
Owner
Let �� be the value function of a risk-neutral principal.
This value function is decreasing in revenue transfer r paid to
the agent. However, the effect of renewable natural resource
stock s and harv sting q on the value function is ambiguous,
since harvesting generates revenues but, at the same time,
reduces utility by diminishing the levels of natural and
environm n al amenities. While the principal is willing to
harvest less than the agent, the question is whether principal's
optimal harvest level ��∗ li s or n t within sustai ability
interva [�, �]. Th principal's value function is defined by:�� = ��(� � , �� � , � � ) (1)
where �� � represents the principal's identity function such
that:�� � ≔ ��∗ > � �����' = ���(�,�,�)� ≤ 0∗ ≤ � �' � �,�,� > (2)
1 The opposite as ump ion yield symmetric results with respect to�.
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The prime consideration of this note is to understand how -
- when it comes to managing renewable natural resources --
the agent's private information may come into conflict with
the objective of a principal, be it a secondary topic that has
been neglected in the literature. We thus model the
contractual relationship between a principal and an agent as
regards the renewable natural resource management. In the
situation of an imperfect information setting, we find that the
Pareto-optimal contracting depends on the probability that the
level of harvesting stands outside the sustainability interval.
This puts the Pareto-optimal allocations in jeopardy. The
information rent held by the agent being unavoidable,
stepping outside the sustainability interval implies the
possibility of depletion of the renewable natural resource.
This potential ecological overshoot, which occurs when
human demand exceeds the regenerative capacity of a natural
ecosystem, puts the Earth on an unsustainable trajectory.
After this starting section, we describe the model in
Section 2, with a focus on the principal-agent relationship in a
perfect information setting (Subsection 2.3) and when the
agent owns private information on the sustainable level of
harvesting (Subsection 2.4). Section 3 concludes.
2. A Principal-agent Model in Renewable
Natural Resource Management
We consider a principal who delegates the management of
a renewable natural resource of stock s to an agent. The
principal and the agent have to agree upon a quantity to be
harvested q from the renewable natural resource levels owned
by the principal. Stock s is considered as a proxy of the
natural resource amenities, which are all non-market goods
and services related to the existence of this resource [8]. The
sustainable harvesting of renewable natural resources, such
that the stock remains unchanged or ���� = 0 , means that the
level of harvest matches with the level of the resource’s
natural growth. Unsustainable harvesting can be envisaged in
two ways. When ���� > 0 , the scenario corresponds to the
damages issued from the resource over-stocking [3]. The
absence of implementation of a management plan is one
possible way to envisage such a context. When ���� < 0 , the
scenario implies the over-harvesting of the stock and the
depletion of the renewable natural resource. Finally, the
principal gives revenue share r to the agent for the renewable
natural resource management, harvesting included, such that���� > 0.
The principal and the agent can have different preferences
on how to conduct the renewable natural resource
management. For instance, the agent could have stronger
preferences for income from harvesting, while the principal
could have stronger preferences for preserving the resource’s
natural and environmental amenities.
In the knowledge that the renewable natural resource
harvesting must not jeopardize its sustainability, interval[�, �] defines the bounding minimum and maximum levels of
harvesting. It is the set of possible actions to be undertaken in
purpose of the sustainable resource management. In detail,
there is a maximum level of harvesting beyond which the
resource is depleted. As a result, the resource cannot be
renewed and no longer provides natural and environmental
amenities. There is also a minimum level of harvesting below
which amenities start to vanish. This can be explained by the
absence of a management plan. Therefore, q has to lie
somewhere within this interval. These assumptions implicitly
mean that, in a specific range of harvesting levels, resources
and natural and environmental amenities are complementary.
If we assume that the principal has stronger preferences for
the stock conservation than the agent, the objectives of the
parties should differ. The principal's harvesting objective will
tend to be a low level of harvest, hence running the risk of
being below �. On the contrary, the agent will seek to harvest
beyond this level.1 The knowledge of the interval of the
sustainable levels of harvesting is crucial. The key issue of the
contract setting is the information gap as to this interval. We
will thus consider that this interval can correspond either to
common knowledge or to a private information.
2.1 The Principal: The Renewable Natural Resource
Owner
Let �� be the value function of a risk-neutral principal.
This value function is decreasing in revenue transfer r paid to
the agent. However, the effect of renewable natural resource
stock s and harvesting q on the value function is ambiguous,
since harvesting generates revenues but, at the same time,
reduces utility by diminishing the levels of natural and
environmental amenities. While the principal is willing to
harvest less than the agent, the question is whether principal's
optimal harvest level ��∗ lies or not within sustainability
interval [�, �]. The principal's value function is defined by:�� = ��(� � , �� � , � � ) (1)
where �� � represents the principal's identity function such
that:�� � ≔ ��∗ > � �����' = ���(�,�,�)�� ≤ 0��∗ ≤ � �����' = ��� �,�,��� > 0 (2)
1 The opposite assumption yields symmetric results with respect to
maximum level �.
 th  (optimal) harve t quantity that maximizes 
t  fu ction defined by Equation (1). In particular, 
Equation (2) states that 
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with ��∗ the (optimal) harvest quantity that maximizes the
function defined by Equation (1). In particular, Equation (2)
states that ���' > 0, which means that the principal's optimal
harvest level lies within t e sustainability interval, and does
not otherwise.
From the foregoing, it can be stated that:
● ���' ≡ ��� � � ,�� � ,� ��� ⋛ 0 , based on the principal's
preferences toward non-market goods and services;
● ���' ≡ ��� � � ,�� � ,� ��� < 0 , for the principal pays the
agent to execute the management plan;
● ���' ≡ ��� � � ,�� � ,� ��� ⋛ 0 , depending on principal's
identity function �� � .
Let us now analyze the conditions in which principal's
optimal harvest level ��∗ lies within sustainability interval[�, �].
Lemma 1 The condition for the principal's optimal harvest
level ��∗ to lie within [�, �] is���' =− ��� ����.
Proof See the Appendix.
Thereby, the optimal harvest level implies that the
marginal value from the renewable natural resource harvest
equals the marginal remuneration for the renewable natural
resource management.
2.2 The Agent: The Renewable Natural Resource
Manager
Let �� be the value function of a risk-neutral agent. We
have previously assumed that the agent in charge of the
renewable natural resource management is more willing to
harvest than the principal. We are interested in revealing
agent's optimal harvest level ��∗ within the sustainability
interval [�, �]. The agent is endowed with the following value
function:�� = ��(� � , � � , �(�)) (3)
where c expresses the harvesting costs and q depends on �,
following the simple functional form � = �+ �, where v can
be a positive or a negative deviation from this level of
harvesting.
The agent's value function increases in resource stock s,
harvest quantities q and in revenue transfer r, and decreases in
harvest costs c. Put another way:
● ���' ≡ ��� � � ,� � ,� ��� ⋛ 0, based on the agent's
preferences toward non-market goods and services;
● ���' ≡ ��� � � ,� � ,� ��� > 0, for the agent is paid by the
principal to execute the management plan;
● ���' ≡ ��� � � ,� � ,� ��� ≤ 0, which involves increasing
returns from the resource management.
Lemma 2 The condition for the agent's optimal harvest level��∗ to lie within [�, �] is−���' ���� = ��� ����.
Proof See the Appendix.
The optimal harvest level implies that the marginal
remuneration from the renewable natural resource
management equals the marginal loss from the embedded
management costs.
2.3 The Optimal Contract with Public Information
on the Sustainability Interval
We assume that both the principal and the agent have the
knowledge of sustainability interval [�, �]. The principal then
chooses a level of harvest such that he maximizes his utility,
subject to the agent's participation constraint (or individual
rationality (IR) constraint) and to minimum harvesting level �
issued from this sustainability interval:2����,� �� � � , �� � , � � (4)������� �� �� ��(� � , � � , �(�)) ≥ 0
The program means that the principal binds the agent to
his participation constraint, that is, he sets the revenue transfer
so that the harvest costs are covered and the agent is not in
deficit. Although the principal might want to harvest less than
the minimum sustainable level (��∗ < �) , he has to comply
with the sustainability constraint.
The Lagrangian can be written:� = �� � � , �� � , � � + ���[��(� � , � � , �(�))] (5)
The first-order conditions implicitly give harvest level �∗
and revenue transfer �∗:���� = ��� � � ,�� � ,� ��� + ��� ���(� � ,� � ,�(�))�� = 0 (6)���� = ��� � � ,�� � ,� ��� + ��� ���(� � ,� � ,�(�))�� = 0 (7)������ = 0 (8)
When an additional level of harvesting provides, for the
principal, an increasing marginal utility (���' > 0 ), while it
grants the agent with a diminishing marginal utility (���' < 0),
Equations (6) and (7) give:��� =− ���'���' ≠ 0 (9)
2 This is minimum sustainable harvesting � at stake, for the principal is
willing to harvest less while the agent struggles to reach this level of
harvesting.
 hich means t at 
th  principal's o timal harvest level lies within the 
sustainability interval, and does not otherwise.
From the foregoing, it can be stated that:
● 
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e (optimal) arvest quantity ha maximizes the
function defi e by Equation (1). In particular, Equation (2)
states that ���' > 0, whic means that the principal's op im l
harvest level lies within the sustainability int rval, a d does
not otherwise.
Fro the foregoing, it can b stated that:���' ≡ ��� � � ,�� � ,� ��� ⋛ 0 , based on the principal's
preferences toward non-market goods and services;
● ���' ≡ ��� � � ,�� � ,� ��� < 0 , for the principal pays the
agent to execute the management plan;
● ���' ≡ ��� � � ,�� � ,� ��� ⋛ 0 , depending on principal's
identity function �� � .
Let us now analyze the conditions in which principal's
optimal harvest level ��∗ lies within sustainability interval[�, �].
Lemma 1 The condition for the principal's optimal harvest
level ��∗ to lie within [�, �] is���' =− ��� ����.
Proof See the Appendix.
Thereby, the optimal harvest level implies that the
marginal value from the renewable natural resource harvest
equals the marginal remuneration for the renewable natural
resource management.
2.2 The Agent: The Renewable Natural Resource
Manager
Let �� be the value function of a risk-neutral agent. We
have previously assumed that the agent in charge of the
renewable natural resource management is more willing to
harvest than the principal. We are int rest d in revealing
agent's optimal harvest level ��∗ withi the sustainab lity
interval [�, �]. The agent is endowed with the following value
function:�� = ��(� � , � � , �(�)) (3)
where c expresses the harvesting costs a d q depends on �,
following the simple functi nal form � = �+ �, where v can
be a positive or a negative deviation from this level of
harvesting.
The agent's value function increases in resource stock s,
harvest quantities q and in revenue transfer r, and decreases in
harvest costs c. Put another way:
● ���' ≡ ��� � � ,� � ,� ��� ⋛ 0, based on the agent's
preferences toward non-market goods and services;
● ���' ≡ ��� � � ,� � ,� ��� > 0, for the agent is paid by the
principal to execute the management plan;
● ���' ≡ ��� � � ,� � ,� ��� ≤ 0, which involves increasing
returns from the reso rce manag ment.
Lemma 2 The condition for t agent's optimal harvest level��∗ to lie within [�, �] is−���' ���� = ��� ����.
Proof See the Appendix.
The optimal harvest level implies that the marginal
remuneration fro the renewable natural resource
management equals the arginal loss from the embedded
management costs.
2.3 The Optimal Contract with Public Information
on the Sustainability Interval
We assume that both the principal and the agent have the
knowledge of sustainability interval [�, �]. The principal then
chooses a level of harvest such that he maximizes his utility,
subject to the agent's participation constraint (or individual
rationality (IR) constraint) and to minimum harvesting level �
issued from this sustainability interval:2����,� �� � � , �� � , � � (4)������� �� �� ��(� � , � � , �(�)) ≥ 0
The program means that the principal binds the agent to
his participation constraint, that is, he sets the revenue transfer
so that the harvest costs are covered and the agent is not in
deficit. Although the principal might want to harvest less than
the minimum sustainable level (��∗ < �) , he has to comply
with the sustainability constraint.
The Lagrangian can be written:� = �� � � , �� � , � � + ���[��(� � , � � , �(�))] (5)
The first-order conditions implicitly give harvest level �∗
and revenue transfer �∗:���� = ��� � � ,�� � ,��� + ��� ���(� � ,� � ,�(�))�� = 0 (6)���� = ��� � � ,�� � ,��� + ��� ���(� � ,� � ,�(�))�� = 0 (7)������ = 0 (8)
When an additional level of harvesting provides, for the
principal, an increasing mar inal u ility (���' > 0 ), while it
grants the agent with diminishi g marginal utility (���' < 0),
Equations (6) and (7) give:��� =− ���'���' ≠ 0 (9)
2 This is minimum sustainable harvesting � at stake, for the principal is
willing to harvest less while the agent struggles to reach this level of
harvesting.
, ase   t e pri ci al's 
s toward non-market goods and services;
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with ��∗ the (optimal) arvest quantity that maximizes the
function defined by Equation (1). In particular, Equation (2)
states that ���' > 0, which means that the principal's optimal
harvest level lies within the sustainability interval, and does
not otherwise.
From the foregoing, it can be stated that:
● ��' ≡ ��� � � ,�� � ,� ��� ⋛ 0 , based on the principal's
preferences toward non-market goods and services;
● ���' ≡ ��� � � ,�� � ,� ��� < 0 , for the principal pays the
agent execute the anag ment plan;
● ���' ≡ ��� � � ,�� � ,� ��� ⋛ 0 , depending on principal's
identity function �� � .
Let us now analyze the conditions in which principal's
optimal harvest level ��∗ lies within sustainability interval[�, �].
Le a 1 The condition for the principal's optimal harvest
level ��∗ to lie within [�, �] is���' =− ��� ����.
Proof See the Appendix.
Thereby, the optimal harvest level implies that the
marginal value from the renewable natural resource harvest
equals the marginal remuneration for the renewable natural
resource management.
2.2 The gent: The ene able atural esource
anager
Let �� be the value functi n of risk-neu r l ag nt. e
have previously assumed that the ag nt in ch rge of the
renewable natural resource manag ment s more willing to
harvest than the principal. e are int rest d in revealing
agent's optimal harvest level ��∗ within the sustainability
interval [�, �]. The agen is endowed with the following value
function:�� = ��(� � , � � , �(�)) (3)
where c expresses the harvesting costs and q depends on �,
following the simple functi nal form � = �+ �, where v can
be a positive or a negative deviation from this level of
harvesting.
The agent's value function increases in resource stock s,
harvest quantities q and in revenue transfer r, and decreases in
harvest costs c. Put another way:
● ���' ≡ ��� � � ,� � ,� ��� ⋛ 0, based on the agent's
preferences toward non-market goods and services;
● ���' ≡ ��� � � ,� � ,� ��� > 0, for the agent is paid by the
principal to execute the management plan;
● ���' ≡ ��� � � ,� � ,� ��� ≤ 0, which involves increasing
returns from the resource management.
Le a 2 The condition for the agent's optimal harvest level��∗ to lie within [�, �] is−���' ���� = ��� ����.
Proof See the Appendix.
The optimal harvest level implies that the marginal
remuneration from the renewable natural resource
management equals the marginal loss from the embedded
management costs.
2.3 The pti al ontract ith Public Infor ation
on the Sustainability Interval
e assume that both the principal and the agent have the
knowledge of sustainability interval [�, �]. The principal then
chooses a level of harvest such that he maximizes his utility,
subject to the agent's participation constraint (or individual
rationality (IR) constraint) and to minimum harvesting level �
issued from this sustainability interval:2���,� �� � � , �� � , � � (4)������� �� �� ��(� � , � � , �(�)) ≥ 0
The program means that the principal binds the agent to
his participation constraint, that is, he sets the revenue transfer
so that the harvest costs are covered and the agent is not in
deficit. Although t pri cipal might w nt to harvest less than
the minimum sustainable level (��∗ < �) , he has to comply
with the sustainability constraint.
The Lagrangian can be written:� = �� � � , �� � , � � + ���[��(� � , � � , �(�))] (5)
The first-order conditions implicitly give harvest level �∗
and revenue transfer �∗:���� = ��� � � ,�� � ,� ��� + ��� ���(� � ,� � ,�(�))� = 0 (6)���� = ��� � � ,�� � ,� ��� + ��� ���(� � ,� � ,�(�))�� = 0 (7)������ = 0 (8)
hen an additional level of harvesting provides, for the
principal, an increasing marginal utility (���' > 0 ), while it
grants the agent with a diminishing marginal utility (���' < 0),
Equations (6) and (7) give:��� =− ���'���' ≠ 0 (9)
2 This is minimum sustainable harvesting � at stake, for the principal is
willing to harvest less while the agent struggles to reach this level of
harvesting.
, f r t  ri i l s t e 
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with ��∗ the (optimal) harvest quantity that maximizes the
function defined by Equation (1). In particular, Equation (2)
states that ���' > 0, which means that the principal's optimal
harvest level lies within the sustainability interval, and does
not otherwise.
From the foregoing, it can be stated that:
● ��' ≡ � ,�� � ,� ��� ⋛ 0 , based on the principal's
preferences toward non-market goods and services;
● ���' ≡ ��� � � ,�� � ,� ��� < 0 , for the principal pays the
agent to execute the management plan;���' ≡ ��� � � ,�� � ,� ��� ⋛ 0 , depending on principal's
identity function �� � .
Let us now analyze the conditions in wh ch principal'
optimal harvest level �∗ lies within sustainability interval[�, �].
Lemma 1 The condition for the principal's optimal harvest
level ��∗ to lie within [�, �] is���' =− ��� ����.
Proof See the Appendix.
Thereby, the optimal harvest level implies that the
marginal value from the renewable natural resource harvest
equals the marginal remuneration for the renewable natural
resource management.
2.2 The Agent: The Renewable Natural Resource
Manager
Let �� be the value function of a risk-neutral agent. We
have previously assumed that the agent in charge of the
renewable natural resource management is more willing to
harvest than the principal. We are interested in revealing
agent's optimal harvest level ��∗ within the sustainability
interval [�, �]. The agent is endowed with the following value
function:�� = ��(� � , � � , �(�)) (3)
where c expresses the harvesting costs and q depends on �,
following the simple functional form � = �+ �, where v can
be a positive or a negative deviation from this level of
harvesting.
The agent's value function increases in resource stock s,
harvest quantities q and in revenue transfer r, and decreases in
harvest costs c. Put another way:
● ���' ≡ ��� � � ,� � ,� ��� ⋛ 0, based on the agent's
preferences toward non-market goods and services;
● ���' ≡ ��� � � ,� � ,� ��� > 0, for the agent is paid by the
principal to execute the management plan;
● ���' ≡ ��� � � ,� � , ��� ≤ 0, which involves increasing
returns from the resource management.
Lemma 2 The condition for the agent's optimal harvest level��∗ to lie within [�, �] is−���' ���� = ��� ����.
Proof See the Appendix.
The optimal harvest level implies that the marginal
remuneration from the renewable natural resource
management equals the marginal loss from the embedded
management costs.
2.3 The Optimal Contract with Public Information
on the Sustainability Interval
We assume that both th principal nd the agent have the
knowledge of sustainability interval [�, �]. The principal then
chooses a level of harvest such that he maximizes his utility,
subject to the agent's participation cons rai t ( r individual
rationality (IR) constraint) and to minimum harvesting level �
issued from this sustainability interval:2����,� �� � � , � � , � � (4)������� �� �� ��(� � , � � , �(�)) ≥ 0
The program means that the pri cipal binds the agent to
his participation constraint, that is, he sets the revenue transfer
so that the harvest costs are covered and the agent is not in
deficit. Although the principal might want to harvest less than
the minimum susta nabl level (��∗ < �) , he has to comply
with the sustainability constraint.
The Lagrangian can be written:� = �� � � , �� � , � � + ���[��(� � , � � , �(�))] (5)
The first-order conditions implicitly give harvest level �∗
and revenue transfer �∗:���� = ��� � � ,�� � ,� ��� + ��� ���(� � ,� � ,�(�))�� = 0 (6)���� = ��� � � ,�� � ,� ��� + ��� ���(� � ,� � ,�(�))�� = 0 (7)������ = 0 (8)
When a additional level of harvesting provides, for the
principal, an increasing marginal utility (���' > 0 ), while it
grants the agent with a diminishing marginal utility (���' < 0),
Equations (6) and (7) give:��� =− ���'���' ≠ 0 (9)
2 This is minimum sustainable harvesting � at stake, for the principal is
willing to harvest less while the agent struggles to reach this level of
harvesting.
, dependi   pri i l's 
identity function 
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with �∗ the (optimal) harvest quantity that maximizes the
function defined by Equation (1). In particular, Equation (2)
states that �' > 0, which means that the principal's optimal
harvest level lies within the sustainability interval, and does
not otherwise.
From the foregoing, it can be stated that:
● �' ≡ � � � � ,�� � ,� ��� ⋛ 0 , based on the principal's
preferences toward non-market g ods and services;
● �' ≡ � � � � ,�� � ,� ��� < 0 , for the principal pays the
agent to execute the management plan;
● �' ≡ � � � � ,�� � ,� ��� ⋛ 0 , depending on principal's
identity functi � � .
Let us now analyze the conditions in which principal's
optimal harvest level �∗ lies within sustainability interval[�, �].
Lemma 1 The condition f r the principal's optimal harvest
level �∗ to lie within [�, �] is �' =− ����.
Pr of See the A pendix.
Thereby, the optimal harvest level implies that the
marginal value from the renewable natural resource harvest
equals the marginal remuneration for the renewable natural
resource management.
2.2 The Agent: The Renewable Natural Resource
Manager
Let � be the value function of a risk-neutral agent. We
have previously assumed that the agent in charge of the
renewable natural resource management is more willing to
harvest than the principal. We are interested in revealing
agent's optimal harvest level �∗ within the sustainability
interval [�, �]. The agent is endowed with the following value
function:
� = �(� � , � � , �(�)) (3)
where c expresses the harvesting costs and q depends on �,
following the simple functional form � = �+ �, where v can
be a positive or a negative deviation from this level of
harvesting.
The agent's value function increases in resource stock s,
harvest quantities q and in revenue transfer r, and decreases in
harvest costs c. Put another way:
● �' ≡ � � � � ,� � ,� ��� ⋛ 0, based on the agent's
preferences toward non-market g ods and services;
● �' ≡ � � � � ,� � ,� ��� > 0, for the agent is paid by the
principal to execute the management plan;
● �' ≡ � � � � ,� � ,� ��� ≤ 0, which involves increasing
returns from the resource management.
Lemma 2 The condition for the agent's optimal harvest level�∗ to lie within [�, �] is− ' ���� = ����.
Pr of See the A pendix.
The optimal harvest level implies that the marginal
remuneration from the renewable natural resource
management equals the marginal loss from the embe ded
management costs.
2.3 The Optimal Contract with Public Information
on the Sustainability Interval
We assume that both the principal and the agent have the
knowl dge of sustainability interval [�, �]. The principal then
ch oses a level of harvest such that he max mizes his u ility,
subject to the agent's participation co straint (or individual
rationality (IR) constraint) and to minimum harvesting level �
issued from this sustainability interval:2� �,� � � � , �� , (4)� � �� �� �� �(� � , � � , �(�)) ≥ 0
The program means that the principal binds the agent to
his participation constraint, that is, he sets the revenue transfer
so that the harvest costs are covered and the agent is not in
deficit. Although the principal might want to harvest less than
the minimum sustainable level ( �∗ < �) , he has to comply
with the sustainability constraint.
The Lagrangian can be written:� = � � � , � � , � � + ��[ �(� � , � � , �(�))] (5)
The first-order conditions implicitly give harvest level �∗
and revenue transfer �∗:���� = � � � � ,�� � ,� ��� + �� � �(� � ,� � ,�(�))�� = 0 (6)���� = � � � � ,�� � ,� ��� + �� � �(� � ,� � ,�(�))�� = 0 (7)��� �� = 0 (8)
When an a ditional level of harvesting provides, for the
principal, an increasing marginal utility ( �' > 0 ), while it
grants the agent with a diminishing marginal utility ( �' < 0),
Equations (6) and (7) give:
�� =− ��'��' ≠ 0 (9)
2 This is minimum sustainable harvesting � at stake, for the principal is
willing to harvest less while the agent struggles to reach this level of
harvesting.
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The prime consideration of this note is to understand how -
- when it comes to managing ren wable natural resources --
the agent's private information may come into conflict with
the obj ctive of a principal, be it a seco dary topic that has
been eglected in t literature. We thus model the
contractual relationship between a principal and an agent as
regards the renewable natural resource management. In the
situation of an imperfect information setting, we find that the
Pareto-optimal contracting depends on the probability that the
level of harvesting stands outside the sustainability interval.
This puts the Pareto-optimal allocations in jeopardy. The
information rent held by the agent being unavoidable,
stepping outside the sustainability interval implies the
possibility of depletion of the renewable natural resource.
This potential ecological overshoot, which occurs when
human demand exceeds the regenerative capacity of a natural
ecosystem, puts the Earth on an unsustainable trajectory.
After this starting section, we describe the model in
Section 2, with a focus on the principal-agent relationship in a
perfect information setting (Subsection 2.3) and when the
agent owns private information on the sustainable level of
harvesting (Subsection 2.4). Section 3 concludes.
2. A Principal-agent Model in Renewab e
Natur l Resource Management
We consider a principal who delegates the management of
a renewable natural resource of stock s to an agent. The
principal and the agent have to agree upon a quantity to be
harvested q from the renewable natural resource levels owned
by the principal. Stock s is considered as a proxy of the
natural resource amenities, which are all non-market goods
and services related to the existence of this resource [8]. The
sustainable harvesting of renewable natural resources, such
that the stock remains unchanged or ���� = 0 , means that the
level of harvest matches with the level of the resource’s
natural growth. Unsustainable harvesting can be envisaged in
two ways. When ���� > 0 , the scenario corresponds to the
damages issued from the resource over-stocking [3]. The
absence of implementation of a management plan is one
possible way to envisage such a context. When ���� < 0 , the
scenario implies the over-harvesting of the stock and the
depletion of the renewable natural resource. Finally, the
principal gives revenue share r to the agent for the renewable
natural resource management, harvesting included, such that���� > 0.
The principal and the agent can have different preferences
on how to conduct the renewable natural resource
management. For instance, the agent could have stronger
preferences for income from harvesting, while the principal
could have stronger preferences for preserving the resource’s
natural and environmental amenities.
In the knowledge that the renewable natural resource
harvesting must not jeopardize its sustainability, interval[�, �] defines the bounding minimum and maximum levels of
harvesting. It is the set of possible actions to be undertaken in
purpose of the sustainable resource management. In detail,
there is a maximum level of harvesting beyond which the
resource is depleted. As a result, the resource cannot be
renewed and no longer provides natural and environmental
amenities. There is also a minimum level of harvesting below
which amenities start to vanish. This can be explained by the
absence of a management plan. Therefore, q has to lie
somewhere within this interval. These assumptions implicitly
mean that, in a specific range of harvesting levels, resources
and natural and environmental amenities are complementary.
If we assume that the principal has stronger preferences for
the stock conservation than the agent, the objectives of the
parties should differ. The principal's harvesting objective will
tend to be a low level of harvest, h nce run ing the ri k of
being below �. On the contrary, the agent will seek to harvest
beyond this level.1 The knowledge of the interval of the
sustainable levels f harvesting is crucial. The key issue of the
co tract setting is the information gap as to this interv l. We
will hus consider that t s interval can correspond either to
common knowl dge or to a private i formation.
2.1 The Principal: The Renewable Natural Resource
Owner
L t �� be the value function f a risk-neutral principal.
This value function is decreasing in revenue transfer r paid to
the agent. However, the effect of renewable natural resource
stock s and harvesting q on th value function is ambiguous,
since harvesting generates revenues but, at the same time,
reduces utility by iminishi g the levels of natural and
environmental amenities. While the principal is willing to
harvest les than the gent, the question is whet er rincipal's
ti al rvest l vel �∗ lies or not within sustainability
interval [�, �]. The principal's valu function is defin d by:�� = ��(� � , �� � , � � ) (1)
wh re �� � represents the principal's identity function such
that:�� � ≔ ��∗ > � �����' = ���(�,�,�)�� ≤ 0��∗ ≤ � �����' = ��� �,�,��� > 0 (2)
1 The opposite assumption yields symmetric results with respect to
maximum level �.
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The prime consideration of this note is to understand how -
- when it comes to managing renewable natural resources --
the agent's private information may come into conflict with
the objective of a principal, be it a secondary topic that has
been neglected in the literature. We thus model the
contractual relationship between a principal and an agent as
regards the renewable natural resource management. In the
situation of an imperfect information setting, we find that the
Pareto-optimal contracting depends on the probability that the
level of harvesting stands outside the sustainability interval.
This puts the Pareto-optimal allocations in jeopardy. The
information rent held by the agent being unavoidable,
stepping outside the sustainability interval implies the
possibility of depletion of the renewable natural resource.
This potential ecological overshoot, which occurs when
human demand exceeds the regenerative capacity of a natural
ecosystem, puts the Earth on an unsustainable trajectory.
After this starting section, we describe the model in
Section 2, with a focus on the principal-agent relationship in a
perfect information setting (Subsection 2.3) and when the
agent owns private information on the sustainable level of
harvesting (Subsection 2.4). Section 3 concludes.
2. A Principal-agent Model in Renewable
Natural Resource Management
We consider a principal who delegates the management of
a renewable natural resource of stock s to an agent. The
principal and the agent have to agree upon a quantity to be
harvested q from the renewable natural resource levels owned
by the principal. Stock s is considered as a proxy of the
natural resource amenities, which are all non-market goods
and services related to the existence of this resource [8]. The
sustainable harvesting of renewable natural resources, such
that the stock remains unchanged or ���� = 0 , means that the
level of harvest matches with the level of the resource’s
natural growth. Unsustainable harvesting can be envisaged in
two ways. When ���� > 0 , the scenario corresponds to the
damages issued from the resource over-stocking [3]. The
absence of implementation of a management plan is one
possible way to envisage such a context. When ���� < 0 , the
scenario implies the over-harvesting of the stock and the
depletion of the renewable natural resource. Finally, the
principal gives revenue share r to the agent for the renewable
natural resource management, harvesting included, such that���� > 0.
The principal and the agent can have different preferences
on how to conduct the renewable natural resource
management. For instance, the agent could have stronger
pref rences for income from harv ting, while the principal
could have s ronger preferences f r preserving the resource’s
natu al and environmental ame ities.
In h k ledge that the r newable natural resource
harvesting mu t not jeopardize its s stainability, i t rval[�, �] defines the bou d ng minimum and maximum levels of
harvesting. It is the s t of possible act ons to be undertaken in
purpose f th su tainabl resource management. In detail,
ere is a maximum level of harvesting beyond which the
resource is depleted. As a result, the resource cannot b
renewed and no l nger provides natural nd nvironmental
amenities. There is also a minimum level of harvesting below
which amenities start to vanish. This can be explained by the
absence of a management plan. Therefore, q has to lie
somewhere within this interval. These assumptions implicitly
mean that, in a specific range of harvesting levels, resources
and natural and environmental amenities are comp em ary.
If we assume that th principal as stronger preferences for
the stock conse vation than the nt, the objectives of the
p rti should differ. The princ pal's sting objecti w ll
tend to be a low level of harvest, hence running the risk of
being below �. On the contrary, th agent will seek to harvest
beyond this level.1 The knowledge of the interval of the
sustainable levels of harvesting is crucial. The key issue of the
contract setting is the information gap as to this interval. We
will t us consider that this interval can correspond either to
c mmo knowledge or to a private information.
2.1 The Principal: The Renewable Natural Resource
Own r
L t �� be the v lue function of a risk-neutral p incipal.
This value function is decreasing in revenue transfer r paid to
the agent. However, the effect of renewable natural resource
stock s and harvesti g q on the value function is ambiguous,
since harvesting generates revenues but, at the same time,
reduces utility by diminishing the levels of natural and
environmental am nities. Whil the ri cipal is willing to
harvest less than the agent, the question is whether principal's
optimal harvest level ��∗ lies or not within sustainability
interval [�, �]. The principal's value function is defined by:�� = ��(� � , �� � , � � ) (1)
where �� � repr se ts th principal' identity function such
that:�� � ≔ ��∗ > � �����' = ���(�,�,�)�� ≤ 0��∗ ≤ � �����' = ��� �,�,��� > 0 (2)
1 The opposite assumption yields symmetric results with respect to
maximum level �.
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The prime consideration of this note is to understand how -
- hen it comes t naging renewable natural resources --
the agent's private information may come into conflict with
the objective of a principal, be it a secondary topic that has
been neglected in the literature. We thus model the
contractual relationship between a principal and an agent as
regards the renewable natural resource management. In the
situation of an imperfect information setting, we find that the
Pareto-optimal contracting depends on the probability that the
level of harvesting stands outside the sustainability interval.
This puts the Pareto-optimal allocations in jeopardy. The
information rent held by the agent being unavoidable,
stepping outside the sustainability interval implies the
possibility of depletion of the renewable natural resource.
This potential ecological overshoot, which occurs when
human demand exceeds the regenerative capacity of a natural
ecosystem, puts t e Earth on an unsustainable trajectory.
After this starting section, we describe the model in
Section 2, with a focus on the principal-agent relationship in a
perfect information setting (Subsection 2.3) and when the
agent owns private information on the sustainable level of
harvesting (Subsection 2.4). Section 3 concludes.
2. A Principal-agent Model in Renewable
Natural Resource Management
We consid r a principal who d legat s the managem nt of
a renewa le natural resource of tock s to an agent. The
principal and the agent have to agree upon quantity to be
harvested q from th renewable natural resource levels owned
by the principal. Stock s is consid r d s a proxy of the
natural resource ameniti s, which are all n n-market goods
and services related to the existence of this resource [8]. The
sustainable harvesting of renewable natural resources, such
that the stock remains unchanged or ���� = 0 , means that the
level of harvest matches with the level of the resource’s
natural growth. Unsustainable harv sting c n be envisaged i
two ways. When ���� > 0 , the scenario corresponds to th
damages issued from the resource over-stocking [3]. The
absence of implementation of a management plan is one
possible way to envisage such a context. When ���� < 0 , the
scenario implies the over-harvesting of th stock and the
depletion of the renewable natural resource. Finally, the
principal gives revenue shar r to the ag nt for the renewab e
natural resource ma agement, harvesting included, such that���� > 0.
The principal and the agent can have different preferences
on how to conduct the renewable natural resource
management. For instance, the agent could have stronger
preferences for income from harvesting, while th principal
could have stronger preferences for preserving the resource’s
natural and environmental amenities.
In the knowledge that the renewa l natural reso rce
harvesting mu t not j opardize its sustainability, int rval[�, �] defin s the bounding minimum and maximum l vels of
arvesting. It is the set of possible a tion t be undertaken in
purpose of th sustainable resou ce management. In detail,
there is a aximum level of harvesting beyond which the
resource is depleted. As a result, the resource cannot be
renewed and no longer provides natural and environmental
amenities. There is also a minimum level of harvesting below
which amenities start to vanish. This can be explained by the
absence of a management plan. Therefore, q has to lie
somewhere within this interval. These assumptions implicitly
mean that, in a specific range of harvesting levels, resources
and natural and environmental amenities are complementary.
If we assume that the principal has stronger preferences f r
the stock conservation than the agent, the objectives of the
parties should differ. The principal's harvesting bjective will
tend to be a low level of harvest, he ce running the risk of
being below �. On th contrar , the ge t will seek to arvest
beyond this level.1 The knowledge of the interval of the
sustainable level of harvesting is crucial. The key issue of the
contract setting is the information gap as to this interval. We
will thus consider that this interval correspond either to
common knowledge or to a private information.
2.1 The Principal: The Re ewable Natural Resource
Owner
Let �� be the value function f a risk-n utral pri cip l.
This value function is decreasing in revenue transfer r paid to
the agent. However, the effect of renewable natural resource
stock s and harvesting q on the value function is ambiguous,
since harvesting generates revenues but, at the same time,
reduces utility by diminishing the levels of natural and
e vironmental amenities. While the principal is willing to
harvest less than the agent, the question is hether principal's
optimal har est leve ��∗ l es or not within sustainabili y
interval [�, �]. Th principal's value function is defined by:�� = ��(� � , �� � , � � ) (1)
where �� represents the princi al's identity functio uch
that:�� � ≔ ��∗ > � �����' = ���(�,�,�)�� ≤ 0��∗ ≤ � �����' = ��� �,�,��� > 0 (2)
1 The opposite assumption yields symmetric results with respect to
maximum lev l �.
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The prime consideration f this note is to understand ow -
- when it comes to managing renewable natural resourc s --
the agent's private information may come into conflict with
the objective of a pri cipal, be it a secondary topic that has
been neglected in the lit ratur . We us model th
contra tual relationship between a rincipal and an age t s
regards the renewable natural resource management. In th
situation of an imperfect information etting, we find that the
Pareto-optimal contracting depends on th rob bility that t
level of harvesting stands outside the su tainability interval.
This puts the Pareto-optimal allocati ns in jeopardy. The
information rent held by the agent b ing unavoidable,
st pping outside the sustainability interval implies the
possibility of depletion f the renew ble natural resour e.
This potential ecological overshoot, which occurs wh n
human demand exceeds the regenerati e cap c ty of a natural
ecosystem, puts the Earth on an unsustainable trajectory.
After this starting section, we describe the model n
Section 2, with a focus on the principal-agent relationship in a
p rfect information setting (Subsection 2.3) and when the
agent owns private information on the sus a nable evel of
harvesting (Subsection 2.4). Section 3 conclud s.
2. A Principal-agent Model in Ren wabl
Natural Resource Management
We consider a principal who delegates the management of
a renewable natural resource of stock s to an agent. The
principal and the agent have to agree upon a quantity to be
harvested q from the renewable natural resource lev ls owned
by the principal. Stock s is considered as a proxy of the
natural resource amenities, which are all non-market goods
and services related to the existence of this r ource [8]. The
sustainable harvesting of renewable natural resources, such
that the stock remains uncha ged or ���� = 0 , m ans hat the
level of harvest matches with the level of the resource’s
natural growth. Unsustainable harvesting can be nvisag d in
two ways. When ���� > 0 , the scenario corresponds to the
damages issued from the resource over-stocking [3]. The
absence of implementation of a management plan is one
possible way to envis ge such a context. When ���� < 0 , the
scenario implies the over-harvesting of the stock and the
depletion of the renewable natural resource. Finally, the
principal gives revenue share r to the agent for the renewable
natural resource management, harvesting included, such that���� > 0.
The principal and the agent can have different preferences
on how to conduct the renewable natural resource
management. For instance, the agent could have stronger
prefere ces for income from harvesting, whil the principa
could ave ronger prefer nces for preserving the resource’s
natural and environmental amenities.
In the knowledge that the renewable natural resource
harvesting must not jeopardize its sustainability, interval[ , �] defi es the bounding minimum and maxi um levels of
harvesting. It is t e set of possible actions to be undertaken in
purpose of the sustainable resource management. In detail,
there is a m ximum l vel of harvesting beyond which the
res urce is depleted. As a esult, the resource cannot be
renewed and no longer provides natural and environmental
amenities. There is also a minimum level of harvesting below
which amenities start to vanish. This can be explained by the
absence of a management plan. Therefore, q has to lie
somewhere within this i terval. These assumptions implicitly
mean that, in a specific range of harvesting levels, resources
d natural and environmental amenities are complementary.
If we assum that th principal has stronger preferences for
the stock conservation than he agent, t objectiv s of the
parties should di fer. The principal's harv sti g objectiv will
tend to be a low level of harvest, hence running the risk of
being below �. On the contrary, the agent will seek to harvest
beyond this level.1 The knowledge of the interval of the
sustainable levels of harvesti g is crucial. The key issue of the
contract setting is the inform tion gap as to this interval. We
will thus consider that this interval can correspond either to
common knowledge or to a private information.
2.1 The P incipal: The Re ewable Natur l Resource
Owner
Let �� be the value function of a risk-neutral principal.
This value function is decreasing in revenue transfer r paid to
the agent. However, the effect of renewable natural resource
stock s and harvesting q on the value function is ambiguous,
since harvesting generates revenues but, at the same t me,
reduces utility by diminishing the levels of natural and
environmental amenities. While the p incipal is willing to
harvest less than the agent, the question is whether principal's
optimal harvest level ��∗ lies or not within sustainability
interval [�, �]. The principal's value function is defined by:�� = ��(� � , �� � , � � ) (1)
where �� � represents the principal's identity function such
that:�� � ≔ ��∗ > � �����' = ���(�,�,�)�� ≤ 0��∗ ≤ � �����' = ��� �,�,��� > 0 (2)
1 The opposite assumption yields symmetric results with respect to
maximum level �.
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wit ��∗ th (optimal) h rvest quantity that maximizes the
function defined by Equation (1). In particular, Equation (2)
stat s that ���' > 0, w ich means that the principal's optimal
t level lies withi the sustainability interval, and does
not otherwise.
From the foregoing, it can be stat d that:
● ��' ≡ ��� � ,�� � ,� ��� ⋛ 0 , based on the principal's
preferences toward non-market go ds and services;
● ���' ≡ ��� � ,�� � ,� ��� < 0 , for the principal pays the
agent to execute the management plan;
● ���' ≡ ��� � � ,�� � ,� ��� ⋛ 0 , depending on principal's
identity function �� � .
Le us now analyze the conditions in whi h principal's
optimal harvest l vel ��∗ lie with n sust inabi ity interval[�, �].
Le ma 1 The c ndition f r the principal's optimal harvest
level ��∗ to lie within [ , �] is ' =− ��� ����.
Proof See the Appendix.
Thereby, the optimal harvest level implies that the
marginal value from the renewable natural resource harvest
equals the marginal remuneration for the renewable natural
resource management.
2.2 The Agent: The Renewable Natura Resource
M nager
Let �� be the value function of a risk-neutral agent. We
have previously assumed that the agent in charge of the
renewable natural resource management is more willing to
harvest than the principal. We are interested in revealing
agent's optimal harvest level ��∗ within the sustainability
interval [�, �]. The agent is endowed with the following value
function:
� = �(� � , � � , �(�)) (3)
where c expresses the h rv sting c sts nd q depends on �,
following the simple functional form � = �+ �, where v can
be a positive or a neg tive deviation fr m this level of
harvesting.
The agent's value func io increases in resource stock s,
harvest quantities q and in revenue transfer r, and decreases in
harvest costs c. Put another way:
● ���' ≡ ��� � � ,� � ,� ��� ⋛ 0, based on the agent's
preferences toward non-market goods and services;
● ���' ≡ ��� � � ,� � ,� ��� > 0, for the agent is p id by the
principal to execute the manag ment pla ;
● ���' ≡ ��� � � ,� � ,� ��� ≤ 0, which involves increasing
returns from the resource management.
Lemma 2 The condition for the agent's optimal harvest level��∗ to lie within [ , ] is− ��' ���� = ��� ����.
Proof See the Appendix.
The optimal harvest level implies that the marginal
remuneration from the renewable natural resource
management equals the marginal loss from the embedded
management costs.
2.3 The Optimal Contract with Public Information
on the Sustainability Interval
We assume that both the principal and the agent have the
knowledge of sustainability interval [�, �]. The principal then
chooses a level of harvest such that he maximizes his utility,
subject to the agent's participation constraint (or individual
rationality (IR) constraint) d to minimum harvesting level �
issued from this sustainability interval:2���,� � , �� , � (4)�� ���� �� � �(� � , � � , �(�)) ≥ 0
The program means that the principal binds the agent to
his participation constraint, that is, he sets the revenue transfer
so that th harvest costs are covered and the agent is not in
deficit. Although the principal might want to harvest less than
the minimum sustainable level (��∗ < �) , he has to comply
with the sus ainability constraint.
Th Lagrangian can be written:� = �� � , �� � , � + ���[ �(� � , � � , �(�))] (5)
The first-order conditions implicitly give harvest level �∗
and revenue transfer �∗:��� = ��� � � ,� ,� ��� + � ���(� � ,� � ,�(�))�� = 0 (6)���� = �� � � ,� ,� ��� + � ���(� � ,� � ,�(�))�� = 0 (7)������ = 0 (8)
When an additional level of harvesting provides, for the
principal, an increasing marginal utility (���' > 0 ), while it
grants the agent with a diminishing marginal utility (���' < 0),
Equatio s (6) and (7) give:��� =− ���'���' ≠ 0 (9)
2 This is minimum sustainable harvesting � at stake, for the principal is
willing to harvest less while the agent struggles to reach this level of
harvesting.
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The prime consideration of this note is t understand how -
- when it comes to managing renewable natural resources --
the agent's private information may come into conflict with
the objective of a principal, be it a secondary topic that s
been neglected in the literat re. We thus model th
contractual relationship betwee a principal and an agent as
regards the renewable natural resource management. In the
situation of an imperfect information setting, we find that the
Pareto-optimal contracting depends on the probability that the
level of harvesting stands outside the sustainability interval.
This puts the Pareto-optimal allocations in jeopardy. Th
information rent held by the agent being unavoidable,
stepping outside the sustainability interval implies the
possibility of depletion of the renewable natural resource.
This potential ecological overshoot, which occurs when
human demand exceeds the regenerative capacity of a natural
ecosystem, puts the Earth on an unsustainable trajectory.
After this starting section, we describe the model in
Section 2, with a focus on the principal-agent relationship in a
perfect information setting (Subsection 2.3) and when the
agent owns private information o the sustainable level of
harvesting (Subsection 2.4). Section 3 concludes.
2. A Principal-agent Model in Renewable
Natural Res urce M agement
We consider a principal who delegates the management of
a renewable natural resource of stock s to an agent. The
principal and the agent have to agree upon a quantity to be
harvested q from the renewable natural resource levels owned
by the principal. Stock s is considered as a proxy of the
natural resource amenities, which are all non-market goods
a d services r l ted o the existence of this resource [8]. The
sustainable harvesting of renewable natural resources, such
tha the stock remains unchanged or ���� = 0 , means that the
level of harvest matches with the level of the resource’s
natural growth. Unsustainable harvesting can be envisaged in
two ways. When ���� > 0 , the scenario corresponds to the
damages issued from the resource over-stocking [3]. The
absence of implementation of a management plan is one
possible way to envisage such a context. When ���� < 0 , the
scenario implies the over-harvesting of the stock and the
depletion of the renewable natural resource. Finally, the
principal gives revenue share r to the agent for the renewable
natural resource management, harvesting included, such that���� > 0.
The principal and the agent can have different preferences
on how to conduct the renewable natural resource
management. For instance, the agent could have stronger
pr f rences for i ome from h vesting, while the principal
co ld h ve tronger prefer nces for prese vi g the esource’s
natural nd iro e t l a ities.
In the k owledge th t the r wa le natura resource
harvesting must not jeopardize its tainabil ty, interval[�, �] defines the bounding mi imum and maximum levels of
arvesting. It is the set of possible actions to be undertaken in
purpose the sustainable r s urce management. In detail,
there is a maximum level of harvesting beyond which the
resourc is depleted. As a result, the resource cannot be
ren and l ger provides natural and environ ental
amenities. There is also a minimum level of harvesting below
which amenities start to vanish. This can be explained by the
absence of a management pla . Therefore, q has to lie
somewhere within this inte val. These assumptions implicit y
mean tha , i a specific range of harvesting levels, resources
and natural and environmental amenities are complementary.
If we assume that the principal has stronger preferences for
th stock onserv tio than th ag nt, the objectives of the
parties should differ. The principal's harvesting objective will
tend to b a low lev l of harvest, hence running the risk of
being below �. On the contrary, the agent will seek to harvest
beyo d this level.1 The knowledge of the interval of the
sustainable levels of h v sti g is rucial. The key issue of the
contract setting is the information gap as to this interval. We
will thus consider that this interval can correspond either to
common knowledge or to a private information.
2.1 The Principal: T e Renewable Natural Resource
Owner
L t �� be the value function of a risk-neutral principal.
This val e function is decreasing in revenue transfer r paid to
the agent. However, the effect of renewable natural resource
stock s and harvesting q on the value function is ambiguous,
since harvesting generates revenues but, at the same time,
reduces utility by diminishing the levels of natural and
environmental amenities. While the principal is willing to
harvest less than the agent, the question is whether principal's
optimal harvest level ��∗ lies or not within sustainability
interval [�, �]. The principal's value function is defined by:�� = ��(� � , �� � , � � ) (1)
where �� � represents the principal's identity function such
that:�� � ≔ ��∗ > � �����' = ���(�,�,�)�� ≤ 0��∗ ≤ � �����' = ��� �,�,��� > 0 (2)
1 The opposite assumption yields symmetric results with respect to
maximum level �.
. The ag nt is endowed ith the following 
value function:
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ith �∗ the (opti al) harvest quantity that axi izes the
function defi e by Equation (1). In particular, Equation (2)
states that ���' 0, hich eans that the princi l's opti al
arv s lev l ies i hin the sustainability int rval, and does
not other se.
r regoing, it can be sta ed that:���' ��� � � ,�� � ,� ��� 0 ba d on the prin ip
preferences to ard non- arket goods and servic s;
● ���' ��� � � ,�� � ,� ��� 0 , for the principal pays the
agent to execute the a age nt plan;
● ���' ��� � � ,�� � ,� ��� 0 , depending on princi al's
identity functi �� � .
Let s no analyze the conditions in hich principal's
opti a harvest lev l ��∗ li s ithi sustainability inte val[�, �].
Le 1 The condition for the rincipal's opti al rvest
level ��∗ to lie within [�, �] is���' ��� ��� .
Proof See the ppendix.
Thereby, the opti al harvest level i plies that the
arginal value fro the r ne able natural resource harvest
equals the arginal re uneration for the rene able natural
resource anage ent.
2.2 he gent: h ene able atural esource
a ager
Let �� be the value function of a risk-neutral agent. e
have previousl ass ed t at t e a ent i char e of the
rene able natural re rc anage ent is ore illing to
harvest than the principal. e are interested in revealing
agent's opti al harvest level ��∗ ithin the sustainability
interval [�, �]. The agent is endo ed ith the follo ing value
function:�� ��(� � , � � , �(�)) (3)
here c expresses the harvesting costs and q depends on �,
follo ing the si ple functional for � � �, here v can
a positive or a negative deviation fro this level of
harvesting.
The agent's value function increases in resourc stock s,
arvest quantities q and in revenue transfer r, and decreases in
h rvest costs c. Put another ay:
● ���' ��� � � ,� � ,� �� 0, based on the agent's
preferences to ard non- arket goods and services;
● ���' ��� � � ,� � ,� �� 0, for the agent is paid by the
principal to execute the anage ent plan;
● ���' ��� � � ,� � ,� �� 0, hich involves increasing
returns fro the resource anage ent.
Le a 2 The condition for the agent's opti al harvest level��∗ to lie within [�, �] is ���' ��� �� ��� .
Proof See the ppendix.
The opti al harv st level i plies that the arginal
re uneration fro the ren able natural resourc
anage ent equals the arginal oss fro the e bedded
anage ent costs.
2.3 he pti al ontract ith ublic Infor ation
on the Sustainability Interval
e assu e that both the principal and the agent have the
kno ledge of sust inability interval [�, �]. The pri cipal then
chooses a level of harvest such that he axi izes his utility,
subject to t e agent's particip tion constraint (or individual
rationality (IR) constraint) and o ini u harvesting level �
issued fro this sustain bility interval:2���,� �� � � , �� � , � � (4)������� �� �� �(� � , � , �(�)) 0
The pr gra eans that the principal binds the agent to
his participation constraint, that is, he sets the revenue transfer
so that the harvest costs are covered and the ag nt is not i
deficit. lth ugh the principal ight ant to harvest less than
the ini u sustainable level (��∗ �) , he has to co ply
ith the sustainability constraint.
The Lagrangian can be ritten:� �� � � , �� � , � � ���[��(� � , � � , �(�))] (5)
The first-order conditions i plicitly give harvest level �∗
and revenue transfer �∗:��� ��� � � ,�� � ,� ��� ��� � �(� � ,� � ,�(�))� 0 (6)��� ��� � � ,�� � ,� ��� ��� � �(� � ,� � ,�(�))� 0 (7)������ 0 (8)
hen an additio al level of harvesting provides, for the
principal, an incr asing ar i al utility (���' 0 ), hile it
grants the agent ith a di inishing arginal utility (���' 0),
Equations (6) and (7) give:��� ���'���' 0 (9)
2 This is minimum sustainable harvesting � at stake, for the principal is
willing to harvest le s while the gent struggle to reach this level of
harvesting.
 ( )
w ere c expresses the harvesting costs and q d pe ds 
on 
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The prime consideration of this note is to understand how -
- when it comes to managing renewable natural resources --
the agent's private information may come into conflict with
the objective of a principal, be it a secondary topic that has
been neglected in the literature. We thus model the
c ntractual relationship between a principal and an agen as
regards the renewable natural resource management. In the
situation of an imperfect information setting, we find that the
Pareto-optimal contracting depends on the probability that the
level of harvesting stands outside the sustainability int rval.
This puts the Pareto-optimal allocations in jeopardy. The
information rent held by the agent being unavoidable,
stepping outside the sustainability interval implies the
possibility f depletion of the r newable natural .
This pot ial ecological ov rshoot, which occurs wh n
human demand exceeds the regenerative capacity of a natural
ecosystem, puts the Earth on an unsustainable trajectory.
After this starting section, we describe the model in
Section 2, with a focus on the principal-agent r latio ship in a
perfect information setting (Subsection 2.3) and when the
agent owns private information on the sustainable level of
harvesting (Subsection 2.4). Se tion 3 c ncludes.
2. A Principal-agent Model in R newable
Natural Resource Management
We consider a princi al who delegates the management of
a renewable natural resource of stock to an agen . The
principal and the agent have to agr e upon a qua tity to be
harvested q from the ren wable natural re ource levels owned
by the principal. Stock s is considered as a oxy of the
natural resource amenities, which are all on-mark t goods
and services elated to the existe ce of this resource [8]. The
sustainable harve ting of renewable natural res urces, such
that the stock remains unchanged or ���� = 0 , means that the
level of harvest m tches with he lev l of the r source’s
natural gr wth. Unsustainable harvesting can b envisaged in
two ways. When ���� > 0 , the scenario corresponds to the
damages issued fr m the resource over-stocking [3]. The
absence of implementation of a managem nt plan is one
possible way to nvisage such a co text. Whe ���� < 0 , the
scenario implies the over-harvesting of the sto k nd the
depletion of the renewabl natural resource. F ally, e
principal gives revenue shar r to the a ent for th renew ble
natural resource a agement, harvesting included, suc that���� > 0.
The principal a d the agent can have different preferences
on how to conduct the renewable na ural resource
management. For instance, the agent could have stronger
preferences for income from harvesting, while the principal
could have stronger prefere ces for preserving the res urce’s
natural and environm ntal amenities.
In the kn wledge that the renewable natural resource
harvesting must not jeopardiz its sustainability, interval[ , �] defines the bounding mini um and aximum l vel of
rvesting. It i the set of possible actions to be unde taken in
purpose of the sust i able resource management. In detail,
there is a maximum level of harvestin beyond which the
resource is depl ted. As a result, th resource cannot be
renewed and n l nger provides natural and environmental
amenities. There is also a minimum level of harvesting below
which amenities start to vanish. This can b expla ned by the
absence of a management plan. Therefor , q has to lie
somewhere within this interval. Thes as umptions implicitly
mean that, in a pecific range of harvesting levels, ources
and natural and environment l a enities are comp em ntary.
If we assume that th principal has stronger preferences for
the stock co servation than the agent, the objectives of the
parties should differ. The principal's harvesting objective will
tend to be a low lev l of harvest, hence run ing the risk of
being bel w �. On the cont ary, the agent will seek o harve t
beyond this level.1 The knowledge of the nterval of the
sustainable levels f harvesting is crucial. The k y issue of e
contract setti g is the information gap as to this interval. We
will thus consid r that t is interval can correspond either to
common knowledg or to a private information.
2.1 The Principal: The Ren wable Natural R source
Owner
Let �� be the value function of a risk-neutral principal.
This value function is d reasing in rev nue ransfer r paid to
t e agent. However, the ffect of renewable natural resource
stock s and harvesting q on the value function is ambiguous,
since harvesting generates revenues but, at the same time,
reduces utility by diminishing the levels of natural and
environmental amenit es. While the principal is willing to
harvest less than the agent, the question is whether principal's
optimal harvest level ��∗ lies or not within sustainability
interval [�, �]. The principal's value function is defined y:�� = ��(� � , �� � , � � ) (1)
where �� � represents the principal's identity function such
that:�� � ≔ ��∗ > � �����' = ���(�,�,�)�� ≤ 0��∗ ≤ � �����' = ��� �,�,��� > 0 (2)
1 The opposite assumption yields symmetric results with respect to
maximum level �.
, following the simpl  functional form 
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with ��∗ the (optimal) harvest quantity that maximizes the
function defin d by Equ tion (1). In particular, Equation (2)
states that ���' > 0, which means that the principal's optimal
arvest level lies ithin th sus ainability i terval, and does
not otherwise.
From the foregoing, it can be stated that:
● � �' ≡ ��� � � ,�� � ,� ��� ⋛ 0 , based on the principal's
preferences toward non-market good and services;
● � �' ≡ ��� � � ,�� � ,� ��� < 0 , for the principal pays the
ag nt to execute the managem nt plan;
● �' ≡ ��� � � ,�� � ,� ��� ⋛ 0 , d pending on principal's
identity function �� � .
Let us now a alyze the conditi s in which principal's
optim harvest level ��∗ lies ithin sustainability i terva[�, �].
Lemma 1 The conditio for the pri ci al's ptimal harvest
level �∗ o i with n [�, �] i ��' =− ��� ����.
Proof See the App ndix.
Thereby, the optimal harvest l vel implies that t e
marginal value from th r newab natural resource harvest
equals the marginal r mun r tion f the renewable natural
resource man g me t.
2.2 The Agent: The Renewable Natural Res urce
Manager
Let �� be the value function of a risk-neutral agent. We
ha previo sly assumed that the agent in charge of the
renew ble natur l resourc ma agement is more willing to
ha vest than the principal. We are interested in revealing
agent's optim l harvest level ��∗ wit in the sustainability
interval [�, �]. The agent s e dowed with the following value
function:�� = ��(� � , � � , �(�)) (3)
where c express s the harvesting costs and q depends n ,
following simple fu tion l for � = �+ �, where v can
be a positive or a ega ive deviation from t is level of
h rvesti g.
The agent's v lue function increas s in resource stock s,
harvest qua tities q and in revenu transfer r, and decreases in
harvest costs c. Put n ther way:
● ��' ≡ ��� � � ,� � ,� ��� ⋛ 0, based on the agent's
preferences toward non-market go ds and s rvic s;
● ��' ≡ ��� � � ,� � ,� ��� > 0, f r the agent is paid by the
principal to execute the managem nt plan;
● ��' ≡ ��� � � ,� � ,� ��� ≤ 0, which involves increasing
returns from the resource management.
L mma 2 The conditio for the agent's optimal harvest level��∗ to lie w thin [�, �] is− ��' ��� = �� ���.
Proof See the Appendix.
The opt mal harvest level implies that the marginal
remune ation from th renewable natur l resource
manage en quals the margi l loss from th embedded
man gement costs.
2.3 The Optimal Contract with Public Information
on the Sustainability Interval
We assume that both the principal and the agent have the
knowledge of sustainabi ity in erv l [�, �]. The principal then
chooses a level of harvest such that e maximizes his utility,
subject to the ag nt's participat on con tra nt (or ind vidual
ration lity (IR) constraint) and to minimu harvesting level �
issued from this sustainab lity interval:2����,� �� � , �� � , � � (4)�� � �(� , � � , �(�)) ≥ 0
The program means that the principal binds the agent to
his participation const a t, that is, he sets th revenue transfer
so that the harvest costs are cov r d and the agent is not in
deficit. Al hough the p incipal might want to harvest less than
the minimum susta nable level (��∗ < �) , he has to comply
with the sustainab lity constraint.
The Lagrangi n can be written:� = �� � � , �� � , � � + ���[��(� � , � � , �(�))] (5)
The first-order conditions implicitly give harvest level �∗
an eve u ra fer �∗:�� = ��� � � ,�� � ,� �� + � ���(� � ,� � ,�(�))�� = 0 (6)��� = ��� � ,�� � ,� �� + � � �(� � ,� � ,�(�))�� = 0 (7)
���� = 0 (8)
When an additional level of harvesting provides, for the
principal, an increasing marginal utility (���' > 0 ), while it
grants the agent with a diminishing marginal utility (���' < 0),
Equations (6) and (7) give:��� =− ���'���' ≠ 0 (9)
2 This is minimum sustainable harvesting � at stake, for the principal is
willing to harvest less while the agent struggles to reach this level of
harv ting.
, 
where v can e a positive or a neg tiv  deviation from this 
lev l of har sting.
The a e t's value function increases in resource stock 
s, harvest quantiti s q and in rev nu  transf r , a  
dec a es i  rvest costs c. Put another w y:
● 
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with ��∗ the (optimal) harvest quan ity that m ximizes the
fu ction defined by Equation (1). In particular, Equation (2)
st es t at ���' > 0, which means that he pri cipal's optimal
harvest lev l lies ithin the sustainability in erval, and does
not oth rwis .
From the foregoi g, it c n be stated that:
● ���' ≡ � � � ,�� � , �� ⋛ 0 , based on the principal's
preferences toward non-market goods and services;
● ���' ≡ ��� � � ,�� � , �� < 0 , for the principal pays the
agent to execute the manag ment plan;
● ���' ≡ ��� � � ,�� � , �� ⋛ 0 , depending on principal's
i ntity function � .
Let us ow a alyze t e conditio s in which princ pal's
op imal harvest l vel ��∗ lies w thin sustain bil ty int rval[�, �].
Lemma 1 The condition for the principal's optimal harvest
level ��∗ to lie within [�, �] is���' =− � ����.
Proof Se the App ndix.
Th reby, th optimal harvest level implies that th
marginal valu from t renew ble natural r source harv s
equals the marginal r mu ration for the ewabl natur l
resourc anagement.
2.2 The Age t: The Renewabl Natural Resource
Man ger
Let �� be the value function of a risk-n utral agent. We
have p eviously ssum d that the gent in ch rg of the
renewable natur l resourc management is mo e willing to
harvest tha the principal. We are interested in revealing
ag n 's optimal rvest l vel ��∗ within the ustainability
i terval [�, �]. The ag t is endowed w th following value
function:�� = ��(� , � , �(�)) (3)
h re c express the har co ts and q depends n �,
following the simpl functional form � = �+ �, where v ca
be a positive or a negative deviation from this level of
harv sting.
The agent' v lue function increases in resource stock s,
harvest quant ties q and in r venu tra sf r, nd decrease in
harvest c s s c. P t nother way:���' ≡ ��� � � ,� � ,� �� ⋛ 0, based on the agent's
preferences toward non-market goods and ervices;
● ���' ≡ ��� � � ,� � ,�� > 0, for the agent is paid by the
principal to execute the management plan;
● ���' ≡ ��� � � ,� � ,� ��� ≤ 0, which involves increasing
retur s from the resource management.
Lemma 2 The c ndition for the age t's optimal harvest level��∗ to lie within [�, �] is− �' ���� = � � ����.
Proof See the Appendix.
The optimal harvest level implies that the marginal
remuneration from th renewable natural resource
a agement quals the marginal loss from the embedded
manage e t cost .
2.3 The Optimal Contract with Public Information
on t Sustainabili y Interval
We assume that both the principal and the agent have the
knowledge of sustainability i terv l [�, �]. Th principal t n
chooses a level of harvest such t t he maximizes his utility,
subj ct to the agent's parti ipation onstraint (or i d vidual
ationality (IR) con train ) and t mi imum harvesting level �
i ued from this sust inability interval:2�� ,� �� � � , �� � , � (4)� ���� � �(� � , � , �(�)) ≥ 0
The program means that the principal binds the agent to
his participation c nstraint, t at is, he sets the revenue transfer
o that the h vest costs are covered and th agent is not in
deficit. Althou h the principal might want to h rvest less than
the minim m sustainable level (��∗ < �) , e has to comply
with the sust inability constraint.
The Lagrangian c n be writte :� = �� � � , �� � , � � + � �[��(� � , � , �(�))] (5)
The first-order c nditions implicitly give harvest level �∗
and revenue transfer �∗:���� = ��� � ,�� � , �� + �� �� (� � ,� � , ( ))�� = 0 (6)���� = ��� � ,�� � , �� + ��� �� (� � ,� � ,�( ))�� = 0 (7)����� = 0 (8)
When an addition l level of harvestin provides, for the
principal, an increasing marginal utility (���' > 0 ), while it
grants the agent with a diminishing arginal utility ( ��' < 0),
Equations (6) and (7) give:��� =− ���'���' ≠ 0 (9)
2 This is mini um sustainable harvesting � at stake, for the principal is
willing to harve t less while th age t struggl s t reach this level of
harvesting.
 sed on the agent's prefer-
ences toward n n-market goods and services;
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ith ��∗ the (opti al) arvest quanti t at ax izes the
function defin d by Equation (1). I particular, Equation (2)
states that ���' 0, ich eans that the pr ncipal's opti al
harves level lies w thin he s inability interval, and does
n t other ise.
Fro the foregoing, it can be stated t
● ���' � � � ,�� � ,� ��� 0 , based on the pr ncipal's
preferences to ard on- arket goods and services;
● ���' � � � ,�� � ,� ��� 0 , for the pr ncipal pays the
agent to execute the anag ent plan;
● ���' � � � ,�� � ,� ��� 0 , depe ding on pr ncipal's
id ntity function � � .
Le us n analyze the conditions in ich p ncipal's
opti al h rvest l vel ��∗ lies thin sus i b lity int rval[�, �].
e a 1 The condition for the pr ncipal's opti al harvest
level ��∗ to lie thin [�, �] is���' � � ����.
Proof See the ppendix.
Thereby, th opti al harvest level i plies that the
arginal value fro t e rene able natural resource harvest
equals the arginal re uneration for th r e able natural
resource m nag ent.
2.2 he ge t: he ne able atural esource
n ger
Let �� b the val e functi n of a risk-neutr l agent. e
have previously assu ed that the agent in charge of the
rene able natural resource anag ent is re illing to
harvest than the pr ncipal. e are inter sted in revealing
agent's opti al rvest level ��∗ thin the sust inability
i terval [�, �]. The ag t s endo d it the f llo ing value
function:�� ��(� � , � � , �(�)) (3)
here c expr s t e harvesting costs and q depends on �,
f llo ing the si ple functional for � � �, here v can
be a positive or a negative deviation fro this level of
harvesting.
The agent's value functio incr ses in resource stock s,
harvest quantities q and in revenue transf r r, nd d cr ases in
harvest costs c. P t another ay:
● ���' � � � ,� � ,� ��� 0, base on the ag nt's
preferences to ard on- arket goods and services;
● ���' � � � ,� � ,� ��� 0, for the agent is paid by the
pr ncipal to execute the anag ent plan;
● ���' � � � ,� � ,� ��� 0, ich in olves increasing
returns fro th resource anag ent.
e a 2 The condition for the agent's opti al harvest level��∗ to lie thin [�, �] is � �' ���� � � ���.
Proof See the ppendix.
The opti al harvest level i plies that the arginal
re uneration fro he rene able natural resource
manag ent equals the arginal loss fro the e bed ed
anag e t costs.
2.3 he pti al ontract ith ublic Infor ation
on the Sustainability Interval
e assu e that bo the pr ncip l and the agent have the
kno ledge of su t inability interval [�, �]. The pr ncip l then
chooses a level of harvest suc that he ax izes his u ility,
subject to the agent's participation constraint (or individual
rationality (I ) c nstraint) and to ini u harvesting level �
issued fro this sust inability interval:2
�, �� � � , � � , � � (4)�� � � � �(� � , � � , �(�)) 0
The progra eans that the pr ncipal binds the agent to
his parti ipation c nstraint, that is, h ets th revenue transfer
so that the harvest costs are covered and the agent is not in
deficit. lthou the pr ncipal ight ant to harvest less than
the ini u sus inab l vel (��∗ �) , he has to co ply
it the sust inability constraint.
The L grangian can be ritte :� �� � � , � � , � � ���[��(� � , � � , �(�))] (5)
The first-order conditions i plicitly give harvest level �∗
and revenue transfer �∗:���� � � � ,�� � ,� ��� �� � (� � ,� � ,�(�))�� 0 (6)���� � � � ,�� � ,� ��� � � (� � ,� � ,�(�))�� 0 (7)������ 0 (8)
hen an addition l level of harvestin provides, for the
pr ncipal, a increa ing arginal u ility (���' 0 ), h le it
grants the agent ith a d in shing marginal u ility ( ��' 0),
Equations (6) and (7) give:��� ��'��' 0 (9)
2 This is mini um sust inable harvesting � at stake, for the pr ncipal is
willing to harvest less while the age t struggles to reac this level of
harvesting.
 f r h  agent s paid by the 
ri  t  ex cute the management l
● 
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with ��∗ the optimal) harvest quantity that maximizes the
function defined by Equation (1). In particular, Equati n (2)
states that ���' > 0, which means that the principal's optimal
harvest level lies within the sustainability interval, and do
not otherwise.
Fro th foregoing, it can be stated at:
● ���' ≡ ��� � � ,�� � ,� ��� ⋛ 0 , based on the principal's
preferences toward non-market goods and services;
● ���' ≡ ��� � � ,�� � ,� ��� < 0 , for the principal pays the
agent to execute the management plan;
● ���' ≡ ��� � � ,�� � ,� ��� ⋛ 0 , depending on principal's
identity function �� � .
Let us now analyze the cond ions in which principal's
optimal h rvest level ��∗ lies wit i sustainability i erval[�, �].
Lemma 1 The conditio for the principal's optimal harvest
level ��∗ to lie within [�, �] is���' =− ��� ����.
Proof See th Appendix.
Thereby, the optimal harvest level implies that the
marginal value from the renewable natural resource harvest
equals the marginal remuneration for the renewable natural
resource management.
2.2 The Agent: The Renewable Natural Resource
Manager
Let �� be the value f nction of a risk-neutral agent. We
have previously assumed that the agent in charge of the
renewable natural resource management is more willing to
harvest than the principal. We are interested in revealing
agent's optimal harvest level ��∗ within the sustainability
interval [�, �]. The agent is endowed with the following value
function:�� = ��(� � , � � , �(�)) (3)
where c expresses the harvesting costs and q depends on �,
following the simple functional form � = �+ �, where v can
be a positive or a negative deviation from this level of
harvesting.
The agent's value function increases in resource stock s,
harvest quantities q and in revenue transfer r, and decreases in
harvest costs c. Put another way:
● ���' ≡ ��� � � ,� � ,� ��� ⋛ 0, based on the agent's
preferences toward non-market goods and services;
● ���' ≡ ��� � � ,� � ,� ��� > 0, for the agent is paid by the
principal to execute the management plan;
● ���' ≡ ��� � � ,� � ,� ��� ≤ 0, which involves increasing
returns from the resource management.
Lemma 2 The co dition for the agent's optimal harv st level��∗ to lie w th n [�, �] is−���' ���� = ��� ����.
Proof See the Appendix.
The optimal harvest level implies that the marginal
remune ation from the renewable natural resour e
management equals the marginal loss from the embedded
management costs.
2.3 T e Optimal Contract with Public Information
on the Sustainability Int rval
We assume that both the principal and the agent have the
knowledge of sustainability interval [�, �]. The principal then
chooses a level of harvest such that he maximizes his utility,
subject to the agent's participation constraint (or individual
rationality (IR) constraint) and to minimum harvesting level �
issued from this sustainability inter l:2����,� �� � � , �� � , � � (4)������� �� �� ��(� � , � � , �(�)) ≥ 0
The program means that the principal binds the agent to
his participation constraint, that is, he sets the revenue transfer
so that the harvest costs are covered and the agent is not in
deficit. Although the principal might want to harvest less than
the minimum sustainable level (��∗ < �) , he has to comply
with the sustainability constraint.
The Lagrangian can be written:� = �� � � , �� � , � � + ���[��(� � , � � , �(�))] (5)
The first-order conditions implicitly give harvest level �∗
and revenue transfer �∗:���� = ��� � � ,�� � ,� ��� + ��� ���(� � ,� � ,�(�))�� = 0 (6)���� = ��� � � ,�� � ,� ��� + ��� ���(� � ,� � ,�(�))�� = 0 (7)������ = 0 (8)
When an additional level of harvesting provides, for the
principal, an increasing marginal utility (���' > 0 ), while it
grants the agent with a diminishing marginal utility (���' < 0),
Equations (6) and (7) give:��� =− ���'���' ≠ 0 (9)
2 This is minimum sustainable harvesting � at stake, for the principal is
willing to harvest less while the agent struggles to reach this level of
harvesting.
 hich involves increasing 
retu ns from the r sourc  management.
Lemma 2 The condition for the agent's optimal harvest 
level 
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with ��∗ the (optimal) harvest quantity that maximizes the
function defined by Equation (1). In particular, Equation (2)
states that ���' > 0, which means that the principal's optimal
harvest level lies within the sustainability interval, and does
not otherwise.
From the foregoing, it can be stated that:
● ���' ≡ ��� � � ,�� � ,� ��� ⋛ 0 , based on the principal's
preferences toward non-market goods and services;
● ���' ≡ ��� � � ,�� � ,� ��� < 0 , for the principal pays the
agent to execute the management plan;
● ���' ≡ ��� � � ,�� � ,� ��� ⋛ 0 , depending on principal's
identity f nction �� � .
Let s now a alyze the conditions in which principal's
optimal harvest level ��∗ lies within sustainability interval[�, �].
Lemma 1 The condition for the principal's optimal harvest
level ��∗ o ie within [�, �] is���' =− ��� ����.
Proof See the Appendix.
Thereby, the optimal harvest level implies that the
marginal value from the renewable natural resource harvest
equals the marginal remuneration for the renewable natural
resource management.
2.2 The Agent: The Renewable Natural Resource
Manager
Let �� be the value function of a risk-neutral agent. We
have previously assumed that th agent in charge of the
renewable natural resource management is more willing to
h rvest than th principal. We are interested in revealing
agent's optimal h vest level �∗ within the ustainability
interval [�, �]. The agent is endowed wit th f llowing valu
function:�� = ��(� � , � � , �(�)) (3)
where c expresses the harvesting costs nd q depends on �,
foll wing the s m le functional form � = �+ �, where v can
be a positive or a negative deviation from this level of
arvesting.
Th agent's value function incr as s in resource sto k s,
harvest quantities q and in revenu transfer r, a d d creases in
harvest costs c. Put another way:
● ���' ≡ ��� � � ,� � ,� ��� ⋛ 0, based on th agent's
pr feren es toward non-market goods d services;
● ���' ≡ ��� � � ,� � ,� ��� > 0, for the gent is paid by he
pri cipal to xecute th man gem t plan;
● ���' ≡ ��� � � ,� � ,� ��� ≤ 0, which involves increasing
returns from the resource management.
Lemma 2 The condition for the agent's optimal harvest level��∗ to lie within [�, �] is−���' ���� = ��� ����.
Proof See the Appendix.
The optimal harvest level implies that the marginal
remuneration from the renewable natural resource
management equals the marginal loss from the embedded
management costs.
2.3 The Optimal Contract with Public Information
on the Sustainability Interval
We assume that both the principal and the agent have the
knowledge of sustainability interval [�, �]. The principal then
chooses a level of harvest such that he maximizes his utility,
subject to the agent's participation constraint (or individual
rationality (IR) constraint) and to minimum harvesting level �
issued from this sustainability interval:2����,� �� � � , �� � , � � (4)������� �� �� ��(� � , � � , �(�)) ≥ 0
The program means that the principal binds the agent to
his participation constraint, that is, he sets the revenue transfer
so that the harvest costs are covered and the agent is not in
deficit. Although the principal might want to harvest less than
the minimum sustainable level (��∗ < �) , he has to comply
with the sustainability constraint.
The Lagrangian can be written:� = �� � � , �� � , � � + ���[��(� � , � � , �(�))] (5)
The firs -order ond tions implicitly give harvest level �∗
and revenue transfer �∗:��� = ��� � ,�� � ,� ��� + ��� ���(� � ,� � ,�(�))�� = 0 (6)���� = ��� � � ,�� � ,� ��� + ��� ���(� � ,� � ,�(�))�� = 0 (7)������ = 0 (8)
When an additional level of harvesting provides, for the
principal, an increasing marginal utility (���' > 0 ), while it
grants the agent with a diminishing marginal utility (���' < 0),
Equations (6) and (7) give:��� =− ���'���' ≠ 0 (9)
2 This is min mum sustainable harvesting � at stake, for the principal is
willing to harvest less while the agent struggles to reach this level of
harvesting.
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The prime consideration of this note is to understand how -
- when it comes to managi g r newable natural re rces --
the agent's private information may come into conflict with
the objective of a principal, be it a secondary topic that has
been neglected n the literatur . We thus mod l the
contractual relationship between a rincipal and a agent as
regards the renewable natural resource manag m nt. In the
situa ion of an imperfect i formation s tt g, we fi that the
Pareto-optimal contracting depends on the probability that t e
level of harvesting st nds outside the sustainability interval.
This puts the Pareto-optimal allocations in jeopardy. The
information rent h ld by agent bei g unavoidable,
stepping outside the sustainability interval implies th
possibility of depletion of the renewable natural resource.
This pot tial ecological overshoot, which occurs when
human d and exceeds the regen rative capacity of a natural
ecosystem, puts th Earth on an u sust i abl trajectory.
After this st rting section, we describe the model in
Section 2, with a focus n the principal-agent relations ip in a
perfect inf rmation etti (Subs ction 2.3) and wh n th
a ent ow s p iv te inform tion on th sustainable level of
harvesting (Subse tion 2.4). Section 3 conclud s.
2. A Princip l- gent Model in Renewable
Natural Resourc Management
We consider a principal wh deleg tes the management of
a r new ble natural resource of stock s to an agent. The
principal and the agent have to agree upon a quantity to be
harvested q from th r newable natural resource levels owned
by the principal. Stock s is con idered as a proxy of the
natural resource amenities, which are all non-market good
a d serv c s el ted to the existenc of this resource [8]. The
s stainable harvesti g of r n wable natural r sources, such
that the stock remains unchanged or ���� = 0 , means that the
level of matches with th l vel of the resourc ’s
n tura growth. Unsus ainable h rvesting can be e visag d in
two ways. When ���� > 0 , the scenari corresponds to the
damages issued from the resource over-stocking [3]. The
absence of implementation of a management plan is one
possibl way to e visage such a c text. When ��� < 0 , the
scenario implies the o er-harvesting of the stock and the
depletion of e renewable natural resource. Finally, the
principal gives r venue share r to the agen for the renewable
natural resourc management, harvesti g in luded, such that��� > 0
The pri cipal and t can have different preferences
on how to conduct the r newabl natural resource
managem n . For instance, the agent could ave stronger
preferences for income from harvesting, while the principal
could have stronger preferences for preserving the resource’s
natural and environmental amenities.
In the knowledge that the renewable natural resource
harvesting must not jeopardize its sustain b lity, interval[�, �] defines the bounding minimum and maximum levels of
harvesting. It is th set f possibl actions to be undertaken in
purpose of the sustainable resource management. In detail,
ther is a maximum level of harvesting beyond which the
r source is depleted. As a result, the r source c nnot be
ren wed and no onger provid s natural and environmental
amenities. Th re is also inimum level of harvesting below
w ich me ities tart t vanish. This can be explained by the
absence of a management plan. Therefore, q has to lie
somewhere n this nterval. These assumptions implicitly
mean that, in specific range of harvesting levels, resources
and natural and environmental amenities are complementary.
If we assume that the principal has stronger preferences for
the stock conservation than the agent, the objectives of the
parties should differ. The principal's harvesting objective will
tend to be a low level of harvest, hence running the risk of
being below �. On the contrary, th agent will seek to harvest
beyond this level.1 The knowledge of the interval of the
sustainable levels of harvesting is crucial. The key issue of the
contract setting is the information gap as to this interval. We
will thus consider that this interval can correspond either to
common knowledge or to a private i formation.
2.1 The Pr ncipal: T e R ewabl Na ural Resource
O ne
Let �� be the value functi n f a risk-neutral principal.
is value functio is decr asing in revenue transfer r paid to
the agent. However, the effect of renewable natural resource
stock s and harvesting q on the value function is ambiguous,
since harvesting generates revenues but, at the same time,
re uces utility b diminishing th levels of natural and
environmental amenities. While the principal is willing to
harvest less than the agent, the question is whether principal's
optimal harvest level ��∗ lies or not within sustainability
interval [�, ]. The principal's value function is defined by:�� = ( , , � � ) (1)
where �� � represents the principal's identity function such
that:�� � ≔ ��∗ > � �����' = ���(�,�,�)�� ≤ 0��∗ ≤ � �� ��' = ��� �,�,��� > 0 (2)
1 The opposite assumption yields symmetric results with respect to
maximum level �.
 is 
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with ��∗ the (optimal) harvest qua tity that maximizes the
function defined by Equation (1). In particular, Equation (2)
states that ���' > 0, which m ans at the principal's opti al
harvest level lies w thin the sustainability interv l, nd does
no otherwise.
From the forego g, it can be stated t t:
● ���' ≡ ��� � � ,�� � ,� ��� ⋛ 0 , based on the princi al's
preferences toward non-market goods and services;
● ���' ≡ �� � � ,�� � ,� ��� < 0 , for the principal pays the
agent to execute the managem nt plan;
● ���' ≡ � � ,�� � ,� ��� ⋛ 0 , depending on principal's
id ntity function �� .
Let us n w analyze the conditio s i which rincipal's
optimal harvest l vel ∗ li s with sust inability interval[�, �].
Lemm 1 The condition for the principal's optim l ha vest
level ��∗ to lie it in [�, �] i ��' =− �� ����.
Proof S the Appendix.
Thereby, the optimal harvest level implies that the
mar inal valu f om the renewable natural resource harvest
equals the marg nal remuner ion for th r newable natural
res rce ma ge ent.
2.2 Th Ag nt: The Ren wabl Natural Resource
Ma a r
Let �� be the value function of risk-n utral ag nt. We
have p evi usly assumed that th agent in charge of the
r newa l natural resource man geme t is more willing to
harv st th the pri ipal. We ar int est d in reveali g
ag nt's optima harvest l v l ��∗ w thin th sustainability
int rv l [�, �]. The agent is endowed with th fol owing value
fun tion:�� = ��(� � , � � , �(�)) (3)
where c expresses the arvesting costs and q depends on �,
following the simple functional form � = �+ �, where v can
b a positive or a n gative deviation from this level of
harves ing.
The age t's value function c ses in resource st ck s,
harvest quantitie q nd in r enu transfer r, and d reases in
harv st c sts c. Put a o her way:
● ���' ≡ ��� � � ,� � ,� ��� ⋛ 0, based o the agent's
pref rences toward non-market g ods and servic s;
● ��' ≡ � � ,� � ,� ��� > 0, for the agent is paid by the
principal to execute the management plan;
● ���' ≡ ��� � � ,� � ,� ��� ≤ 0, which involves i creasing
returns from the resource management.
L mma 2 The condition for the agent's optim l harvest level��∗ to lie within [�, �] is−���' ���� = ��� ����.
Proof See the Appendix.
T e optimal harvest level implies that the marginal
remun ra ion from the renewable natural resource
managem nt equals the marginal loss from the embedded
man ge nt c sts.
2.3 T e Optimal Co tract with Public Information
on the Sustainability Interval
We assume that both the principal and the agent have the
knowledge of sustainability interval [�, �]. Th principal the
choo es a level of arv st su h that maximizes his utility,
subject to he ag nt's pa icipation constr int (or individual
rationality (IR) constraint) nd to minimu harvesting level �
issu d from thi sustainability i terval:2����,� �� � � , �� � , � � (4)������� �� �� ��(� � , � � , �(�)) ≥ 0
The program means that the principal binds the agent to
his participation constraint, that is, he sets the revenue transfer
so that the harvest costs ar covered and the agent is n t in
deficit. Although he principal mig t wa t to harvest less than
the minimum ustain ble le l (��∗ < �) , he has to comply
with the s s ainability constraint.
Th Lagr g an can be written:� = �� � � , �� � , � � + ���[��(� � , � � , �(�))] (5)
The first-order conditions implicitly give harvest level �∗
and rev nue transfer �∗:���� = ��� � � ,�� � ,� ��� + ��� ���(� � ,� � ,�(�))�� = 0 (6)���� = � � ,�� ,� ��� + � ( , ,�(�))� = 0 (7)���� = 0 (8)
When an additional level of harvesting provides, for the
principal, an increasing marginal utility (���' > 0 ), while it
grants the age t with a d minishing arginal utility ( <
Equatio s (6) and (7) give:��� =− ���'���' ≠ 0 (9)
2 This is minimum sustainable harvesting � at stake, for the principal is
willing to harvest less while the agent struggles to reach this level of
harvesting.
.
Proof See the Appendix.
The optimal harvest level implie  th t the ma ginal 
remune ation fr m the renewable n tural resource 
manage t quals th  marginal loss from the e bedded 
manage t c sts.
2.3 The Optimal Contrac  with Public I for ation 
on the Sustai bility Interval
We ass me h t both the pri cipal and the gent have 
the knowledge of sust inability interval 
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The p im co s deration of this te is to understand how -
- when it comes o m naging renewable atura resources --
the agent's private information may come into co flict with
the objective of a principal, be t a sec nda y topic at has
een neglected in e liter tu e. W u m de the
contract al relationship between a principal and an agent as
regards the renewable natural resource management. In the
situation of an imperfect information setting, we find that the
Pareto-optimal contracting depends on the probability t at the
level f harvesting stands utside the ustaina ility interval.
This puts the Pa e o-opt mal allocations in jeopardy. T
information rent held by the agent be ng unavoid ble,
stepping outside the sustainability interval implies the
possibility of depl tion of t e r newable natural resource.
Th s po ential ecological overshoot, which occurs when
human d mand exceeds t e regenerative cap ci y of a atural
ecosystem, puts he Earth n an u sustai ble rajectory.
After this starting section, w d s ribe the mod l i
Section 2, with a focus n the princip l-agent re ation hip i
perfect i formation setti g (Subsection 2.3) and hen the
agent owns private information on he sustainable level of
harvesting (Subs ction 2.4). Sec io 3 con lud s.
2. A Principal- g nt Model in Renewable
Na ur l R rce Management
We consider a principal who delegates the anagement of
a renewable natural resource of stock s to an age t. The
principal and the age t have to agree u on a quantity to be
harvested q fro the renewable natural resource levels owned
by the principal. Stock s is considered as a proxy of the
natural resource amenities, which are all non-market goods
and s r ic s related to the existence of this resource [8]. The
sustainable harvesting of renewable natural resources, such
that the stock remains unch nged or ���� = 0 , eans tha the
level of harvest matches with he level of the resou ce’s
natural growth. Unsust inable harvestin can be envisaged in
two ways. When ���� > 0 , the scenar o corresponds to the
damages issued from the resource over-stocking [3]. The
ab e ce of implementation of a manag e t plan is on
possible way to envisage such a contex . Wh n ���� < 0 , the
scenario implies the over- arvesting of the stock and the
depletion of the ren wable natural resource. Finally, the
principal gives revenue share r to the agent for the renewable
natural resource manageme t, harvesting included, such that���� > 0.
The principal and the agent can have different preferences
on how to conduct the renewable natural resource
management. For instance, the agent could have stronger
preferenc s for income from harvesting, while the principal
c uld ave stronger preferences for preserving the resource’s
natural and envi onment l amen ties.
In the knowledge that the renewable natural resource
harvesting must not jeopardize its sustainability, interval[�, �] defines the bounding minimum and maximum levels of
harvesting. It is the set of possible actions to be undertaken in
purpose of the sustainable resource management. In detail,
there is a maximum level of harvesting beyond which the
resource is depleted. As a result, the resource cannot be
renewed and no longer provides natural and environmental
ameni ie . There is also minimum l vel of har esting below
which amenities start to vanish. This can be explained by the
absence of a management plan. Therefore, q has to lie
somewhere within this interval. These assumptions implicitly
mean tha , in specific range of harvesting levels, resources
a d natural and environmental amenities are complementary.
If we assume that the principal has stronger preferences for
the stock conservation than the agent, the objectives of the
parties should differ. The principal's harvesting objective will
tend to be a low level of harvest, hence running the risk of
being below �. On the contrary, the agent will seek to harvest
beyond this level.1 The knowledge of the interval of the
sustainable levels of harvesting is crucial. The key issue of the
contract setting is the information gap as to this interval. We
will thus consider that this interval can correspond either to
common knowledge or to a private information.
2.1 The Principal: The Renewable Natural Resource
Owner
Let �� be the value function of a risk-neutral principal.
This value function is decreasing in revenue transfer r paid to
th agent. How ver, the ffect of renewable natural resource
stock s and harvesting q on the value function is ambiguous,
since harv sting generates revenues but, at the same time,
reduces utility by diminishing the levels of natural and
environmental amenities. While the principal is willing to
harvest less than the agent, the question is whether principal's
optimal harvest level ��∗ lies or not within sustainability
interval [�, �]. The principal's value function is defined by:�� = ��(� � , �� � , � � ) (1)
whe �� � repres nts the principal's identity function such
that:�� � ≔ ��∗ > � �����' = ���(�,�,�)�� ≤ 0��∗ ≤ � �����' = ��� �,�,��� > 0 (2)
1 The opposite assumption yields symmetric results with respect to
maximum level �.
. The 
princip l then choo es a level of rvest su h that he 
maximizes his tility, subjec  t  the ge t’s articipation 
constraint (or individual rationality (IR) constraint) 
and to minimum harvesting level 
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The prime consid ration of this note is to understand how -
- when it com to manag ng renewable natural resources --
the agent's private i formation ay come into c nflict with
the objectiv of a principal, be it a secondary topic that has
been neglected in the liter ure. We thus model the
contractual relationship betw n a principal and an agent as
regards t e renewable na ural resource managemen . In the
situation of an im erfect information setting, we find that the
Pareto-optimal co tracting depends on the probab l ty at the
level of harvesting stands outside the sustai abili y i terval.
This puts the Pareto-optimal allocations in jeop rdy. The
information rent held by th agen being u avoidabl ,
stepping ut ide the sustainability int rval implies th
possibili y of depletion of the renewable natural reso rce.
This potential ecological vershoot, which occurs when
human demand exceeds the regenerative capacity of a natural
ecosystem, puts the Earth o an unsustainable trajectory.
After this starting section, we describe the model in
Section 2, with a focus on the principal-agent r lationship in a
perfect nformation setting (Subsection 2.3) and when the
agent owns private information on the sustainabl l vel of
harvesting (Subsection 2.4). Section 3 concludes.
2. A Pri cipal- gent Model in Renewable
Natural Resource Manage n
We consid a principal who d legates the management of
a renewable natural resourc of stock s to a agent. The
principal and the ag nt have to gree upon a quantity to be
harvested q from the renewa le natural resource l vel wned
by the princip l. Stock s is c nsid red as a proxy f t e
natural resource amenities, which are all non- ark t good
and s rvices related to the existence of this resource [8]. T
sustai able harv sting of ren wable natu l reso rces, such
that the stock rem ins unchanged r ���� = 0 , means that the
level of h vest mat hes with the level of the resource’s
natura grow . U sustain ble h rvesting ca be envisag d in
two ways. W en ���� > 0 , the scenario corresponds to the
damages i ued from the resource over-stocki g [3]. The
abse ce of implem tation f a management plan is one
pos ible way to en isage uch a context. When ��� < 0 , the
s enario implies the over- a vesting of the stock and the
d l tio of the renewable natural resource. Finally, the
p incipal gives rev nue sha e r to the agent for the renewable
natural r sourc management, harve ting includ d, such that��� > 0.
The principal and the agent can have different preferences
on ho to cond ct the renewable natural resource
mana em nt. For in t nce, th agent could have stronger
preferences for income from h rvesting, while the principal
could have stronger preferences for preserving the resource’s
natural and environmental amenities.
In the knowledge that the renewable natural resource
harvesting must not jeopardize its sustainability, interval[ , �] defines the bounding minimum and maximum levels of
harvesting. It is the set of possible actions to be undertaken in
purpose of the sust inable resource management. In detail,
there is a maximum level of harvesting beyond which the
resource is deplet d. A a result, the resource cannot be
renew d and n longer provi es natural and e vironmental
ameniti s. There is also a minimum l vel of harvesting below
which meniti st r to vani h. This can be xplained by the
absence of a m nagement plan. Therefore, q has to lie
omewhere within this i terval. These assumptions implicitly
mean that, in a specific range of harvesting levels, resources
and n tural and e vironmental amenities are compleme tary.
If we assume that the principal has stronger preferences for
t sto k conservation tha th ag t, the objectives of the
parties should differ. The principal's harvesti g objective will
tend to be a low level of harvest, hence running the risk of
being below �. On the co trary, the agent will seek to harvest
beyond this level.1 The knowl dge of th i terval of the
sustainable levels of harvesting is crucial. The key issue of the
contract setting is the information gap as to this interval. We
will thus consider that this interval can correspond either to
c mmon knowledge or to a private information.
2.1 The Principal: Th R ewable Natural Resourc
Owner
Let �� be he v lu function of a risk-neutral principal.
This v lu funct on is decreasing in revenue transfer r paid to
the agent. Howev r, the effect of renewable natural resource
stock s and harvesting q on the value function is ambiguous,
since harvesting generates revenues but, at the same time,
reduces utility by diminishing the levels of natural and
env ronmental amenities. Whi e the principal is willing to
harvest less than the agent, the question is whether principal's
optimal harvest level ��∗ lies or not within sustainability
interval [ , �]. The principal's value function is defined by:�� = � � , � � , � � ) (1)
where �� represents the principal's identity function such
th t:�� � ≔ ��∗ > � �����' = ���(�,�,�)�� ≤ 0��∗ ≤ � � ���' = ��� �,�,��� > 0 (2)
1 The opposite assumption yields symmetric results with respect to
maximum level �.
 issued from this 
susta b lity interval:c
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with ��∗ the (optimal) harvest quantity that maxim zes th
function defin d by Equatio (1). In particul r, Equ tion (2)
states that ���' > 0, which me ns that the principal's optimal
harv t level lies within t e sustainability int rval, a d does
not otherwise.
From the foregoing, it can b stated that:
● ���' ≡ ��� � � ,�� � ,� �� ⋛ 0 based on he principal's
preferences toward non-market goods nd services;
● ���' ≡ ��� � � ,�� � ,� ��� < 0 , for th princ p l pays the
agent to execute the management plan;
● ���' ≡ ��� � � ,�� � ,� ��� ⋛ 0 , epending o pri cipal's
identity function � � .
Let us ow analyze the onditions in which princi al's
optimal harvest level ��∗ lies with n us ai abili y terval[�, �].
Lemma 1 The condition for the principal's optimal harvest
lev l �∗ to lie within [�, �] is���' =− ��� ��� .
P oof Se h A pendix.
Thereby, the optimal h rvest level implies t at the
marginal valu from he renewab e atural resour e rvest
equals the marginal re un ratio for the ren wable natur l
r source manag ment.
2.2 The Agent: The Renewa le Natural R source
Manag r
Let �� be the value function of a risk-n tral nt. We
have previously assum d that the ag nt i c rge of the
renewabl natural resource m g ment is more willing to
harvest than the principal. We re intere ted in revealing
agent's optimal harvest level ��∗ ithin the sustainabi ty
interval [�, �]. The g t is ndowed the following va ue
function:�� = ��(� � , � � , �(�)) (3)
where c xpre ses the harvesti g costs and q depends �,
fol owing th mpl funct onal form � = �+ �, wh re v can
be a positiv or a negative deviation from t is l v l of
harvesting.
The agent's value fu ction increases i resource s ck s,
harvest quantities q and i revenue transfer r, and decreases in
harvest costs c. Put another way:
● ���' ≡ ��� � � ,� � ,� �� ⋛ 0, b sed on the agent's
p ferences toward non-market goo s a d s rvice ;
● ���' ≡ ��� � � ,� � ,� ��� > 0, f r t e age t i pa d by the
principal to ex cute the management pl n;
● ���' ≡ ��� � � ,� � ,� ��� ≤ 0, which involves increasing
r turns from the resource management.
L mma 2 The condition for the agent's op imal harvest lev l��∗ to lie within [�, �] is−���' ��� = �� ��.
Proof See Appendix.
The optimal harvest level implies that the marginal
remun ration from the r newabl natural resource
manage ent equals the margin l loss from the embedded
management costs.
2.3 The Optimal Contract ith Public I formation
on the Sustainability Interval
We assu e that both the p incipal and the agent have
knowl ge of sust i ability interval [�, �]. T princip l hen
cho ses a level of h rvest such that maximizes his utility,
subject to the agent's particip ti n constr int (or i dividual
rationality (IR) constrai t) and to minimum harv sting le el �
is ued from this sustainability in erval:2����,� �� � � , �� � , � � (4)� � �� � � ( � , � , �(�)) ≥ 0
The program means that the principal binds the gent to
his p rticipation con traint, th t is, he sets the revenue tran fer
so that the harvest costs are covered and t agent is not in
d ficit. Although the pr ncipal migh w t to harv st le s than
th minimum sustainable level (��∗ < �) , h has to comply
wit the sustainability constraint.
The Lagrangi n can be w itt n:� = �� � � , �� � , � + ���[ �(� � , � � , (�))] (5)
The first-order condi ions implicitly give harvest level �∗
and revenue transfer �∗:��� = ��� � � ,�� � ,��� + � �� ( � ,� � ,�(�))�� = 0 (6)���� = ��� � � ,�� ,� ��� + ��� �� (� � ,� � ,�(�))�� = 0 (7)
��� = 0 (8)
When an additional level of harvesting provides, for the
prin ipal, an increasi g marginal utility (���' > 0 ), while it
gra t the agent with a di inishing marginal utility (���' < 0),
Equa ions (6) a d (7) give:�� =− ���'���' ≠ 0 (9)
2 This is mi imum sustainable harvesting � at stake, for the principal is
willing to harvest less while the agent struggles to reach this level of
harvesting.
 ( )
  eans that the pri cipal binds the agent 
to his partic pati  cons r in , that i , he sets the revenue 
transfe  so that the ha vest costs ar  covered and the gent 
is not in d ficit. Although the r ipal mi ht wa t to 
harvest less than t  i imum sustainabl  lev l 
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with ��∗ th (optimal) harv st quantity that aximizes the
unctio def ed by Equation (1). In particular, Equation (2)
states t at ���' > 0, which m a s th t th rincipal's opti al
harv st level lie within the sust inability interval, nd does
ot oth rwise.
From the foregoing, it c n be stated that:
● ��' ≡ �� � ,�� � ,� ��� ⋛ 0 , based on the rincipal's
p ef renc s toward non-mark t goo and services;
● �' ≡ �� � ,�� � ,� ��� < 0 , for the rincip l pays the
agent to execute the anage e t plan;
● �' ≡ �� � ,� � ,� ��� , i rincipal's
identity function � � .
Let us now analyze t i rincipal's
optimal arv t level �∗ l ilit interval[�, �].
Lemma 1 The c nditio f ti l harves
l vel �∗ t l e within [ , ] i �' � .
Pro f Se t Appendix.
Thereby, th opti al arv t evel i plies that h
argin val e fro th ene ble natu al esource harvest
equals th arginal re uneration fo th enewable natural
esource managem nt.
2.2 Th Agent: The Renew ble N tural Resource
Manag r
Let �� be the value func i n of a risk-n utral agent. We
have previou y assum tha he agent in charge of the
enew ble n ural source mana men is more willing to
h rvest t an th i cipal. We are terested in revealing
age t's ptimal harvest l vel ��∗ wit i the sustainabili y
int rva [�, �]. The ag t i n wed w th the following value
function:
� = ( , , �(�)) (3)
wh r c expresses the harvesting costs and q epe ds on
following the simple functi nal form � = �+ �, where v can
be positi r a negative d viati n f m this l vel of
harvesting.
he gent's v lu function inc eases in esource stock s,
harvest qu tities q a d r ve ue transfer r, and de re ses in
harv t osts c. Put othe way:
● ��' ≡ �� � , � ,� ��� ⋛ 0, based on the agent's
p ef r nces tow r non-market goo and services;
● ��' ≡ �� � ,� � ,� ��� > 0, for th ag nt is paid by the
rincipal to execute the manageme t la ;
● ��' ≡ �� � ,� � ,� ��� ≤ 0, whic i olves increasing
returns fro the esource managem nt.
Le ma 2 The c ndition for the agent' optimal harvest level�∗ to lie with n [�, ] is−�' ���� = � � ����.
Proof S e the App dix.
The optimal harvest level implies t t the marginal
r muneration fr m the r newable n tu al esource
nagem nt equ ls the marginal l s from the mbedd d
a age ent cost .
2.3 The Optimal Contra t with Public Information
on t e S s ain bili y Int rval
We a sume that both the rincipal nd t agent have the
kn wledg of sustain bility int rv l [ , �]. The rincipal then
ch s a level of harvest s ch that e aximizes his u ility,
subject the ge t's p rt cipati n co straint (or individual
ration lity (IR) co straint) and to m im m harvesting l vel �
i sued from thi sust inability interval:2
,� � � , �� , � � (4)� ���� � � ( , , �(�)) ≥ 0
The progr m means th t the rincipal binds the agent to
his participa ion co str int, tha is, he s s t revenue transfer
so th t harvest costs ar cov r d d the age t is n t in
d fici . Although th rincipal might w nt to harvest less than
t mi m sustain l l ( �∗ < �) , he ha to comply
with the sust i ability o straint.
The Lagrangian can be writt n:� = � � , , � � + ��[ ( , , �(�))] (5)
The first-order c ditions implicitly give harvest level �∗
and r venue transfer �∗:�� = �� � ,�� � ,� ��� + ��� ���(� ,� � ,�(�))�� = 0 (6)�� = ��� � ,�� � ,� ��� + ��� � �(� ,� � ,�(�))�� = 0 (7)������ = 0 (8)
When an additional level of harvesting provides, for the
i cipal, an i c e sing marginal utility (���' > 0 ), while it
grants the age t with a dimin shin marginal utility (���' < 0),
Equations (6) nd (7) give:��� =− ���'���' ≠ 0 (9)
2 This is minimum sustain bl harvesting at stake, for the principal is
willing to harvest less while the agent struggl s to reach thi level of
harvesting.
, 
he has to comply with the a n i ity co straint.
The Lag a g an a  be w itten:
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with ��∗ the (optimal) arvest quan ty maximizes t
function d fin d by Equatio (1). In p rtic lar, Equation (2)
states that ��' > 0, which ans th t the princip l' optimal
arvest leve li s within th sustai ability interval, and does
not oth rwise.
From the f regoing, it can b s ated that:
● ��' ≡ �� � ,� ,� ��� ⋛ 0 , based on he princip l's
prefe nces toward non-market goods a d services;
● ��' ≡ �� � ,� ,� ��� < 0 , for the principal ys
agent to execut th ma agem nt plan;
● ��' ≡ �� � ,� ,� �� ⋛ 0 , de ending on principal's
identity function � .
Let us ow analyz h conditio s w ich pr ncipal's
optimal h rvest l ve �∗ i s wi h n ustai bility terval[�, �].
Lemma 1 Th ondition f r the principal's optimal h rvest
leve �∗ o lie w t in [�, �] is��' =− � ��.
Proof Se th Appendix.
Ther by, th optimal harvest leve impli s that th
marginal v ue fro the renewable natur resource harv st
equals the r i l remune ation f th en wable natu l
reso rce management.
2.2 The Age t: Th R ewable Natur l Re ource
Ma ag
Let �� be th value f nction f a risk-neutra agent. We
have previously ssum d that th gent i c ge of the
renewable at r l o rc management is more willi g to
ha ves than the principal. W are int rested in rev aling
ge t's op imal arv st level �∗ within the sustainab lity
interval [�, �]. The g n is end ed it the follo ing v lue
function:�� = ��( � , � , ( )) (3)
here c expresse the arvesting costs and q pe s n �,
f llowing the simpl functional for � = �+ �, whe e v can
be a positive or a negative d v ati n from this leve of
harvesting.
The agent's value f ction ncreases in es urce stock s,
harvest qu nti ies q d i reve u t ansf r r, and decr a in
h rv t costs c. Put anoth r way:
● ��' ≡ �� � ,� � ,� �� ⋛ 0, based on the ag nt's
pref nces toward non-mark t go ds a d services;
● ��' ≡ �� � ,� � ,� �� > 0, for th ag nt is paid by
principal to execut th anagem nt plan;
● ��' ≡ �� � ,� � ,� �� ≤ 0, which involves increas ng
retu ns fr m e resource management.
Le ma 2 The condition f r the ag nt's opti al rvest l ve�∗ to lie w thin [�, �] is−��' �� = �� ��.
Proof See th Appendix.
The timal harv st level implies that the marginal
remu erati n from h renewab natur l resource
management quals the a ginal los f o the bedd
man gement costs.
2.3 The Optim l Co tract with Public Information
o the Sus ai bili y Int rv l
We assume that bo h the principal and ag nt h ve th
k owl dg of sus i a ility interval [�, �]. T princip l then
hooses leve of harve t uch that e maxi izes i utility,
subject to th ag nt's participat on con train (or i d vi u l
rationality (IR) constrai t) nd to mi i u h rves ing le e �
i su d from this su tainability interval:2��� ,� � , � , (4)��� �� ��( , � , ( )) ≥ 0
The program me ns that the p in ipal binds the agent to
his partici at on c str int, that is, he se s the revenu tr fer
so that t rvest s are cover d and the agen is not in
eficit. Alt oug the principal might want to harvest l than
th mini u s s ainable level (�∗ < �) , he s to comply
wit the s stai ability constr i .
r be writte :� = �� � , � � , � � + ���[ ( � , � , �( ))] (5)
The first-order conditions implicit y give harvest l vel �∗
a d re nu tra sf �∗:��� = �� � ,� � ,� �� + � ���(� ,� � ,�(�)) = 0 (6)��� = �� � ,� � ,� ��� + �� ���(� ,� � ,�(�))�� = 0 (7)���� � = 0 (8)
When additional leve of harvesting provides, for the
pr cipal, an increas ng m rgi al utility (��' > 0 ), while it
grants the ag nt wi h diminishing marginal uti ity ( �' < 0),
Eq ations (6) and (7) give:� � =− �'�' ≠ 0 (9)
2 This is mini um s stainable harvesting � a s ake, for th principal is
willing to harvest l s wh le the gen struggles to reach t is level of
harv sting.
 
he first-order conditi ns implic tly give harve t l vel 
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with ��∗ the (optimal) harvest quantity that maximizes the
function defined by Equation (1). In particular, Equation (2)
states that ���' > 0, hich means that the principal's optimal
h rv st level lies within the sustainability int rval, and does
not otherwise.
From the foregoi g, it c n b stated that:
● ���' ≡ ��� � � ,�� � ,� ��� ⋛ 0 , based on the principal's
preferences toward non-market goods and services;
● ���' ≡ ��� � � ,�� � ,� ��� < 0 , for the principal pays the
agent to xecute t e management plan;
● ���' ≡ ��� � � ,�� � ,� ��� ⋛ 0 , depending n principal's
identity function �� � .
Let us now an yze the conditions in which principal's
optimal harves leve ��∗ lies within sustainability interval[�, �].
Lemma 1 The condition for the principal's optimal harvest
level ��∗ to lie within [�, �] is���' =− ��� ����.
Proof See the Appendix.
T ere y, the mal h rvest lev l implies that the
marginal value from the renewabl natural resource harvest
equals the marginal remu eration for the renewable natural
resource management.
2.2 The Agent: The Renewable Nat al R source
Manager
Let �� be the value function of a risk-neutral agent. We
have previously assumed that the agent in charge of th
renewable natural resource management is more willing to
harvest than the principal. We are interested in r vealin
agent's optimal harvest level ��∗ within the sustainability
interval [�, �]. The agent is endowed with the following value
function:�� = ��(� � , � � , �(�)) (3)
where c expresses the harvesting costs and q depends on �,
following the simple functional form � = �+ �, where v can
be a positive or a negative deviation from thi level of
harvesting.
The agent's value function increases in resourc stock s,
harvest quantities q and in revenue transfer r, and decreases in
harvest costs c. Put another way:
● ���' ≡ ��� � � ,� � ,� ��� ⋛ 0, based on th agent's
preferences toward non-market goods and services;
● ���' ≡ ��� � � ,� � ,� ��� > 0, for the agent is paid by the
principal to execute the management plan;
● ���' ≡ ��� � � ,� � ,� ��� ≤ 0, which involves increasi g
returns from the resource man gement.
Lemma 2 The condition for the gen 's opti l harv t l vel��∗ to lie withi [�, �] is−���' ���� = ��� ����.
Pro f See the Appe dix.
The optimal harvest level implies that the m rginal
r muner tio from th renewable natur l resour
m nag ment quals the marginal lo s f om the emb dded
management costs.
2.3 The Opti al Contract with Public Information
o the Sustainability Inte val
We assu e th t both th principal nd the age t have the
knowledge f sust inability int rval [�, �]. The pr ncipa hen
chooses a l l of h vest such tha e maxim zes his utility,
subject to the agent's partic pation con t aint (o ndividual
r tionality (IR) c straint) and to m imum h rvesting evel �
issu from th s susta ability interv l:2����,� �� � � , �� � , � � (4)������� �� �� ��(� � , � � , �(�)) ≥ 0
The program ea s th t th pri cipal bi ds the nt to
his p rticipation constraint, that is, h sets th revenue ransfer
so that the h rvest costs are covered nd t agent i not in
d ficit. Alt ough th principal might want to harvest less th n
the minimum sust inable level (��∗ < �) , he has to comply
with the sustainability constraint.
The L grangian can be writt :� = �� � � , �� � , � � + ���[��(� � , � � , �(�))] (5)
The first-order condition impl citly giv harvest lev l �∗
and revenu tr nsfer �∗:�� = ��� � � ,� � ,� ��� + ��� ���(� � ,� � ,�(�))�� = 0 (6)���� = ��� � � ,�� � ,� ��� + ��� ���(� � ,� � ,�(�))�� = 0 (7)������ = 0 (8)
When n additional lev l of h rvesting provides, fo the
princip l, an i creasi g margin l ut lity (���' > 0 ), while it
g ant the ge t with a d minishing m ginal utility (���' < 0),
Equations (6) a d (7) give:�� =− ���'� �' ≠ 0 (9)
2 This is minimum sustainable harvesting � at stake, for the principal is
willi g to harvest less while the agent struggles to reach this level of
harvesting.
 and  transfer 
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with ��∗ he (o timal) harvest quan ity that aximiz s the
fu ction defined by Equation (1). In p rt cular, Equatio (2)
s a es hat ���' > 0, wh ch mea tha t e princip 's optimal
harvest level lies wi in the susta n b ity int rval, and does
not th rwis .
From the fo eg in , it can b s ated h t:
● ���' ≡ � � � ,�� � ,� �� ⋛ 0 , based on the principal's
pref rences oward non-market g o s and s rvice ;
● ��' ≡ � � � ,�� � ,� �� < 0 , for the principal pays the
agen to execute the managem t plan;
● ��' ≡ � � � , � � ,� �� ⋛ 0 , dependi g principal's
den ity fu ction � .
L t us n w a alyze th co d t ons i w ich principal's
op imal harvest ev ��∗ li s with sustainab li y i terval[�, �].
Le ma 1 The cond tion for the principal's op imal h r est
l vel ��∗ to lie within [ , ] ���' =− �� ��.
Pr of S e t e A pendix.
Th reby, th optim l h rv st level impli s that th
m rginal value fro th renewabl natural r ourc harvest
equals the m rginal remune ation for the enewabl n tural
resource anag m nt.
2.2 T e Agent: e Re wabl Natural R source
Manager
Let �� be the valu f tion of a risk-neutral gent. We
have previou ly a sumed at th age t in c arge of th
r new bl natur l resource nagement is or willing to
harvest than t prin ip l. We ar i terest d in rev aling
agent's ptimal harv st lev l ��∗ wi in th su tainab lity
i erval [�, �]. Th agent is en o ed wit the following value
fu ction:�� = � (� � , � � , �(� ) (3)
wh r c expr ses t e harvesting c d q depe ds on �,
foll wing the simple fu ctional form = �+ , where v can
be a pos tiv r a n gative deviation from this l vel of
harvesting.
The gent's valu fu ction increas s resource tock s,
harvest quan t es q a d n rev e transfe r, and decreases in
harvest cos s c. Pu anoth way:
● ���' ≡ �� � , � , �� ⋛ 0, b sed e t's
pref rences toward non-market g o s and s vices;
● ���' ≡ �� � , � , �� > 0, for the agen is paid by the
principal to execute the manageme t plan;
● ���' ≡ �� � , � , �� ≤ 0, which inv lves incre sing
returns from resourc manag ment.
Lem a 2 The c nd tion f r the agent's ptimal harvest level��∗ to li within [ , �] is− ��' � = � ��.
Pr of S the A p dix.
The optim l harv st leve mplies t at the m rginal
re neration fro renewable natural source
managem nt equals the rgin l o s from the be ded
manag ment costs.
2.3 Th Optimal Contra t wit Public Informatio
n he Susta ability In erva
We a sume that both th principal and the age t have the
k owledge of sustainab lity terv l [�, �]. Th principal then
ch os s level f harvest such t at h aximizes his ut lity,
subjec t the g nt's participati co stra nt (or ndividual
r t onali y (IR) c str int) nd to mi imum harvesting level �
i su d from this stainab lity interval:2� , �� � , �� , (4)� (� , � � , (� ) ≥ 0
The program means t at the pri cipal binds the agent to
his part cipation co s ra n , that i , he s ts revenu ran fer
so that the harve costs ar cov red and the ag t is ot in
deficit. Al ough t e principal might wan to harve t le s than
the minim m sustainabl evel (��∗ < �) , he has to comply
with th sustainab ty co straint.
The La r g a e writte := � � , � � , + ��[� ( , � , �(� )] (5)
The fir t-order cond t ons implicitly give harvest level �∗
and revenue tr sf �∗:�� = � � � ,�� � ,� �� + ��( � , � , (�))� = 0 (6)
� = � � � ,�� ,� �� + ��( , , (�))� = 0 (7)���� = 0 (8)
When an a d tional level of arvestin provides, for the
princip l, n incre sing m rgin l u lity (���' > 0 ), while it
grants the agent wi h a dim ishing m rgina ut lity (���' < 0),
Equations (6) and (7) giv :��� =− ���'���' ≠ 0 (9)
2 This is minimum su tain bl harvesting � at stake, for the rincipal is
willing to harvest less while th ag nt stru gles t r ach this evel of
harvesting.
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with ��∗ the (optimal) harvest quantity that maximizes the
function defined by Equation (1). In particular, Equation (2)
states that ���' > 0, which means that the princip l's optimal
harvest level lies within the sustainability interval, and does
not otherwise.
From the foregoing, it can be stated that:
● ��' ≡ � � � � ,� � ,� �� ⋛ 0 , based on the principal's
preferences toward non-market goods and services;
● ���' ≡ � � � � ,� � ,� �� < 0 , for he principal pays the
gent to execute the an gement plan;
● ���' ≡ � � � � ,� � ,� � ⋛ 0 , depending principal's
identity function �� � .
Let us now analyze the conditio s in which principal'
optimal harvest level ��∗ lies within sustainability interval[�, �].
L mma 1 Th condition for th principal's optimal harvest
level ��∗ to lie within [�, �] is���' =− ��� � .
Proof S the A pend x.
Ther by, the optimal harv st level impli s that the
marginal value from the renewable na ur l resourc h rvest
equals the m rginal remuneration for the renewable natural
resource an gement.
2.2 The Agent: The Ren wable Natural R source
anager
Let �� be the v lue functi of risk-neutral agent. W
hav previously as umed that the agent in charge of the
renewable atural resource m agement i more wil ing o
harve t t an the p incipal. We re nterested in revealing
ag nt's optimal har st level ��∗ within the t i ilit
interval [�, �]. The ag t is endo ed ith the fol owing val e
function:�� = ��(� � , � � , (�) (3)
where c expres es the arvesting costs and q depends on �,
fol owing the simpl functional form � = �+ �, wh re v can
be a positive or a negative deviation from this level of
harvestin .
The age 's value function incre ses in resource stock s,
quantities q and in revenue transfer r, and decreases in
harvest costs c. Put another way:
● ���' ≡ � � � ,� ,� �� ⋛ 0, based o the age t's
pre erences t ward non-mark t goods nd services;
● ���' ≡ � � � , ,� �� > 0, fo the agent is paid by the
principal to execute the management plan;
● ���' ≡ � � � , ,� �� ≤ 0, which volv s increasing
returns from the resource managem t.
Le ma 2 The condition for the agent's optimal h rv st level��∗ t lie within [�, �] is−���' � = �� � .
Proof S the Appendix.
The o timal harv st level implies th t the marginal
remun ation from t re ewable natural resource
equals the marginal los from the embedded
m n gement osts.
2.3 The Optimal Contract with Publi Info mati n
the Sustainability Interval
We s ume that both the principal and t age t have t
knowledge of sustainab lity interval [�, �]. The princip l then
hooses level of harvest suc that he maximizes hi utility,
subject o the agen 's participation constrai t (o individual
rationality (IR) constraint) and to minimum harvesti g l vel �
is ued from this sustainability interval:2����, � � � , �� � , � � (4)� �� �� � � ��(� � , � � , �(�) ≥ 0
The program means tha the principal binds t age t to
his p r cipation constraint, that is, he sets the rev ue transfer
so that the harvest costs are c vered and the gent is not i
d ficit. Although the princ pal igh want to harvest les than
the minimum sustainable level (��∗ < �) , he has to comply
with th sust inability constr int.
The Lagrangian can be writ en:� = �� � � , �� � , � � + �� [��(� � , � � , �(�) ] (5)
The first-order conditio implicitly give harvest level �∗
and revenue transfer �∗:
� = � � � � ,� � ,� �� + � � �(� � ,� � , (�) = 0 (6)
� = � � � � ,� � ,� �� + � � �(� � ,� � , (�)� = 0 (7)
� � = 0 (8)
When additional level of harvesting provides, for the
principal, an increasing marginal utility (���' > 0 ), while it
grants the agent with a diminishing marginal utility (���' < 0),
Equations (6) and (7) give:�� =− '���' ≠ 0 (9)
2 This is minimum sustainable harvesting � at stake, for t e principal is
wil ing to harvest les while t agent strug les to reach this level of
harvesting.
 (7)
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w th �∗ the (optimal) harv st quantity t maximizes t e
function de in d by Equation (1). I particular, Equati n (2)
st tes that ���' > 0, whic mean a pr nc p l's o t mal
harves lev l l es within the sus a ability interval, and does
not othe wis .
From the foregoi g, it can be stated that:
● ���' ≡ ��� � ,� � , ��� ⋛ 0 , base o the princi al's
preferences towa d non-market g ods d s vi es;
● ���' ≡ ��� � ,� � , ��� < 0 , for th pri cipal ays the
agent to execut he manag m nt pl n;
● ���' ≡ ��� � ,� � , �� ⋛ 0 , depending on principal's
identi y func io �� .
L t us ow analyze the c ditions in wh ch pri l's
opti l ar t level ��∗ li it i st i ability i ter al[ , ].
Lem a 1 Th co dition for t e principal's optimal harvest
level ��∗ to lie within [�, �] is���' =− ��� ���.
Proof S the Appen x.
The eby, the pti al arvest level implies that t e
margin l value from the re wable a u al resource ha ves
equals the mar inal re uneration for the re ewable natural
resource managem nt.
2.2 The A ent: The Renewab Na ura R o ce
Ma ager
L t �� be th value f nction of risk- eutr l ag nt. We
hav previously ssum d th t the n charge of the
rene able atural r sourc m nag m t is or willing to
h rve t han th p incipa . We are n erested in reve ling
agent's opt mal arv st lev l ��∗ ithin the susta ability
interval [�, �]. The agen is endowed with th following value
function:�� = ��( � , � � , �(�)) (3)
where c expr s es th arvesti g o ts d q depends on �,
following the imple functi na orm � = �+ �, w re v n
be a posi v or a negative deviation rom this level f
harvestin .
T age 's value functio i rease in esourc stock ,
quantities q and i revenue transfer r, and decreases in
harvest costs c. Pu ano her way:
● ���' ≡ ��� � � ,� ,� ��� ⋛ 0, b s d o the g n 's
preferences towa d non-market g ods nd services;
● ��' ≡ ��� � � ,� ,� ��� > 0, for th age t is paid by the
principal to execute the manag m nt pl n;
● ���' ≡ ��� � � ,� ,� ��� ≤ 0, wh ch involves incr asing
returns from t r source ma ag m .
Lem a 2 Th condition for the agent's optimal harvest level��∗ to lie within [�, �] is−���' ��� = ��� ���.
Proof See the App ndix.
Th optimal harve t lev l impli s th the arginal
remun r tio fro the e ewable natural re ourc
qual the argi al l ss from the embedded
management costs.
2.3 The Optim l Con ac with Public I fo matio
on the Sustain bility I terv l
We assum ha both the principal nd the agent hav
kn wledge of sustainabi ity int rv l [�, �]. The principal then
choos s a l vel f h rvest such th he maximizes h s utility,
subj ct to the age 's particip ion constr int (or ind vidual
rationality (IR) con raint) and to m imum harvesting level �
issu d from this sustainability interval:2
, � , , (4)������� �� �� ��( � , � � , �(�)) ≥ 0
The rogram me ns th th principal binds the age t to
his p rticipation constr int, th t is, h s ts the r v ue tra sfer
s that the a ves costs a vered and th gen is no i
defici . Although he pr cip l might wa t to harvest less than
the mi i u susta nable level (��∗ < �) , he has to comply
with t sust ability constra n .
The Lagrangi n c n be written:� = �� � , �� , � + ���[ �( � , � , �(�))] (5)
Th first-ord conditions implicitly g ve harvest level �∗
and r venue transfer �∗:� = ��� � ,� � , ��� + �� ���(� � , � ,�(�))� = 0 (6)�� = ��� � ,� � , ��� + ��� ���(� , � ,�(�))�� = 0 (7)
���� = 0 (8)
When an addition l lev l of harves ng pro ides for t e
p incip l, n r sing rginal util y (���' > 0 ), while t
grants the a nt wi a diminishing marg nal utility (���' < 0),
Equations (6) nd (7) give:��� =− ����' ≠ 0 (9)
2 Thi is minimum su tainable harvest g � at stake, for the principal is
willing o harvest less while the agent struggles to reach thi level of
harvesting.
       ( )
  ition l level of harvesting provides, for 
the p i cipal, an incre sing marginal utility (
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with ��∗ the (optimal) harvest ntity hat maximizes th
f nction defined by Equa ion (1). In particular, Equatio (2)
s at s that ���' > 0, which m a s that th pr cipal' optimal
harvest level lies within the sust in bility i erval, and does
not oth rwise.
From the foregoing, it can b stat tha :
● � �' ≡ �� � � ,�� � ,� ��� ⋛ 0 , based n the princ pal's
preferences toward no -market goods d se vices;
● ���' ≡ �� � � ,�� � ,� ��� < 0 , for the principal pays the
agent to execute th management la ;
● ���' ≡ �� � � ,�� � ,� ��� ⋛ 0 , depending on principal's
ide tity function �� � .
L t us now analyze t e condit ons n which principal's
opti al harvest level ��∗ lies within sustain bility n erval[�, �].
Lemm 1 T c ndition for the principal's optimal harv st
l v l ��∗ to lie within [�, �] is���' =− ��� ����.
Proof S e the ppendix.
Th reby, t optimal h rvest l vel implies that the
arginal valu from the rene abl atural reso rce harve t
equals the marginal remuneration for the renewable natural
resource managem t.
2.2 The Age t: The Renewable Natural Resource
Manager
Let �� b the value f nctio of a ri k-n utral agent. We
ave p eviously assumed that h age t in cha e of the
renewabl natur resourc management is more willing to
harvest t n the principal. W are terested in reveali g
age t's optimal harvest l vel ∗ wi in the s stainability
nterval [�, �]. The agent is endowed with the following value
function:�� = ��(� � , � � , �(�)) (3)
where c xpresses the harvesting costs nd q d pe ds on ,
following the simple functional f r � = �+ �, whe v can
be a positive or a negative deviati n from this level of
harve ting.
The age t's value f ctio inc e ses in source stock s,
harv st q ti ies q d in r v ue tr sfer r, and dec ses in
harvest costs c. Put an h r w y:
● � �' ≡ ��� � � ,� � ,��� ⋛ 0, based the ag nt's
preferences toward non-ma k t goods n services;
● ���' ≡ ��� � � ,� � ,� ��� > 0, for the ag nt is paid by the
principal t exec t management pla ;
● ���' ≡ ��� � � ,� � ,� ��� ≤ 0, which i volves increasing
returns from the resource ma agement.
Le m 2 The condition for the agent's optimal harvest level��∗ to li withi [�, �] is−���' �� = ��� ����.
Proof See the App dix.
The ptimal har st lev l i plies that the marginal
remuner tion from the renewable natural resource
a agement equals the marginal loss from the embedded
management costs.
2.3 The Op imal Cont ct with Public Infor ation
on the Sustainability In erval
We a sume that both th principal d the gent have th
k ow dge of su ain ilit in erv l [�, ]. The principal then
chooses a lev l of harvest such th t he maximiz s his tility,
subject to he age t's part cipation con raint (or i dividual
rati nality (IR) co strai t) an to minimu harvesting level �
issued from thi sustainability interval:2
�,� � , � � , � (4)������� �� �� ��(� � , � � , �(�)) ≥ 0
Th pr gr m me ns t at the princip l bi ds th agent to
is p ticipation constraint, th t is, sets the revenue transfer
so that the harvest cost are cov red nd th agent is not in
deficit. Although the principal mig t w t t harvest less than
mi imum sustainable level (��∗ < �) , he has to comply
with the sust inability constraint.
The Lagrangian ca be written:� = �� � � , �� � , � � + ���[��(� � , � � , �(�))] (5)
The first-orde conditions implicitly give harvest level �∗
and revenue tr nsfer ∗:��� = �� � � ,�� � ,� � + � � ���(� � ,� � ,�(�))� = 0 (6)���� = �� � � ,�� � ,� ��� + ��� ���(� � ,� � ,�(�))�� = 0 (7)������ = 0 (8)
When n additional leve of harvesting provides, for the
princip l, a increas ng marginal utili � �' > 0 ), while it
grants the agent with a diminishing marginal utility (���' < 0),
Equations (6) and (7) give:��� =− ���'���' ≠ 0 (9)
2 This is minimum sust inable harvesting � t stake, for the principal is
willi g to harvest less while the agent struggles to reach this level of
harvesting.
, 
while t grants the agent with a diminishing marginal 
utility (
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with ��∗ the (optimal) harvest quantity that maximizes he
function defined by Equ tion (1). In particular, Equation (2)
stat s that ���' > 0, which means that the pri cipal's optimal
harvest level lies within the sustainability interval, a d d es
not otherwise.
From the foregoing, it can be stated that:
● ���' ≡ ��� � � ,�� � ,� ��� ⋛ 0 , based on the principal's
pre e ces toward non-mark t goods and services;
● ���' ≡ ��� � � ,�� � ,� ��� < 0 , for the principal pays the
agent to execute the management plan;
● ���' ≡ ��� � � ,�� � ,� ��� ⋛ 0 , dependi g on principal's
identity function �� � .
Let us n w analyze the conditions in which principal's
optimal harvest lev l ��∗ lies within sustainability interval[�, �].
Lemm 1 The c ndition f r the principal's optimal harv st
l vel ��∗ to lie within [�, �] is���' =− ��� ����.
Proof See the Appendix.
Thereby, the optimal harvest level implie at t e
marginal value from the renewable natural h rvest
equals t e marginal remuneration for the renewabl nat ral
resource ma ag ment.
2.2 The Agent: The Renewable Na ural R source
Manager
Let �� be th value function of a risk-neu ral g t. We
have previously assumed hat the agent in charge f the
renewable natural resource management is mo e willing t
harvest than the principal. W are interested in revealing
agent's optimal harvest level ��∗ within the su tai ability
i terval [�, �]. The agent is endowed with t e following value
function:�� = ��(� � , � � , �(�)) (3)
wher c express s the harv sting costs and q depend n �,
following the simple functional form � = �+ �, where v an
be a positive o a negative deviation from this lev l of
harvesting.
The agent's value function increases in resource stock s,
harvest quantities q and in revenue transfer r, and decre ses i
harvest costs c. Put another way:
● ���' ≡ ��� � � ,� ,� ��� ⋛ 0, based on the agent's
preferences toward non-market goods and services;
● ���' ≡ ��� � � ,� � ,� ��� > 0, for the agent is paid by th
principal to execut the m nag ment plan;
● ���' ≡ � � � ,� � ,� ��� ≤ 0, which inv lves increasing
e urns from the resource management.
Lemma 2 The condition for the gent's optimal harv st l vel∗ t lie within [ , ] is−���' ���� = ��� ����.
Proof See the App nd x.
The optimal harvest level implies that the arginal
remunerati n fr m the ren w bl atural resour
man gem nt equ ls the rgin l loss from the embedd d
t costs.
2.3 The Optimal Contract w th Publi Information
on the Sustai b lity Interv l
We a sume that both the p inc pal nd the agent h ve the
knowledge of sustainab lity in rval [�, �]. The pri cipal n
cho ses a l el of h rvest such t t h maximizes his tility,
subject to the gent's participati n constr int (or individual
rati ali y (IR) constrai t) and to minimum harvesting level �
issued from this sustainab lity interval:2����,� �� � � , �� � , � � (4)������� � �� ��(� � , � � , �(�)) ≥ 0
prog a means th t the prin ipal binds th ag nt to
is participation constrai t, that i , he sets the revenue transfer
so that th harvest costs are covered and the agent is not in
deficit. Alth ugh the pri cipal ight ant to harvest less tha
t mum s st abl level (��∗ < �) , he has to comply
with the sust inabili y const aint.
Th Lagrangia can b writte :� = � � , �� � , � � + ���[��(� � , � , �(�))] (5)
The firs -order con itions implicitly give h rvest lev l ∗
and revenue trans er �∗:���� = ��� � ,�� � ,� ��� + �� ���(� � ,� ,�(�))�� = 0 (6)���� = ��� � � ,�� � ,� ��� + �� ���(� � ,� � ,�(�))�� = 0 (7)������ = 0 (8)
W n a dditi nal level of harvesting provides, for the
principal, an increasing marginal utility (���' > 0 ), while it
grants the agent wit d minishing marginal utilit (� �' < ),
Equations (6) and (7) give:��� =− ���'���' ≠ (9)
2 This is mi imum sustainable harvesting � at stake, for the principal is
willing to harvest less while the agent struggl to r ach this level f
harvesting.
), Equations (6) and (7) give:
i l | l | u |
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ti fi ti . ti l , ti
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l l l it i t t i ilit i t l,
t t i .
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The prim consid ration of this note is to understand how -
- when i comes to managing renewable natural resources --
the age ' privat information may com into conflict with
the objective of a principal, be it a secondary topic that has
been n glected in the lit rature. We thus model the
contractual relationship between principal and an agent as
regards the renewabl natural resource management. In the
ituation of an imperfect information setting, we find that the
Pareto-optimal contracting depends on the probab l ty th t the
level of harvesting stan s outsid the sust inab lity i terval.
This puts the Pareto-optimal llo atio s i jeop rdy. The
information rent held by the agent b ing u avoidable,
stepping outside the sustainability interval implies the
possibility of depletion of he re ewable natural resour e.
This potential ecological overshoot, which occurs when
human demand exceeds the regenerative capacity of a natural
ecosystem, puts the Earth on an unsustainable trajectory.
Aft r hi starting section, we de cribe the odel in
Section 2, with a focus on the principal-agent relationship in a
perfect information setting (Subsection 2.3) and when the
age t owns private information on the sustainable level of
harvesting (Subsection 2.4). Section 3 concl de .
2. A Principal-agent M del in R ne able
Natural Resource Management
We consid r a principal who delegates the management of
a r newable natural resource of stock s to an agent. The
principal and the agent have to agree upon a quantity to be
harvested q from the renewable atural r source levels owned
by the principal. Stock s is considered as a proxy of the
natural resource amenities, which are all non-market goods
and services related to the existence of this resource [8]. T e
sustainable harvesting of renewable natural resources, such
that the stock remains unchanged or ���� = 0 , means that the
level of harvest matches with the level of the resource’s
natural growth. Unsustainable harvesting can be envisaged in
two ways. When ��� > 0 , the scenario corresponds to the
damages issued from the resource over-stocking [3]. The
absence of implementation of a management plan is one
possible way to envisage such a context. When ���� < 0 , the
scenario implies the ov r-harvesting of the stock and the
depletion of the renewable natural resource. Finally, the
principal gives revenue share r to the agent for the renewable
natural resource management, harvesting included, such that���� > 0.
The principal and the agent can have different preferences
on how to conduct the renewable natural resource
management. For instance, the agent could have stronger
preferences for income from harvesting, while the principal
could have stronger preferences for preserving the resource’s
natural and environmental amenities.
In the knowledge that the renewable natural resource
harvesting must not jeopardize its sustainability, interval[�, �] defines the bounding minimum and maximum levels of
harvesting. It is the set of possible actions to be undertaken in
purpose of the sustainable resource management. In detail,
there is maximum level of harvesting beyond which the
resource is depleted. As a result, the resource cannot be
renewed and no longer provides natural and environmental
amenities. There is also a minimum level of harvesting below
which amenities start to van sh. This can be explained by the
absence of a ma age ent plan. Therefore, q has to lie
somewhere within this interval. These assumptions implicitly
mean that, in a specific range of harvesting levels, resourc s
and natural and environmental amenities are complementary.
If we assume that the principal has stronger preferences for
the stock conservation than the agent, the objectives of the
parties should differ. The principal's harvesting objective will
tend to b a low lev l of harvest, he ce run ng the risk of
b ing below �. On the co trary, the agent will seek to harvest
beyo d t is lev l.1 The knowledge of the interval of the
sustainable levels of harvesting is crucial. The key issue of the
contract setting is the information gap as to this interval. We
will thus consider that this interval can correspond either to
common knowledge or to a private information.
2.1 The Principal: The Renewable Natural Resource
Owner
Let �� be the value function of a risk-neutral principal.
This value function is decreasing in revenue transfer r paid to
the agent. However, the effect of renewable natural resource
stock s and harvesting q on the value function is ambiguous,
since harvesting generates revenues but, at the same time,
reduces utility by diminishing the levels of natural and
environmental amenities. While the principal is willing to
harvest less than the agent, the question is whether principal's
optimal harvest level ��∗ lies or not within sustainability
interval [�, �]. The principal's value function is defined by:�� = ��(� � , �� � , � � ) (1)
where �� � represents the principal's identity function such
that:�� � ≔ ��∗ > � �����' = ���(�,�,�)�� ≤ 0��∗ ≤ � �����' = ��� �,�,��� > 0 (2)
1 The opposite assumption yields symmetric results with respect to
maximum level �.
 at stake, for  principal 
is willing to harve t le s while the a e t t l  t   t i  l l f 
harvesting.
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���'���' = ���'���' (10)
From Equation (8), we know that the agent's participation
constraint is binding, that is, the information rent is set to zero.
The sign in Equation (9) indicates that an optimum exists. At
last, Equation (10) means that the first-best contractual
harvesting is when the principal's and the agent's ratios of
marginal values equate.
Thecomplete information efficientharvesting level is such that:�∗ < � (11)
Indeed, the principal cannot request to harvest outside the
sustainability interval, so that the agent harvests up to the
minimum sustainable level. Besides, harvesting diminishes
the principal's marginal utility outside the sustainability
interval.
The following proposition ensues.
Proposition 1 In case of a perfect information setting, the
Pareto-optimal contracting implies a level of harvest at least
equal to the lower bound of -- and thus inside -- the
sustainability interval, such that the principal's value function
remains unchanged.
Proof See the Appendix.
Proposition 1 uncovers the fact that the optimal contracting
does not affect the principal's value function, so that the marginal
costs and benefits from harvestingcanceleach other.3
2.4 The Optimal Contract with Private Information
on the Sustainability Interval
In an imperfect information case, the principal does not
know what the sustainable harvest interval is. The
information is privately held by the agent. This time, the
agent announces an interval [�, �] to the principal, where the
bounds depend on his own optimal levels of harvesting. The
private knowledge of the sustainability interval gives the
agent an opportunity to over-estimate the minimum
harvesting level.4 This in turn stimulates the principal to
accept a more intensive level of harvesting.
Following[7], we assume that � ∙ is a continuous
distribution function, with a positive density � ∙ , that
describes the prior of the principal over the set of potential
minimum levels of sustainable harvesting [0, �] .5 The
principal maximizes his expected value function subject to
3 This property only holds because we study the case of renewable
natural resources.
4 It is our only variable of interest, since we assume that the principal
is less willing to harvest than the agent.
5 The possible set of harvest goes from no harvesting (� = 0) to clear-
cutting of the whole stock (� = �), even if the latter is never reached.
the agent's individual rationality (IR) and incentive
compatibility (IC) constraints:����,� 0��� � � , �� � , � � �(�)��� (12)������� �� �� �� � � , � � , � � ≥ 0�� �� � � , � � , � � − �� � � , � � , � � ≥ 0
Based on the above, the principal is maximizing his
surplus by integrating his payoff function over � . Although
this value is provided by the agent, the principal reveals his
preferences regarding �.
The risk is that the agent attempts to signal a level of� which maximizes his payoff function at a cost to the
principal. Indeed, the agent sends a signal of the minimal
sustainable harvesting level, but the principal ignores whether this
signal is an honest one. Since the agent knows that both players
disagree on the harvest level, and that the interval defining the
sustainable harvest is his private information, he might want to
belie on � and choose a level that can lower the principal's payoff.
In consequence, the principal has to maximize his value function
over density �(�) , knowing that the real �(�) is somewhere
between0 and s.
Two casesare possible:
In case ��∗ ≥ ��∗(�) , the principal and the agent implicitly
agree on the harvesting volume. Therefore, both the principal and
the agent enter into a contract that optimizes their respective
payoff functions. Indeed, ��∗(�) saturates the participation
constraint.
In case ��∗ < ��∗(�) , the principal and the agent implicitly
disagree on the harvesting volume. Given that ��∗(�) > 0, for the
natural resource management includes some non-null resource
maintenance, we have 0 < ��∗ < ��∗ . This time, the harvesting
leveldoes notgive theagentan incentive to contract.
The IC constraint is a maximizing argument. Hence, we
have to look at the optimal conditions. The optimal condition
of the IC constraint, that is, �(�(�), �(�)) ≥ �(�(�),�(�))∀[0,�], is given by:
0=
�� � � ,� ��� � � � = �(�)
The second-order condition of the IC constraint is:
0≥ �2�(�(�),�(�))��(�)2 � � = �(�)
We define the Hamiltonian of the associated maximization
problem:� = �� � � , �� � , � � �(�)
+ ���[�� � � , � � , � � ]
+ ��� ��� � � ,� � ,� ��� (13)
 ( )
From Equation (8),  we know that  the agent 's 
participation constraint is binding, that is, the information 
rent is set to zero. The sign in Equation (9) indicates that 
an optimum exists. At last, Equation (10) means that the 
first-best contractual harvesting is when the principal's 
and the agent's ratios of marginal values equate.
The complete information efficient harvesting level is 
such that:
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From Equation (8), we know that the agent's particip t
constrain is binding, that s, the information rent is set to zero.
The sign in Equation (9) indicates that an opti um exists. At
la t, Equation (10) me ns that the first-best co tractual
harvestin is when the principal's and th agent's ratios of
marginal values quate.
Thecomplete information efficientharvesting level is such that:�∗ < � (11)
Indeed, the principal cannot request to harvest outside the
sustainability interval, so that the agent harvests up to the
minimum sustainable level. Besides, harvesting diminishes
the principal's marginal utility outside the sustainability
interval.
The following proposition ensues.
Proposition 1 In case of a perfect information setting, the
Pareto-optimal contracting implies a level of harvest at least
equal to the lower bound of -- and thus inside -- the
sustainability interval, such that the principal's value function
remains unchanged.
Proof See the Appendix.
Proposition 1 uncovers the fact that the optimal contracting
does not affect the principal's value function, so that the marginal
costs and benefits from harvestingcanceleach other.3
2.4 The Optimal Contract with Private Information
on the Sustainability Interval
In an imperfect information case, the principal does not
know what the sustainable harvest interval is. The
information is privately held by the agent. This time, the
agent announces an interval [�, �] to the principal, where the
bounds depend on his own optimal levels of harvesting. The
private knowledge of the sustainability interval gives the
agent an opportunity to over-estimate the minimum
harvesting level.4 This in turn stimulates the principal to
accept a more intensive level of harvesting.
Following[7], we assume that � ∙ is a continuous
distribution function, with a positive density � ∙ , that
describes the prior of the principal over the set of potential
minimum levels of sustainable harvesting [0, �] .5 The
principal maximizes his expected value function subject to
3 This property only holds because we study the case of renewable
natural resources.
4 It is our only v iable of interest, since we assume that the principal
is less willing to harvest than the agent.
5 The p ssible set of harvest goes from no harvesting (� = 0) to clear-
cutting of the whole stock (� = �), even if the latter is never reached.
the agent's individual rationality (IR) and incentive
compatibility (IC) constraints:����,� 0��� � � , �� � , � � �(�)��� (12)������� �� �� �� � � , � � , � � ≥ 0�� �� � � , � � , � � − �� � � , � � , � � ≥ 0
Based on the above, the principal is maximizing his
surplus by integrating his payoff function over � . Although
this value is provided by the agent, the principal reveals his
preferences regarding �.
The risk is that the agent attempts to signal a level of� which maximizes his payoff function at a cost to the
principal. Indeed, the agent sends a signal of the minimal
sustainable harvesting level, but the principal ignores whether this
signal is an honest one. Since the agent knows that both players
disagree on the harvest level, and that the interval defining the
sustainable harvest is his private information, he might want to
belie on � and choose a level that can lower the principal's payoff.
In consequence, the principal has to maximize his value function
over density �(�) , knowing that the real �(�) is somewhere
between0 and s.
Two casesare possible:
In case ��∗ ≥ ��∗(�) , the principal and the agent implicitly
agree on the harvesting volume. Therefore, both the principal and
the agent enter into a contract that optimizes their respective
payoff functions. Indeed, ��∗(�) saturates the participation
constraint.
In case ��∗ < ��∗(�) , the principal and the agent implicitly
disagree on the harvesting volume. Given that ��∗(�) > 0, for the
natural resource management includes some non-null resource
maintenance, we have 0 < ��∗ < ��∗ . This time, the harvesting
leveldoes notgive theagentan incentive to contract.
The IC constraint is a maximizing argument. Hence, we
have to look at the optimal conditions. The optimal condition
of the IC constraint, that is, �(�(�), �(�)) ≥ �(�(�),�(�))∀[0,�], is given by:
0=
�� � � ,� ��� � � � = �(�)
The second-order condition of the IC constraint is:
0≥ �2�(�(�),�(�))��(�)2 � � = �(�)
We define the Hamiltonian of the associated maximization
problem:� = �� � � , �� � , � � �(�)
+ ���[ � � , � � , � � ]
+ ��� ��� � � ,� � ,� ��� (13)
 (11)
Indee ,  rincipal ca not request to harvest outsid  
the susta nabili y interval, so that the agent harvests up 
to the minimum sustainable lev l. Besides, harvesting 
diminishes the principal's marginal utility ou s de the 
sustainability interval.
The f  proposition ensues.
Pr ion 1 In case of a perfect information setting, 
the Pareto-optimal contracting imp ies a level of harve  
at least equal t  the lower b und of -- and thus inside -- 
the sustainab li y interval, such that the principal's value 
function remai s unchanged. 
Proof   endix.
Pr os tion 1 uncovers the fact that the ptimal 
contrac ing does not affect the princ pal's value function, 
so th t th  marginal cost  and ben fits from harvesting 
cancel each other.d
2.4 The Optim l Contract with Private Information 
on the Sustainability Interval
In an imperfect information cas , the p incipal does 
not know what the sustainable harvest interval is. T  
informati n is privat ly held by t  agent. This time, 
the agent annou ce  an interv l 
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The prime consideration of this note is to understand how -
- when it comes to managing renewable natural resources --
the agent's private information may co e in o onflict with
the objective of a principal, be it a sec dary opic that has
been neglected in the literature. We thus model the
contractual relationship between a principal and an age t as
regards the renewable natural resource management. In the
situation of an imperfect information setting, we fi d that the
Pareto-optimal contracting depends on the probability that the
level of harvesting stands outside the sustainability interval.
This puts the Pareto-optimal allocations in jeopardy. The
information rent held by the agent being unavoidable,
stepping outside the sustainability int rval implies the
possibility of depletion of the renewable natural resource.
This potential ecological overshoot, which occurs when
human demand exceeds the regenerative capacity of a natural
ecosystem, puts the Earth on an unsustainable trajectory.
After this starting section, we desc ibe the mod l in
Section 2, with a focus on the principal-agent relationship in a
perfect information setting (Subsection 2.3) and when the
agent owns private information on the su tainable level o
harvesting (Subsection 2.4). Section 3 concludes.
2. A Principal-agent Model in Renewable
Natural Resource Management
We consider a principal who delegates the management of
a renewable natural resource of stock s to an agent. The
principal and the agent have to agree upon a quantity to be
harvested q from the renewable natural resource levels owned
by the principal. Stock s is considered as a proxy of the
natural resource amenities, which are all non-market goods
and services related to the existence of this resource [8]. The
sustainable harvesting of renewable natural resources, such
that the stock remains unchanged or ���� = 0 , means that the
level of harvest matches with the level of the resource’s
natural growth. Unsustainable harvesting can be envisaged in
two ways. When ���� > 0 , the scenario corresponds to the
damages issued from the resource over-stocking [3]. The
absence of implementation of a management plan is one
possible way to envisage such a context. When ���� < 0 , the
scenario implies the over-harvesting of the stock and the
depletion of the renewable natural resource. Finally, the
principal gives revenue share r to the agent for the renewable
natural resource management, harvesting included, such that���� > 0.
The principal and the agent can have different preferences
on how to conduct the renewable natural resource
management. For instance, the agent could have stronger
preferences for income from harvesting, while the principal
could have stronger preferences for preserving the resource’s
natural and e vironmental amenities.
In the kno ledge that the renewable natural resource
harvesting must not jeopardize its sustainability, interval[�, �] defines the bounding minimum and maximum levels of
harvesting. It is the set of possible actions to be undertaken in
p rpose of the sustainable resource management. In detail,
there is a maximum level of harvesting beyond which the
resource is depleted. As a result, the resource cannot be
renew d and no longer provides natural and environmental
amenities. There is also a minimum level of harvesting below
which amenities start to vanish. This can be explained by the
absence of a management plan. Therefore, q has to lie
somewhere within this interval. These assumptions implicitly
mean that, in a specific range of harvesti g levels, res urces
and natural and environmental amenities are complementary.
If we assume that the principal has stronger preferences for
the stock conservation than the agent, the objectives of the
parties should differ. The principal's harvesting objective will
tend to be a low level of harvest, hence running the risk of
being below �. On the contrary, the agent will seek to harvest
beyond this level.1 The knowledge of the interval of the
sustainable levels of harvesting is crucial. The key issue of the
contract setting is the information gap as to this interval. We
will thus consider that this interval can correspond either to
common knowledge or to a private information.
2.1 The Principal: The Renewable Natural Resource
Owner
Let �� be the value function of a risk-neutral principal.
This value function is decreasing in revenue transfer r paid to
the agent. However, the effect of renewable natural resource
stock s and harvesting q on the value function is ambiguous,
since harvesting generates revenues but, at the same time,
reduces utility by diminishing the levels of natural and
environmental amenities. While the principal is willing to
harvest less than the agent, the question is whether principal's
optimal harvest level ��∗ lies or not within sustainability
interval [�, �]. The principal's value function is defined by:�� = ��(� � , �� � , � � ) (1)
where �� � represents the principal's identity function such
that:�� � ≔ ��∗ > � �����' = ���(�,�,�)�� ≤ 0��∗ ≤ � �����' = ��� �,�,��� > 0 (2)
1 The opposite assumption yields symmetric results with respect to
maximum level �.
 to the pr cipal, 
where the bounds depend on his own optim l le ls  
harvesting. The private knowl dge of the sustainability 
interval iv s the agent an oppor unity to over-esti ate 
the mini um harvesting l vel.e This i  turn timu a s the 
principal to accept a more intensive level of harvesting.
Following[7], we assume that F( ▪ ) s a c ntinuous 
distrib tion functi n, with a ositi e density f ( ▪ ), that 
describes the prior of the principal over the set of potential 
minimum levels of sustainable harv sting [0, s].f The 
principal maximizes his expected value function subje t 
d is rt  l  l s se       
natural res urces.
e It is our only variable of interest, since we assume that the principal is 
less willing to harvest than the agent.
f The possible set of harvest goes from no harvesting (q=0) to clear-
cu ting of the whol  stock (q=s), even if the latter is never reached.
to the agent’s i ividual rationality (I ) and incentive 
compatibility (I ) tr ints:
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From quation (8), e kno that the agent's participation
constraint is binding, that is, the for tion rent is set to zer .
The sign n Equation (9) ndicates that n ptimum exist . At
last, Eq ation (10) me s that e first-best con rac ual
harvesting is when the p incip l's and t agent's ratios of
marginal values equate.
Theco plete information efficientharvesting level is such that:�∗ < � (11)
Indeed, the principal cannot request to harvest outside the
sustainability interval, so that the agent harvests up to the
minimum sustainable level. Besides, harvesting diminishes
the principal's marginal utility outside the sustainability
interval.
The following proposition ensues.
Proposition 1 In case of a perfect information setting, the
Pareto-optimal contracting implies a level of harvest at least
equal to the lower bound of -- and thus inside -- the
sustainability interval, such that the principal's value function
remains unchanged.
Proof See t e Appendix.
Proposition 1 uncovers the fact that the optimal contracting
does n t affect the principal's value func ion, s that the ma ginal
co ts and b nefits from harvestingcanceleach other.3
2.4 The Optimal Contract with Private Information
on the Sustainabilit Interval
In an imperfect information case, the principal does not
know what th sustainable harvest i terval is. Th
informatio is privately held by the agent. This time, the
agent announces an interval [�, �] to the principal, where the
b unds depend on hi own optimal l vels of harvesting. The
private knowledge of the sustainability int rval gives the
agent an opportunity to over-estimate the minimum
harvesting level.4 This in turn stimulates the principal to
accept a more intensive level of harvesting.
Following[7], we assume that � ∙ is a continuous
distribution function, with a positive density � ∙ , that
describes the prior of the principal over the set of potential
minimum levels of sustainable harvesting [0, �] .5 The
principal maximizes his expected value function subject to
3 This property onl holds because we study the case of renewable
natural resources.
4 It is our only variable of interest, since we assume that the principal
is less willing to harvest than the agent.
5 The possible set of harvest goes from no harvesting (� = 0) to clear-
cutting of the whole stock (� = �), even if the latter is never reached.
the agent's individual rationality (IR) and ince tive
atibility (IC) constraints:����,� 0��� � � , �� � , � � �(�)��� (12)������ � �� �� � � , � , � � ≥ 0�� �� � � , � , � − �� � � , � � , � � ≥ 0
Based on the above, the principal is maximizing his
surplus by integrating his payoff function over � . Although
this value is provided by the agent, the principal reveals his
preferences regarding �.
Th risk is that the agent attempts to signal a level of� which maximizes his payoff function at a cost to the
principal. Indeed, th agent sends a signal of the minimal
sustainable harvesting level, but the principal ignores whether this
signal is an honest one. Since the agent knows that both players
disagree on the harvest level, and that the interval defining the
sustainable harvest is his private information, he might want to
belie on � and choose a level that can lower the principal's payoff.
In consequence, the principal has to maximize his value function
over density �(�) , knowing that the re l �(�) is somewhere
between0 and s.
T o casesare possible:
In case ��∗ ≥ ��∗(�) , the principal and the agent implicitly
agree on the harvesting volume. Therefore, both the principal and
the agent enter into a contract that optimizes eir respe tive
p yoff functions. Indeed, ��∗(�) saturat s the partic pation
constraint.
In case ��∗ < ��∗(�) , the principal and the agent implicitly
disagree o the harvesting volume. Given that ��∗(�) > 0, for the
natural r s urce m nagement includes some non-null resource
maintenance, w ve 0 < ��∗ < ��∗ . This time, the harvesting
leveldoes notgiv the gentan ince tive to contract.
The IC constraint is a maximizing argument. Hence, we
have to look at the optimal conditions. The optimal condition
of the IC constraint, that is, �(�(�), �(�)) ≥ �(�(�),�(�))∀[0,�], is given by:
0=
�� � � ,� ��� � � � = �(�)
The second-order conditi n of the IC constraint is:
0≥ �2�(�(�),�(�))��(�)2 � � = �(�)
We define the Hamiltonian of the associated maximization
problem:� = �� � � , �� � , � � �(�)
+ ���[�� � � , � � , � � ]
+ ��� ��� � ,� ,�� (13)
 (12)
ased on the above, the principal is aximizing 
his surplus by integrating his pay ff function over 
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The prime consideration of this note is to understand how -
- when it comes to managing renewable natural resources --
the agent's private information may come into conflict with
the objective of a principal, be it a secondary topic that has
been neglected in the literature. We thus model the
contractual relationship between a principal and an agent as
regards the renewable natural resource management. In the
situation of an imperfect information setting, we find that the
Pareto-optimal contracting depends on the probability that the
level of harvesting stands outside the sustainability interval.
This puts the Pareto-optimal allocations in jeopardy. The
information rent held by the agent being unavoidable,
stepping outside the sustainability interval implies the
possibility of depletion of the renewable natural resource.
This potential ecological overshoot, which occurs when
human demand exceeds the regenerative capacity of a natural
ecosystem, puts the Earth on an unsustainable trajectory.
After this starting section, we describe the model in
Section 2, with a focus on the principal-agent relationship in a
perfect information setting (Subsection 2.3) and when the
agent owns private information on the sustainable level of
harvesting (Subsection 2.4). Section 3 concludes.
2. A Principal-agent Model in Renewable
Natural Resource Management
We consider a principal who delegates t management of
a renewabl natural resour e of stock to an agent. The
principal and the agent have to agree upon a quantity to be
harvested q from the renewable n tural resource levels ow ed
by the principal. Stock s consid red as a proxy of the
natural resource amen ties, which are all non-market goods
and services related to the existence f this resource [8]. The
sustainable h rvesting of renewable natural resources, such
that the stock remains uncha g d or ���� = 0 , mean hat th
level of harvest matches with the leve of the resource’s
natural growth. Unsustainable harvesting can be envisaged in
two ways. When ���� > 0 , scenario corresponds to the
damages issued from the resource over-stocking [3]. The
absence of implementation of a management plan is one
possible way to envisage such a context. When ��� < 0 , the
scenario implies the ver-h rvesting of the stock and e
depletion of the renewable natural resource. Finally, the
principal gives revenue share r to the ag nt for the renewable
natural resource managem nt, har sting i cluded, such that���� > 0.
The principal and th agent can h ve different preferences
o how to conduct the renewable natural resource
managem nt. For instance, the agent could have stronger
preferences for income from harvesting, while the principal
could have stronger preferences for preserving the resource’s
natural and environmental amenities.
In the knowledge that the renewable natural resource
harvesting must not jeopardize its sustainability, interval[�, �] defines the bounding minimum and maximum levels of
harvesting. It is the set of possible actions to be undertaken in
purpose of the sustainable resource management. In detail,
there is a maximum level of harvesting beyond which the
resource is depleted. As a result, the resource cannot be
renewed and no longer provides natural and environmental
amenities. There is also a minimum level of harvesting below
which amenities start to vanish. This can be explained by the
absence of a management plan. Therefore, q has to lie
somewh re within this interval. These assumptions implicitly
mean that, in a specific range of harvesting levels, resources
and natural and environmental amenities are complementary.
If we assume that the principal has stronger preferences for
the stock conservation than the agent, the objectives of the
parties should differ. The principal's harvesting objective will
tend to be a low level of harvest, hence running the risk of
being below �. On the contrary, the agent will seek to harvest
beyond t level.1 The knowledge of the interval of the
sustainable levels of harvesting is crucial. The key issue of the
contract setting is the information gap as to this interval. We
will thus consider that this interval can correspond either to
com on knowledge or to a private information.
2.1 Th Principal: The Renewable Natural Resource
Owner
Let �� be the value function of a risk-neutral principal.
This value function is decreasing in revenue transfer r paid to
the agent. However, the effect of renewable natural resource
stock s and harvesting q on the value function is ambiguous,
since harvesting generates revenues but, at the same time,
reduces utility by diminishing the levels of natural and
environmental amenities. While the principal is willing to
harvest less than the agent, the question is whether principal's
optimal harvest level ��∗ lies or not within sustainability
interval [�, �]. The principal's value function is defined by:�� = ��(� � , �� � , � � ) (1)
where �� � represents the principal's identity function such
that:�� � ≔ ��∗ > � �����' = ���(�,�,�)�� ≤ 0��∗ ≤ � �����' = ��� �,�,��� > 0 (2)
1 The opposite assumption yields symmetric results with respect to
maximum level �.
 
Although this value is provid d by the agent, the principal 
reveals hi  preferences regarding 
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The prime consideration of this note is to understand how -
- when it comes to managing renewable natural resources --
the agent's private information may come in o conflict with
the objective of a principal, be it a secondary topic that has
been neglected in the litera ure. We thus model the
contractual relationship betwee a princi al and an agent as
regards the renewable n tural resource management. In the
situation of an imperfect information setting, we find that the
Pareto-optimal contracting de ends on the pr bab lity that the
level of harvesting stands outside the sustainability interval.
This puts the Pareto-optimal all cat ons in jeopardy. The
information rent held by the agent b ing unavoidabl ,
stepping outside the sustainabili y interval impli s the
possibility of depletion of the renewable natural source.
This potential ecological overshoot, which occurs when
human demand exceeds the regenerative capacity of a natural
ecosystem, puts the Earth on a unsustainable trajectory.
After this starting s ction, we describe the model in
Section 2, with a focus on the principal-agent relationship i a
perfect information setting (Subsection 2.3) and whe the
agent owns private information on the sustainable level of
harvesting (Subsection 2.4). Section 3 conclud s.
2. A Principal-agent Model in Renewable
Natural Resource Management
We consider a princi al who delegat s th management of
a renewable natur l resource of stock s to an agent. The
principal and the agent have to agree upon a quantity to b
harvested q from the renewable natural resource levels own d
by the rincipal. Stock s i co sider d as a proxy of th
natural resource amenitie , which are all non-ma ket goods
and services related to t e existence of this resourc [8]. The
sustainable arvesting of ren wable natural resource , such
that the stock remains unchanged or ���� = 0 , means th t the
level of harvest matches with the level of the resour ’
natural growth. Unsustainable harvesting can be envisag d
two ways. When ���� > 0 , scenario corresponds to the
damages issued from the resource ver-stocking [3]. The
absence of implementation of a management plan is one
possible way to envisage such a context. When ���� < 0 , the
scenario implies the over-harvesting of the stock a d the
depletion of the renew ble natural resourc . Fi ally, the
principal gives revenue share r to the agent for t renewabl
natural resource management, harvesting inc ud d, such that���� > 0.
The principal a d the agent can hav differe t preferences
on how to conduct the renewable natural resource
management. For in ance, the agent could ha stronger
preferences for income from harvesting, while the principal
could have stronger prefere ces for preserving t e resou ce’s
natural and environmental amenities.
In the knowledge that the renewable natural resource
harvesting must not jeopardize its sustainability, nt rval[�, �] defines the bounding minimum and maximum levels of
harvesting. It is the set of possible actions to be undertaken in
purpose of the sustainable resource management. In detail,
there is a maximum level of harvesting beyond which the
resource is depleted. As a result, th resource cannot b
renewed and no longer provides a ural nd environmental
amenities. There is also mi imum level of harv sting below
which me ities start to vanish. This can be explained by the
abse ce of a manage ent pl n. Therefore, q has to lie
somewhere within this interv l. These assumptions implicitly
mean that, in a specific range of harves ing levels, resource
and natural and environmental amenities are complementary.
If we assume that the p incipal has stronger preferences for
the stock conservation han the agent, th objectives of t
parties should d ffer. The pr ncipal's arvesting objective will
tend to be a low lev l of arves , henc running the risk of
being below �. On the contrary, the agent will seek to harvest
beyond this level.1 The know edge of i te val f the
sustai abl levels of harvesting is ruc al. The key issue of the
c ract s tting is the inf rmation gap as to this inte val. We
will thus co sider that this int val can correspond either to
common kno ledge or to a priv t information.
2.1 The Principal: The Renewabl Natural Resource
Owner
Let �� be the value function of a risk-neutral principal.
This value function is decre sing i revenue transfer r paid to
the agent. However, the eff ct of renewable n tural reso rce
stock s and harvesting q on the value function is ambi uous,
since harvesting generates evenues but, at the same tim ,
reduces utility by diminishing the levels of natural and
environmental amenities. While the principal is willing to
harvest ess than the agent, the question is whether principal's
optimal harvest level �∗ lies or not within sustainability
interval [�, �]. The principal's value function is defined by:�� = ��(� � , �� � , � � ) (1)
where �� � represents the principal's identity function such
that:�� � ≔ ��∗ > � �����' = ���(�,�,�)�� ≤ 0��∗ ≤ � �����' = ��� �,�,�� > 0 (2)
1 The opposite assumption yields symmetric results with respect to
maximum level �.
e risk is that the agent attempts to sign l  l vel of 
Research in Ecology | Volume 03 | Issue 04 | December 2021
Distributed under creative commons license 4.020
10
The prime consideration of this not is to underst nd how -
- when it comes to managing renewable natural resources --
the agent's private information may come into confl ct with
the objective of a principal, be it a secondary topic that has
been neglected in the literature. We us model the
contractual relationship between a principal and an agent as
regards the renewable natural resourc management. In he
situation of an imperfect information s tting, we find that the
Pareto-optimal contracting depends on the probability that the
level of harvesting stands outside the susta nability int rval.
This puts the Pareto-optimal allocations in jeopardy. The
information rent held by the agent being unavoidable,
stepping outside the sustainability interval implies the
possibility of depletion of the renewable natural resource.
This potential ecological overshoot, which occurs when
human demand exceeds the regenerative capacity of a natural
ecosystem, puts the Earth on an unsustainable trajectory.
After this starting section, we des ribe the model in
Section 2, with a focus on the principal-agent relationship in a
perfect information setting (Subsection 2.3) and when the
agent owns private information on the sustainable level of
harvesting (Subsection 2.4). Section 3 concludes.
2. A Princip l-agent Model in Renewable
Natural Resource Management
We consider a principal who deleg tes the manageme t of
a renewable natural res urce of st ck to an agent. The
principal and the agent have to agr e upon a quantity to be
harvested q from the renew ble natur l resource levels owned
by the principal. Stock s is considered as a proxy of the
natural resource amenities, which are ll non-market goods
and services related to the xistence of t is resource [8]. The
sustainable harvesting of renewable natural resources, such
that the stock remains unchanged or ���� = 0 , means that the
level of harvest matches with the level of the resource’s
natural growth. Unsustainable harvesting can be envisaged in
two ways. When ���� > 0 , the scenario corresponds to the
damages issued from the resource over-sto king [3]. Th
absence of implementation of a management plan is one
possible way to envisage suc a con ext. When ���� < 0 , th
scenario implies the over-harvesting of the stock and the
depletion of the renewable natural resource. Finally, the
principal gives revenue share r to the agent for the renewable
natural resource management, harvesting included, such that���� > 0.
The principal and the agent can have differen pr f r nces
on how to conduct the renewab e natu al reso ce
management. For insta ce, the gent could have stronger
preferences for income from harvesting, while the princip
could have stronger preferences for preserving the resource’s
natural and environ ental amenities.
In the knowledge that the renewable natural resource
harvesting must not jeopardize its su ainabil ty, int rval[�, �] d fines the bounding minimum and maximum levels of
harvesting. It is the set of possible actions to be undertaken in
purpose of the sustainable resource management. In etail,
there is a maximum level of harvesting beyond which the
resource is depleted. As a result, th resource cannot be
renewed and no lon r provides natu l nd environment l
amenities. There is lso a minimum lev l of harvesting below
which amenities start to vanish. Thi can be explained by the
absence of a management plan. Therefore, q has to lie
somewhere within this interval. These assumptions implicitly
me n that, in a specific range of harvesting levels, resources
nd n tural and environmental ameniti s are compl mentary.
If we assume that the pri cipal has s rong r reference for
th stock conser tion than the agen , the bjectives of the
parties should differ. The principal's harvesti objective will
tend to be a low l vel of harvest, h nc running the risk of
being below . On t e contrary, the agent will seek to harvest
beyon this level.1 The kn wl dge of the interval of the
su ain ble levels of harv s ing is crucial. The key ssue of the
co tract setting is the i formation gap as to this interval. We
will thus consider that this interval can correspond either to
common knowledge or to a private infor ation.
2.1 The Principal: The Renewable Natural Resource
Owner
Let �� be th value function of a risk-neu ral principal.
This value function is decreasing in revenue transfer r paid to
the agent. However, the effect of renewable natural resourc
stock s and harvesting q on the valu f nctio s ambiguous,
since h rvesting g nerates r venues but, at the s time,
reduces utility by diminishing the levels of natural and
nvironm tal amenities. While the principal is willing to
harvest less tha the agent, th question is whether principal's
ptimal harvest level ��∗ lies or not within sustainability
interval [�, �]. The principal's value function is defined by:�� = ��(� � , �� � , � � ) (1)
wher �� � repr sents the principal's identity function such
t at:�� � ≔ ��∗ > � �����' = ���(�,�,�)�� ≤ 0��∗ ≤ � �����' = ��� �,�,��� > 0 (2)
1 The opposite assumption yields symmetric results with respect to
maximum level �.
 ich aximizes his payof  function t a cost to the 
ipal. Ind ed, the agent sends a signal of the mi imal 
stainable harvesting level, but the principal ignores 
whether t is ig al is n hon st one. Since the agent 
knows that both pl yers disagree on the harvest level, 
and that the interval defining the sustainable harvest is 
his private information, he might want to belie on 
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The prime cons deration of this note is to understand how -
- when it comes to managing re ewable natural resources --
t e agent's private information may come into conflict with
the objectiv f a pr ncipal, be it a secondary topic that has
been neglected in the lit rature. We thus model the
contractual relationship between a principal a d n agent as
regards the renewabl natural resource manage ent. In the
situation of an imperfect information setting, we fi d that the
Pareto-optimal contracting depends on the prob bility th t the
level of harv sting stands outside the sustain bility inter a .
This put the Pareto-optimal allocations in j opardy. The
information rent held by the agent b in unavoidab e,
stepping o tside the su tainability int rval implies the
possibility of d pletion of the ren wabl natu l resource.
This potential ecological ove sh ot, whic oc urs when
human demand exceeds the regener tive capac ty of nat ral
ecosy tem, puts t Earth o an unsustainable tr jectory.
After this starting ec io , we d crib the model in
Section 2, with a focus on the principal-age t relations ip i a
perfect information setti g (Subsection 2.3) and when the
agent owns private inform tion on the sustainable level of
harvesting (Subsection 2.4). Section 3 concludes.
2. A Principal-age t Model in Renewable
Natural Resource Management
We consider a principal who delegates the management o
a renewable n tural resourc of stock s to a agent. The
princip l and the a ent ha o gree upon quantity to be
harvested q from the r newable natural esource levels own d
by the principal. Stock s is considered as a proxy of the
natural resource a enities, which are all non-market goods
and services related to the existence of this resource [8]. The
sustainable harvesting of renew ble natural resources, such
that the stock remains unch ng d or ���� = 0 , means that the
level of harv st matches with the lev l of the resource’s
natural growth. Unsustainable harvesting can be e visaged in
two w ys. Wh n ���� > 0 , the scenario corresponds to the
damages issued from the resource over-stocking [3]. The
bsenc of imple entation of a management pla is one
possible way to envisag s ch a context. When ��� < 0 , the
scenario implies he over-harvesting of the stock and the
depletion of t e renewable natural re ource. Finally, the
principal gives revenue share r to the agent for the renewable
natural resource management, harvesting included, such that���� > 0.
The principal and the agent can have different references
on how to conduct the renewable n tural res urce
management. For instance, the agent could have stronger
prefer nces for inc me fr m harvesti g, while the principal
could h ve tronger pr ferences for preser ing t e resource’s
atural and nvironmental amenities.
In the knowl dge that the renewable natural resource
harvesti g must not jeopardiz its sustainability, interval[�, �] defines the bounding mi imum and maximum evel f
harvesting. It is the set of possible actions to be undertaken in
purpose of the sustainable resource management. In detail,
there is a maximum level of harvesting beyond which the
resource is depleted. As a result, the resource cannot be
renewed and no longer provides natural and environmental
amenities. There is also a minimum level of harvesting below
which amenities start to vanish. This can be explained by the
absence of a management plan. Therefore, q has to lie
som where within this interval. These assumptions implicitly
mean that, in a specific range of harvesting levels, resources
and natur l a d environmental amenities are complementary.
If e assume that the principal has str nger preferences for
the stock conservation than the agent, the objectives of the
pa ties should differ. The principal's harvesting objective will
te d to be a low lev l of harvest, hence running the risk of
being bel w �. On the contrary, the agent will seek to harvest
beyond th s level.1 The knowledge of the interval of the
sustainable levels of harvesting is crucial. The key is ue of the
contract setting is the info mation gap a to his int rv l. We
will thus consider that th s i terval can correspond eithe to
common k owledge or to a priv te informatio .
2.1 The Principal: The Renewable Natural Resource
Owner
Let �� be the value function of a risk-neutral principal.
This value function is decreasing in revenue transfer r paid to
the agent. However, the effect of renewable natural resource
stock s and harvesting q on the value function is ambiguous,
since harvesting generates revenues but, at the same time,
reduces utility by diminishing the levels of natural and
environmental amenities. While the principal is willing to
harvest less than the agent, the question is whether principal's
optimal harvest level ��∗ lies or not within sustainability
interval [�, �]. The principal's value function is defined by:�� = ��(� � , �� � , � � ) (1)
where �� � represents the principal's identity function such
h t:�� � ≔ ��∗ > � �����' = ���(�,�,�)�� ≤ 0��∗ ≤ � �����' = ��� �,�,��� > 0 (2)
1 The opposite assumption yields symmetric results with respect to
maximum level �.
 and 
choose a level that can lower the principal's payoff. In 
consequence, the principal has to maximize his alue 
function over density 
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���'���' = ���'���' (10)
From Equation (8), we know h the age t's articipation
constraint is binding, that is, the information rent is set to zero.
The sign in Equation (9) indicat s that an optimum ex st . At
last, Equation (10) means that the first-best contractu l
harv ting is when the principal's and the agent's ratios of
arginal values equate.
Thecomplete information efficientharvesting leve is s ch that:�∗ < � (11)
Indeed, the principal cannot request to harvest outside the
sustainability interval, so that the agent arvests up to he
minimum sustainable leve . ides, harvesting dimi shes
the principal's marginal utility outside the sustainability
interval.
The foll wing propo ition ensues.
Proposition 1 In cas of a perfect inf rmatio setting, the
Pareto-optimal contracting implies a level of harvest at least
equal to the lower bound of -- and thus inside -- th
sustainability interval, such that the principal's value function
remains un .
Proof Se th Appendix.
Proposition 1 uncovers the fact that th o timal contractin
does not aff ct th princi al's value function, so that the ma ginal
costs and benefits from harvest ngcanceleach other.3
2.4 The Optim l Contract with Private Information
on the S stainability I terval
In an imperfect information case, the principal does not
know what the sustainable harvest int rval is. The
information is privately held by t e age t. is time, the
agent announces an interval [�, �] to the principal, where the
bounds depend on his own optimal levels of harvesti g. The
private knowledge of the sustainability interval gives the
agent an oppor unity to over-estimate the minimum
arvesting level.4 This in turn stimulates the principal to
accept a more intensiv level of harvesting.
Follo ing[7], we assume that � ∙ is a continuous
distributio function, w th a positive density � ∙ , that
describes the prior of the principal over the set of potential
minimu lev ls of sustainable harvesting [0, �] .5 The
prin ipal maximiz s his expected value function subject to
3 This property only holds because we study the case of renewable
natural resources.
4 It is our only variable of interest, since we assume that the principal
is less willing to harvest than the agent.
5 The possible set of harvest goes from no harvesting (� = 0) to clear-
cutting of the whole stock (� = �), even if the latter is never reached.
the ag nt's individual rationality (IR) and incentive
compatibility (IC) constraints:��� ,� 0� � � , �� � , � � �(�)��� (12)������� �� �� �� � � , � � , � � ≥ 0�� �� � � , � � , � � − �� � � , � � , � � ≥ 0
Based on the abov , th princi a is maximizing his
surplus by integrating his payoff function over � . Although
this value i provided by the agent, the principal reveals his
preferen es regarding �.
The ri k i that the agent att mpts to ignal a lev l of� whic m ximizes his payoff function at a co t to the
principal. I deed, the agent sends a signal of the minimal
sus ainabl h rve ting evel, but the principal ig ores whether this
signal is an honest n . Since the gent kn ws that both players
disag ee on the harvest level, and tha th interval defining the
sustainable harvest is his private informati , he might want to
belie on � and ch os a level that an lower the principal's payoff.
In consequence, the principal has to aximize his v lu fu ctio
over densit �(�) , knowing that the real �(�) i som wher
betw 0 and s.
Two case are possible:
In case ��∗ ≥ ��∗(�) , he princ pal and th agent implicitly
agree on the har sting volume. Therefore, both the principal and
th agent ente into a contract that optimizes their respective
payoff functions. Indee , ��∗(�) saturates the participation
constraint.
In case ��∗ < ��∗(�) , t e princip l a d the agent implicitly
disagree on th harvesting volume. Given that ��∗( ) 0, for the
n tural resour e management includes some non-null resource
maintenance, we have 0 < ��∗ < ��∗ . This time, the harvesting
leveldoes notgive theagentan incentive to con ract.
The IC constraint is a maximizing argument. Hence, we
have to look at the optimal conditions. The optimal condition
of the IC constraint, that is, �(�(�), �(�)) ≥ �( (�),�(�))∀[0,�], is given by:
0=
�� � � ,� ��� � � � = �(�)
The second-order condition of the IC constraint is:
0≥ �2�(�( ),�(�))��(�)2 � � = �(�)
W define the Hamiltonian of the associated maximization
proble :� = � , �� � , � � �(�)
+ �[ � � � , � � , � � ]
+ ��� ��� � � ,� � ,� ��� (13)
, g that the real 
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���'���' = ���'���' (10)
From Equation (8), we know that th age t's p rticip ion
const ain is binding, that s, the information ent is set o zero.
The sign in Equation (9) indicates that an optimum exis s. At
last, Equatio (10) means th t th first- est contractual
harvesting is when the princip l's and the a e t's rat os of
margina val es equat .
T ecomplete information f icientha vesti v l is such that:�∗ < � (11)
Inde d, e princip l ca not request to harvest ou side he
sustainability in e val, so th t th gen harvests p to the
minimum sustainable level. B sides, harvesting dimi ishes
h principal's marginal u ility ou side the su tai ability
int rval.
The following proposition ensues.
Proposition 1 In case of a perfect information setting, the
P reto-optimal contracting implies a level of harvest at least
equal to the lower bound of -- and thus inside -- the
sustai ability interval, such that the principal's value functi n
remains unchanged.
Proof See t e Appendix.
Proposition 1 uncovers th fact at the optimal contracting
does ot affect e principal's valu function, so th t the margin l
costs a d benefits from harvestingcanceleach other.3
2.4 The Op imal C ntract with Priva e Information
on e Sust inab li y Int rval
In an im rfect inf rmation ca e, th pri cipal does not
know what the su tainable harvest interval is. The
i formation is priva ely h ld by the a en . This time, the
agent announces n interval [�, �] to the principal, where the
bounds dep d o his ow optimal levels of harvesting. The
priv te k owl dge of the sustainability interval gives the
ag nt an opportunity to over-estimate the minimum
harvesting level.4 This in urn stimulates the principal to
accept a more intensive level of harvesti g.
Following[7], we assume that � ∙ is a continuous
distribution function, with a positive density � ∙ , that
describes the prior of th principal over the set of potential
minimum levels of sustainable harvesting [0, ] .5 The
principal maximizes his expected value function subject to
3 Thi property only holds because we study the case of renewable
natural resources.
4 It is our only vari ble of i terest, since we assume that the principal
is less willing to harvest than the agent.
5 The possible set of harvest goes from no harvesting (� = 0) to clear-
cutting of the whol stock (� = �), even if the latter is never reached.
the agent's individual rationality (IR) and incentive
compatibility (IC) constraints:�� �,� 0��� � � , �� � , � � �(�)�� (12)������ �� �� �� � � , � � , � � ≥ 0� �� � � , � � , � � − �� � � , � � , � � ≥ 0
Based n the above, the p incipal is maximizing is
surplus by integrating his payoff function over � . Although
t is value is provided by the agent, the principal r veal his
preferences regarding �.
Th risk is that the agent attempts to signal a level of� whi maxi izes his payoff funct on at a cost to the
principal. Indeed, the agent sends a ignal of th minimal
susta able harvesting l vel, but the principal ignores wh ther this
signal is an honest one. Since the agent knows that oth players
disagree on th harv st level, and hat the interval defining the
sustainable harvest s his private information, he might want to
belie n � nd choose a level that can lower the principal's payoff.
In consequ ce, t principal has to m ximize his value funct on
over density �(�) , knowing that th re l �(�) is somewh re
between0 and s.
Two casesare possible:
In c s ��∗ ≥ ��∗(�) , the princip and the agent implicitly
agre n the harv sting volume. Therefore, both the principal and
the agent enter into a contract that optimizes their respective
payoff functions. Indeed, ��∗(�) saturates the participation
constraint.
In case ��∗ < ��∗(�) , the principal and th agent implicitly
disagr e o the harvesting volum . Giv n that ��∗(�) > 0, for the
n tural resource management includes some non-null resource
aintenance, e ave 0 < ��∗ < ��∗ . This time, the harvesting
leveldoes tgive theagentan incentive to contract.
The IC constraint is a maximizing argument. Hence, we
have to look at th opti al conditions. The optimal condition
of the IC constraint, that is, �(�(�), �(�)) ≥ �(�(�),�(�))∀[0,�], is given by:
0=
�� � � ,� ��� � � � = �(�)
The sec d-order condition of the IC constraint is:
0≥ �2�(�(�),�(�))��(�)2 � � = �(�)
We define the Hamiltonia of the associated maximization
problem:� = �� � � , �� � , � � �(�)
+ ���[�� � � , � � , � � ]
+ ��� ��� � � ,� � ,� ��� (13)
is 
somewhere between 0 d .
Two cases are possible:
In case 
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���'���' = ���'���' (10)
From Equation (8), we know that the agent's particip tion
constraint is binding, that is, the information rent is set to zero.
The sign in Equation (9) indic tes that a optimum exists. At
last, Equation (10) means that the first-best contractual
harvesting is when the principal's nd th agent's ratios f
marginal valu s equate.
Thecomplete information efficie tharv sting level is such that:�∗ < � (11)
Indeed, he principal cannot r quest o harve t outside the
sustainability interval, so that the agent harv sts up to the
minimum sustainable level. Besides, harvesti g diminishes
the principal's marginal utility outside the sustain bility
interval.
The following proposition ensues.
Proposition 1 In case of a perfect information setting, the
Pareto-optimal contracting implies a level of harvest at l ast
equal to the lower bound of -- and thus inside -- the
sustainability interval, such that the principa 's value function
remains unchanged.
Proof See the Appendix.
Proposition 1 uncovers the fact that the optimal contracti
does not affect the principal's value functi n, so that the marginal
costs and benef ts from harvestingcanceleach other.3
2.4 The Optimal Contract w th Private I f rmation
on the Sustainability In rv l
In an imperfect information case, the principal does not
know what the sustainable harvest interval is. The
information is privately held by the agent. This time, the
agent announces n i te v [�, �] to the principal, wher he
bou ds depend n his own optimal levels of arvesting. The
private knowl dge of the sustainabi ity int rval g ves the
agent an opportunity to over- stimate the minimum
harvesting level.4 Thi in turn stimulates the principal to
accept a more intensive level of harvesting.
Following[7], we assume that � ∙ is a c ntinuous
distribution function, with a positive de sity � ∙ , that
describes the prior of the principal over the set of pot nti l
minimum levels of sustainable harvesting [0, �] .5 The
principal maximizes his expected value function subject to
3 This property only holds because we study the case of renewable
natural resources.
4 It is our only variable of i terest, since we assume that the principal
is less willing to harvest than the agent.
5 The possible set of harvest goes from no harvesting (� = 0) to clear-
cutting of the whol stock (� = �), even if th latter is never reached.
the agent's individual rationality (IR) and incentive
compatibility (IC) constraints:����,� 0 �� � � , �� � , � (�)��� (12)������� �� �� � � , � � , � � ≥ 0�� �� � � , � � , � � − � � � , � � , � � ≥ 0
Based on the above, t e principal is maximizing his
surplus by integrating his payoff function over � . Although
t is value is provid d by th a ent, the principal reveals his
preferences regarding �.
Th risk s that t e ge t att mp s to signal a level of� which m ximizes his payoff function at a cost to the
pri cip l. I deed, th agent send signal of the inim l
su tainabl harvesti g level, but t e pri cip ig or s wheth r this
signal is n h est one. Sin e the agent knows that bo h play rs
disagree on the h rvest level, a d that the i terval defining the
ustain ble harvest is his private information, he might w t to
belie on � and choose a level that c n low r the principal's payoff.
I cons quence, the pri al has to maximize his value function
over density �(�) , knowing that the real �(�) is somewhere
bet een0 and s.
Two casesare p ssible:
In cas ��∗ ≥ ��∗( ) , the principal and the agent implicitly
agre on th har sting v lume. T refore, both the pr ncipal and
the agent enter into a c ntract that optimizes their respective
payoff functions. Indeed, ��∗(�) saturates the participation
c str i t.
In case ��∗ < ��∗( ) , the pri cipal a d the gent implicitly
disagree on the harvesting volume. Given that ��∗(�) > 0, for the
natural resource management includes some non-null resource
maintenance, we have 0 < ��∗ < ��∗ . This time, the harvesting
leveld es notgive theagentan incentive to contr ct.
The IC constraint is a maximizing argument. Hence, we
have to look at the optimal conditions. The optimal condition
f the IC c nstrai t, that is, �(�(�), �(�)) ≥ (�(�),�(�))∀[0,�], is given by:
0=
�� � � ,� ��� � � � = �(�)
The second-order condition of the IC constraint is:
0≥ �2�(�(�),�(�))��(�)2 � � = �(�)
We define the Hamiltonian of the associated maximization
problem:� = � � , �� � , � (�)
+ ���[�� � � , � � , � � ]
+ ��� ��� � � ,� � ,� �� (13)
 he principal and the agen  
i plicitly agree on the harvesting volume. Therefor , 
both the principal and the agent enter into a contract that 
opti izes their respective payoff function . Inde d, 
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���'���' = ���'���' (10)
From Equation (8), w know hat the agent's participation
constraint is binding, that is, the information rent is set to zero.
The s gn in Equation (9) i dicates that an opti um xists. At
last, Equ ti n (10) mea s that he irst-b st co tractual
harvesting is whe the principal's and the ag nt's ratios of
marginal lues equate.
Th compl te information efficientharv ting l vel is such that:�∗ < � (11)
Indeed, the p incipal cannot request to harvest outside the
sustainability inter al, so that t agent harvests up to the
minimum sustainable level. Besides, harvesting diminishes
the principal's marginal utility outside the sustainability
interval.
The following proposition ensues.
Propositio 1 In case of a perfect formation setting, the
Pareto-optimal contracting implies a level of harvest at least
equal to the lower bound f -- and thus inside -- the
sustainability interval, such that the principal's value function
remains unchanged.
Proof See the Appendix.
Proposition 1 uncovers the fact that the optimal contracting
does not affect the principal's value function, so that the marg al
costs and benefits from harvestingcanceleach other.3
2.4 The Optim l Contract with Private Information
on the Sustainab lity In erval
In an imp rfect information cas , the principal does not
know what th sust inable harv st inte val is. Th
information is priv t ly held by the ge t. This time, th
ag nt announces an interv l [�, �] to th principal, w r the
b unds depend n his ow optimal levels of harvesting. The
private knowledge of the sustainability interval gives the
agent an opportunity to over-estimate the minimum
harves ing lev l.4 This in turn stimulates the principal to
acce t a more intens ve level of harvesting.
Following[7], we assume that � ∙ is a contin ous
distribution fu ction, with a positive density � ∙ , that
describes th prior of the pri cipal over the set f p tential
minimum levels of sustainabl harvesting [0, �] .5 The
principal maximizes his expected value function subject to
3 This propert only holds because we study the case of renewable
natural resources.
4 It is our only variable of interest, since we assume that the principal
is less willing to harvest than the agent.
5 The possible set of harvest goes from no harvesting ( = 0) to clear-
cutting of the whol stock (� = �), ven if the la ter is n ver reach d.
the gent's individual rationality (IR) and incentive
compatibility (IC) constraints:���,� 0��� � � , � � , � � �(�)�� (12)������� �� �� �� � � , � � , � � ≥ 0�� � � � , � � , � � − �� � � , � � , � � ≥ 0
Based on the bove, the principal is maximizing his
surplus by integrating his payoff function over � . Although
this value is provided b t e a e t, the principal reveals his
preferences regarding �.
Th r sk is tha the ag nt attempts to signal a level of� which maximizes his payoff function at a cost to the
princ pal. Indeed, the age t s nds a signal of t e minimal
sta abl harvesting level, but the principal ignores whether this
sig al is an hon st one. Sinc the agent knows that both players
disagre on the har st l vel, and that the interval defining the
sustai able harvest is his private information, he might want to
belie on � and c oose a level that can lower the principal's payoff.
In consequence, the principal has to maximize his value function
over d nsity �( ) , knowing t at the real �(�) is somewhere
between0 and s.
Two casesare possible:
I case ��∗ ≥ ��∗(�) , the principal and the agent implicitly
agr e o the harvesting vo ume. Therefore, both the principal and
h ag t ent r i to a contract that optimizes their re pective
pay functi . ed, �∗(�) saturates he participation
constraint.
I case ��∗ < ��∗(�) , the principal and the agent implicitly
disagree on th harvesti g volume. Given that ��∗(�) > 0, for the
atural r ource management includes som non-null resource
maintenance, we have 0 < ��∗ < ��∗ . Th t me, t harve ting
leveldoes notgive theag tan inc tiv to contract.
The IC constraint is a maximizing argument. Hence, we
have to look at the optimal conditions. The optimal condition
of the IC constraint, that is, (�(�), �(�)) ≥ �(�(�),�(�))∀[0,�], is given by:
0=
�� � � ,� ��� � � � = �(�)
The s cond-order condition of the IC constraint is:
0≥ �2�(�(�),�(�))��(�)2 � � = �(�)
We d fine the Ha iltonian of the associated maximization
problem:� = �� � � , �� � , � � �(�)
+ ���[�� � � , � � , � � ]
+ ��� ��� � � ,� � ,� ��� (13)
 
satur t s the participation constraint.
In case 
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From Equ tion (8), w k ow tha the agent's participation
constraint is binding, that is, the information rent is se to z ro.
The sign in Equation (9) indicates that an optimum exists. At
last, Equation (10) means that the first-best c ntractual
harvesting is when the principal's and the agen 's rati s of
marginal val es equate.
Theco plete information effici ntharvesting l vel is such hat:�∗ < � (11)
Inde d, the principal cann t r quest to harvest outside the
sustainability interval, so that th agent harvests up to the
minimum sustainable level. Besides, harvesting diminishes
the principal's marginal utility o tside the sustainability
interval.
The following proposition ensues.
Prop sition 1 In case of a perfect informati n s t ing, the
Pareto-optimal c ntracting implies a level of harves at lea t
equal t the l wer bound of -- d thus inside -- the
sustai ability int rv l, such that t e principal's value func i
remains unc anged.
Proof S e the Appendix.
Proposition 1 uncovers the fact that the optimal contracting
does not affect the principal's value function, so that the mar al
costs and benefits from harvestingcanceleach ot er.3
2.4 The Optimal Cont act with Private Information
on the Sustainability Interval
In n imperfect i f rmation case, the ri cipal do s no
know what the s stainab e interval is. The
informatio is privat ly held by the ag t. T is time, the
agent announces an nterval [�, �] to he pri cipal, wher e
bounds depe d n his own optim l levels of harvest . The
private k wl d e f the sustainability interv l gives he
gent an opportuni y to over-estimate the minimum
harvesting l vel.4 This in turn stimulates the princ pal to
accept a more intensive level of harvesting.
Following[7], we assume that � ∙ is a conti uous
distribution func ion, with a positive density � ∙ , that
describes the pri r of the principal over the set of potenti l
minimum lev ls of su ainable harvesting [0, �] .5 The
principal maximizes his expected value function subject to
3 This property only holds because we study the case of renewable
natural resources.
4 It is our only variable of int rest, since we assume that the principal
is less willing to harvest than the agent.
5 The possible set of harvest goes from no harvesting (� = 0) to clear-
cutting of the whole stock (� = �), even if the latter is never reached.
the agent's i divid al rationa ity (IR) and incentive
compatibility (IC) straints:����,� 0��� � � , �� � , � � �(�)��� (12)������� �� �� �� � � , � , � � ≥ 0�� �� � � , � � , � � − �� � � , � � , � � ≥ 0
Based on the above, the prin ipal is aximizing his
surplus by integra ing his payoff function over � . Although
this v lue is pro id d by the age t, th princ pal r ls his
prefe nces reg rding �.
The risk is that h age t attempts to signal a le l of� which maximizes his payoff function at a cost to the
principal. Inde d, the g nt sends a sig al of th mi imal
sustainabl harvesting level, but t e principal ignor s w ther t is
sig al is a honest e. Since the agent knows at both players
disagree on the harvest level, and that the interval defini g the
sustainable harvest is his private inform tion, he ight want to
belie o � nd hoose a level t at ca l wer the principal's payoff.
In consequence, the pri cipal h s to maxi ize h s value f nction
over density �(�) , k owing t at th r al �(�) is somewhere
betw e 0 and s.
Two cas a e possible:
I e ≥ ��∗(�) , the pr ncipal nd the agent implicitly
agree on the harvesting volume. Th r fore, bot the pri cipal and
th agent nter into a contra t that optimizes their respective
payoff functions. Indeed, ��∗( ) saturates the participation
constraint.
In case ��∗ < ��∗(�) , the principal and t e agent implicitly
disag e n the harve ting volume. Giv that ��∗(�) > 0, f r the
natural resource m nagement i cludes some non-null resource
maintenance, w have 0 < ��∗ < ��∗ . This time, the harvesting
leveldoes notgive theagentan incentive to contract.
The IC constraint is a maximizing argument. Hence, we
have to look at the optimal conditions. The optimal condition
of the IC constraint, that is, �(�(�), �(�)) ≥ �(�(�),�(�))∀[0,�], is given by:
0=
�� � � ,� �� � � � = �(�)
The second-order condition of the IC constraint is:
0≥ 2�(�(�),�(�))��(�)2 � � = �(�)
We d fine the Hamiltonian the associated maximization
probl m:� = �� � � , �� � , � � �(�)
+ ���[�� � � , � � , � � ]
+ ��� ��� � � ,� � ,� ��� (13)
, the princ  a  t  a  i itly 
dis gree on t e rv sting vo um . Giv  that 
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From Equation (8), we know th t the agent's participation
constraint is binding, that is, the informati rent i s t to zero.
The sign in Equation (9) indicates that an optimum exi ts. At
last, Equation (10) means that the first-b st contr ctual
harvesting is wh n the principal' and the agent's r tios f
marginal values equate.
Thecomplete information effici ntharvesting level is such that:�∗ < � (11)
Indeed, the principal cannot request to h rvest outside the
sustainability interval, so th t the agent harvests up to th
i imum sustainable level. Besides, harvesti g diminishes
the principal's marginal utility outside the s stainability
interval.
The following proposition ensues.
Pr osition 1 In case f a perfect i formati n setting, the
Pareto-optimal contracting im lies a level of harvest t least
equal to the lower bound f -- and thus i side -- the
sustainability interval, such that the principal's value function
remains unchanged.
Proof See the Appendix.
Proposition 1 uncovers the fact that the optimal contracting
does not affect the principal's value function, so that the marginal
costs and benefits from harvestingcanceleach other.3
2.4 The Optimal Contract with Private Information
on the Sustai ability Int rval
In an imperfect inf rmation ca , th principal does not
know what th sustai ab e arv st interv l is. Th
inf rmation i vately held by the agent. T is time, he
agent announces an interval [�, �] to the principal, where the
bounds depend on his ow optimal levels of harvesting. The
private knowledge of the sustainability interval gives the
agent an opportunity to over-estimate the inimum
harvesting level.4 This in turn stimulates the principal to
accept a more i tensive level of harvesting.
Following[7], w assume that � ∙ is a continuous
distribution function, with a posi ive density � ∙ , that
describes the prior of the principal over the s t of potential
inimum levels of sustainable harvesting [0, �] .5 The
principal aximizes his ex ected value function subject to
3 This property only holds because we stud the cas of renewable
n tural resources.
4 It is our only variable of interest, si ce we ssume that the principal
is less willing to harvest than the age t.
5 The possible set of harvest g es fr m no harvesting (� = 0) t cle -
cutting of the whole stock (� = �), ven if the latter is never reached.
the agent's individual rationality (IR) and incentive
compatibility (IC) constraints:� �,� 0��� � � , �� � , � � (�)�� (12)������� �� �� �� � � , � , � ≥ 0�� �� � � , � � , � � − �� � � , � � , � � ≥ 0
Based on the above, th pri cipal is aximizing his
surplus by integrating his payoff functio over � . Although
this value is provided by the agent, the principal reveals his
preferences regarding �.
The risk is that the age t attempts t signal a level of� which aximizes his payoff function at a cost to the
principal. Inde d, the agent sends a signal of t e inimal
sustainable harv sting level, but the i i l ignores whether this
sig al s a honest one. Si ce t age t knows that both players
disagree on the h st level, and t at the interval defining the
s stainable harvest is his priv te information, he mig t want to
belie on � and choose a l v l that can lower the princip l's pay ff.
In cons quence, the principal has to aximize his value function
over density �(�) , kn wing that the real �(�) is somewher
between0 and s.
Two case are possible:
I ase ��∗ ≥ ��∗(�) , th principal and the g t implicitly
agr e on t e harvesting volu e. her fore, both the princi a and
the agent enter into a co ract that opt mizes their spective
payoff functions. Indeed, ��∗(�) saturates the participation
onstr int.
In case �∗ < ��∗(�) , the pri c p l and the ag nt implicitly
d sagree on the harv sting volume. Given that ��∗(�) > 0, for the
atural resource man g ment incl des some non- ull r sourc
main e ance, w have 0 ��∗ < ��∗ . T is time, the harvesting
leveldoes notgive theagentan incentive to contrac .
The IC constraint is a aximizi g rgument. Hence, we
have to look at the optimal c nditions. The optimal condition
of th IC constr int, that is, �(�(�), �(�)) ≥ (�(�),�(�))∀[0,�], is gi n by:
0=
�� � � ,� ��� � � � = �(�)
The second-order c ndition of the IC constraint is:
0≥ �2�(�(�),�(�))��(�)2 � � = �(�)
We define the Hamiltonian of the associated ximization
problem:� = �� � � , �� � , � � (�)
+ ���[�� � � , � � , � ]
+ �� �� � � ,� � ,� ��� (13)
 
for the n tural resourc  managem nt includes some non-
null resourc  maint nanc , we have 
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From Equation (8), we know hat the agent's participation
constraint is binding, that is, the i formation r nt is set to zero.
The sign in Equation (9) indicates that an optimum exists. At
last, Equatio (10) means that he fi st-best contractual
harvesting is when the princip l's and the agent's ratios f
margin l values equate.
Thecomplet information efficientharvesting level is such th t:�∗ < � (11)
Indeed, the principal cannot equest to harvest outside the
sus ain bility interval, so that th agent harvests up to the
minimum sustainable level. Bes des, harvesting diminishes
the principal's marginal utility out ide the ust inability
interval.
The followi g proposition ensues.
P oposition 1 In cas a p rfec informa ion setting, the
Paret -optimal contracting impli s a level of harvest at least
equal to the lower bound of -- and thus inside -- he
sustain bility interval, such that the principal's value function
remains unchanged.
Proof See the Appendix.
Prop sition 1 u overs fact that the optimal contracting
does not affect the principal's value function, so th t th margin l
co ts and benefi s from harvestingcanceleach ther.3
2.4 The Optimal Cont act with P iv e Informa ion
on the Sustainabi ity Interval
In a imperfect inf rm on c se, the pri cipal do s no
know wh t th sus ainable h rvest interval is. The
nform ion is privat ly held by the agent. This time, the
agent an ounces an interval [�, �] to the p incipal, where the
bounds depend on his own optim l l vels of arvesting. The
private knowledge of the sustainability interval gives the
agent an opportunity to over-estimate the minimum
harvesting level.4 This in turn stimulates the principal to
accept a more intensive level of harvesting.
Followi g[7], e assume that � ∙ i a continuous
distribu io function, with a positive density � ∙ , th t
describ s or of the pri cipal ver the set of potential
minimum levels of sustainable harvesting .5 The
principal maximizes his expected value func ion subject to
3 T is property only hold because we study the case of renewable
natural resources.
4 It is our only variable of inter st, since we assume that the principal
is less willing o h rvest than the agent.
5 The possible set of harvest goes from no harvesting (� = 0) to l a -
cutting f the whole stock (� = �), even if the l tter is never reached.
the agent's individual rationality (IR) and incentive
compatibility (IC) constraints:
,� 0� � � , �� � , � � (�)��� (12)�� ���� � �� � � � , � � , � � ≥ 0�� �� � � , � , � � − �� � � , � � , � � ≥ 0
Based on the above, the principal is maximizing his
surplus by ntegrating his pay ff function ver � . Although
t is value is provid d by the agent, the principal reveals his
preferences regarding �.
The risk is that the agent attempts to signal a level of� which maximizes his payoff function a a cost to the
principal. Indeed, the g nt sends a signal of the minimal
susta able harvesti g level, but t e principal ignores whether this
ignal is honest one. Since the a ent knows that both players
di ag ee on the h rvest l vel, and that the terval defining the
sustainable har est is his private informa ion, he might want to
belie on � nd c oos a evel that can lower the principal's payoff.
In consequence, the principal has to m ximize h s value function
ov r density �(�) , knowing that the real �(�) is somewhere
between0 and s.
Two casesare possible:
In case ��∗ ≥ ��∗(�) , the principal and the agent implicitly
agree o the harvesting v lume. Th fo e, both the principal and
the ag nt ente i o c ntract th t optimiz s their respectiv
payoff functions. Indeed, ��∗(�) satu ates the participation
c straint.
I case �∗ < �∗(�) , the principal and the agent implicitly
disagr e the harv sting volume. Given that ��∗(�) > 0, f r the
natur l esource manag ment includ s some non-null resource
mai te ance, we have 0 < ��∗ < ��∗ . T is time, the harvesting
le eldoes notgive th agen an i c ive to co tract.
T IC onstr int is a maxi izing argum . H nce, we
have t lo k at the optimal condi on . The optima condition
of the IC con traint, that is, �(�(�), �(�)) ≥ �(�(�),�(�))∀[0,�], is given by:
0=
�� � � ,� ��� � � � = �(�)
Th second- rder condition of the IC constraint is:
0≥ �2�(�(�),�(�))��( )2 � � = �(�)
We define the Hamiltonian of the associated maximization
problem:� = � � � , �� � , � � (�)
+ ��[ � � � , � � , � � ]
+ ��� ��� � � ,� � ,� �� (13)
. s 
time, the harvesting level does not give the agent an 
inc ntive to co tract.
The IC co str int is a m ximizing argument. Henc , w  
ave to look at the ptimal c ndit ons. The optimal condition 
of the IC c nstraint, that is, 
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Fr m Equation (8), we kn w ha he agent's partic pation
constraint is binding, that is, the i form tion re t is set to z ro.
The sign in ati (9) indica es ha an op imum ex sts. At
la , Equation (10) m ans that the first-b st cont actual
harvesting is when th principal's nd the agen 's rati s of
rginal values quate.
Th complete nformation efficie tharvesting level is such that:�∗ < � (11)
Indeed, the pri cipal cannot requ t o harvest outs de he
sustainability interv l, so that the ag nt h rvests up to th
mi imum sustainable level. Besides, h rvesting dim ishes
the pri cipal's marginal utility outside the sustainability
interval.
The foll wing proposition ensue .
Proposition 1 In c se of a perfect information se ting, the
Pareto-optimal c ntracting implies a lev l of ha vest at least
eq al to the lower bo nd of -- nd thus inside -- th
sustainability interval, such that the principal's value function
remains unc anged.
Proof See the Appe dix.
Prop sition 1 uncovers the f ct that the optimal contracting
doe not affect the p incip l's v lue fu tio , so t at t e rginal
costs and benefits from harvestingc nceleach other.3
2.4 T Op imal Contract ith Private Information
on the Su inability Interval
In an imperfect informati c se, the pri cipal does not
know what the sustainab e harv st i terv l is. The
informatio is privately held by the ge t. This time, the
agent announc s an int rval [�, �] t the principal, wher the
bounds depend on his ow ptim l lev ls of a esting. The
private knowl dg of th sustainability interval gives the
agent op ortunit to o r- stim t t m i um
h rvesti g level.4 This in turn stimulat s he principal to
acc pt a more intensive level of harvest .
Following[7], we assume hat � ∙ s a continuous
distribution functi n, with a positive density � ∙ , that
descr bes the prior of the pri cipal over t e set of pote tia
minimum levels of su tainable harvest ng [0, �] .5 The
principal maximizes his expected value function subject to
3 This property only holds becau e we study the c se of r newable
natural resources.
4 It is our on y variable of i ter st, since we assume that the prin ip l
is less willing to arve t than the agent.
5 The possible set of harvest goe from no harvesting (� = 0) to cl ar-
cutting of the whole stock (� = �), even if the latter is never reached.
the agent's individual ra ionali y (IR) and incentive
compatibility (IC) constraints:��� , 0� � � , �� , � � ( ) (12)������� �� � �� � � , � � , � � ≥ 0�� �� � � , � � , � � − �� � � , � � , � � ≥ 0
Based on the abov , the princi l is maximizing his
surplus by in egrating his payoff function ov r � . Al hough
this value is provi d by the agent, the principal reveals his
preferences r garding �.
T e ri k is that t e agent attem ts t sig al a level of� w ich maximizes i payo f function at a cost t t e
princi al. Ind ed, the ag t s ds a si nal of the minimal
sustaina le arvesting level, but t ri cipal ignores whet r this
sign l is an hon st one. Since the ag nt k ws th t both p ayer
disagree t e harve t level, and that he interval definin the
sustainabl harvest is his private infor ation, he might wa t to
b lie on � and choose a le l t at c n lowe the principal's p yoff.
In on equence, the principal has t maximize his value function
over density �(�) , knowi g that the real �(�) is somewhere
be ween0 and s.
Two sesare po sible:
In case ��∗ ≥ ��∗(�) , the principal a d the agent implicitly
agr e on the harvesting volum . Theref r , both the pr ncipal and
the agen e ter into a contr t that op im zes ir respective
pay ff functio s. Indeed, ��∗(�) saturates the participatio
constraint.
In ca e ��∗ < ��∗(�) , th principal and the ag nt implici ly
di gr e on the harvesting volume. Given that ��∗( ) > 0, for the
natural resource m agem nt includes some non-null resourc
mainte ance, we have 0 < ��∗ < ��∗ . This t me, the har sting
leveldo s n tgive theagentan incentive to co tract.
Th IC c ns raint is a maximiz ng argum nt. Hence, we
hav to l ok at th optim c nditions. The optimal ditio
of the I c nstr �(�(�), �(�)) ≥ �(� ),�( ))∀[0,�], is given by:
0=
�� � � ,� ��� � � = �(�)
e second-order condition of the IC constraint is:
0≥ �2�(�( ), (�))��(�)2 � � = �(�)
We define the Hamiltonian f the associated maximization
problem:� = �� � � , � , � � �( )
+ ��[� � , � , � � ]
+ ��� ��� � � ,� ,� ��� (13)
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From Equ tion (8), we k ow that the agent's participation
constraint is bi ding, that s, the i formation rent is s t to zero.
The sign in Equation (9) indicates that n optimum exists. At
last, Equation (10) means that t first-best contractual
harvesting is when the principal's and the agent's ratios of
marginal values equat .
Thecomplete information efficientharvesting level is such that:�∗ < � (11)
Indeed, the principal cannot requ st to harv st outside the
su tainability interval, so that the agent harvests up to t e
minimum sustainable level. Besides, harvesting diminishes
the pri cipal's marginal utility outside the sustainability
interval.
The f llowing proposi on sues.
Proposition 1 In case f a per ect i formation etting, t
Pareto-optimal contr cting implies a l vel f harvest at least
equal to the lower bou d of -- nd th s inside -- the
sustainability interval, such t at he p incipal's value function
remains unchang d.
P oof See the Appe dix.
Propositio 1 un ov rs the fa t t the optimal contra ng
does not affect the principal's valu function, so that the margin l
costs and benefits from harvestingcanceleach othe .3
2.4 The Opti al Contract with Private Infor ation
on the Sustainability Interval
In an imperfect inf rmation case, the principal does not
know what the sustain ble harvest interval is. The
informatio is priv t ly held by the agent. This time, the
agent announces a interval [�, �] to the princip l, where the
bounds depend on his own ptimal levels of harvesting. The
private knowledge of the sustainability interval giv s the
agent an opportunity to over-estimate the min m
harvesting level.4 This in turn stimul tes th principal to
accept a more inte sive level of harvesting.
Following[7], we assume that � ∙ is a continuous
distribution function, w th a positive density � ∙ , that
describes the prior of the princip l over t e s t of potential
minimum levels of sust inable harvest ng [0, �] .5 Th
principal maximizes his expected value function subject to
3 This property only holds because we study the case of renewable
natural res urces.
4 It is our only vari bl of interest, si ce we assume that t e principal
is less willing to harvest than the agent.
5 The possible set f harvest goes fro harves ing (� = 0) to l ar-
cutting of the whole stock (� = �), even if the latter is never reached.
the agent's individual rationality (IR) and incentive
compatibility (IC) constraints:� �,� 0 �� � , � , � � (�)�� (12)������� �� �� �� � � , � , � ≥ 0�� �� � � , � � , � � − �� � � , � � , � � ≥ 0
Ba ed on the above, the rincipal is maximizing his
surplus by integrating his payoff func ion over � . Althoug
this value is provid d by the ag nt, the principal reveals his
preferences regarding �.
T e risk s that t agent atte pts to ign l level f� which maximizes his payoff function t a cost to the
principal. Indeed, the agent sends a signal of the minimal
ustainabl harvesti leve , but the principal ignor s whether this
signal is an honest on . Since th age t k ows t at both players
disagree on the harvest level, and that the interval defining the
sustain le arvest is is priv t information, h might want to
b li � n hoos level t t can lower the principal's payoff.
In consequenc , the principal has to maximiz his value functi n
ov r d nsity �(�) , knowing that the r al �(�) is somewhere
between0 and s.
Two casesare possibl :
I case ��∗ ≥ ��∗(�) , the prin ipal and the agent mpli tly
agree the harv sting volume. Th r for , both the p incipal and
the agent enter i to contract hat optimizes th ir respective
payoff functions. Indeed, ��∗( ) saturates the participation
constraint.
In case ��∗ < ��∗(�) , the principal and the agent implicitly
dis gr e on the arvestin volume. Giv that ��∗(�) > 0, for the
atu al resource nagem nt includ s some non-null resource
maintenance, we have 0 < ��∗ < ��∗ . This tim , t harvesting
leveldo s n tgive theagenta inc ntive to contract.
n t. c , e
. i l ition
of the IC constr int, at is, �(�(�), �(�)) ≥ �(�(�),�(�))∀[0,�], is given by:
0=
�� � � ,� ��� � � � = �(�)
he second-order condition of the IC constraint is:
0≥ �2�(�(�),�(�))��(�)2 � � = �(�)
e defin the Hamiltonian of the associated maximization
problem:� = �� � , �� � , � � �(�)
+ �� [�� � � , � � � � ]
+ ��� ��� � � ,� ,� ��� (13)
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���'���' ���'���' (10)
Fro quat on (8), e kno that the agent's participation
constraint s bi ding, that is, the i for ation rent is set to zero.
he sign in quation (9) indica es that an opti u exists. t
last, quation (10) eans that the first-best contractual
harvesting is h n th principal's and the agent's ratios of
arginal values equate.
heco plete infor ation efficientharvesting level is such that:�∗ � (1 )
Indeed, the principal cannot request to harv st outside the
susta nability interva , so that the agent harvests up to t
ini u sustainable level. esides, harvesting di i ishes
the pri cipal's arginal utility outside the sustainability
interval.
he foll ing proposition ensues.
roposition 1 In c se f p f ct infor ation setting, the
reto- pti al c ntr cting i pli a evel of arvest at least
eq al to the lo r bo nd of - nd thus insid -- the
sustainability interval, such t at the p incipal's value function
re ains unc anged.
ro f See the ppe dix.
Prop sitio 1 uncovers the fact that he opti l contr cting
doe not aff ct the principal's value function, so at the arginal
costs and benefits fro harvestingcanc leach other.3
2.4 i l o tract it rivate I for atio
o t e stai a ility I terval
In an i perfect infor ation case, the princip does not
k o hat the sustainable harv st i erval is. he
infor ation is priv tely held by the agent. his ti e, the
agent announces an interval [�, �] to the principal, here he
bounds depend on his o n pti al levels of harvesting. he
private k o ledge of the sustainability interval gives the
agent a opportunity to over-esti in mu
h rv sting level.4 his in turn sti ulates the principal to
accept a ore inte sive level of harvesting.
Follo i g[7], e assu e that ∙ is a continuo s
distribution function, ith a positive density � ∙ , that
describes the prior the pr cipal over t e set of potential
ini u levels of sustainabl harvesting [0, �] .5 he
principal axi izes his expected value function subject to
3 This roperty only holds because e study the case of rene able
natural resources.
4 It is our only variable of interest, since e assu e that the principal
is less illing to harv st than the agent.
5 The p ssible set of harvest goes from no harv s ing (� 0) to clear-
cutting of the hole stock (� �), even if the latter is never reached.
th agent's i dividual rationality (I ) and incentive
co p tibility (I ) constrai ts:
�,� 0 , �� � , � �(�) � (12)������� �� � � � � , � , � � 0�� �� � � , � � , � � �� � � , � � , � � 0
ased on the above, the rincipal is axi izing hi
surplus by integrating his payoff function over � . lthough
this value is provided by the ag nt, the principal reveals his
preferences regarding .
e risk is that t e agent tte pts to signal a level f� hich axi izes his payoff function at a cost to the
principal. Indeed, the agent sends a s gnal of the ini al
sustainable harvesti l vel, but principal ignores hether this
sign l is an hon st on . Sinc the agent k o s t at both players
disagree o the harvest level, nd that the i terval defining the
sustainable harvest is his private infor ation, he ight ant to
beli on � an choose a level t at can lo er the principal's payoff.
In co sequenc , the principal has to axi ize his value functi n
over densi y �(�) , kno ing that the real �(�) is so e here
bet een0 nd s.
o casesar possible:
I case ��∗ ��∗(�) , the principal and the agent i plicitly
a r e on the harv sting volu e. herefore, both the principal and
the a ent ent r into contract that opti izes their respective
payoff functions. Indeed, ��∗( ) saturat s the participation
constraint.
In ca e ��∗ ��∗(�) , the pr cipal a d the agent i plicitly
disagree on the harvesting volu e. ive that ��∗(�) 0, for the
natural resource ma age ent includ s so e non-null resource
ainten nc , e h v 0 ��∗ ��∗ . his ti e, the harvesting
leveldoe notg ve theagentan incent ve to contract.
The IC constraint is a axi zing argu ent. ence, e
ave to look at the pti al c ndi ions. The opti al condition
of th I constraint, that is, �(�(�), �(�)) �(�(�),�(�))[0, �], i gi :
0=
�� � � , ��� � � � �(�)
he r er condition of e I constraint s:
0
�2�(�( ),�(�))�(�)2 � �(�)
e define the a iltonian of the associated axi ization
probl :
� � � , �� � , � � �(�)
+ ���[ � � � , � , � ]
+ ��� ��� � � ,� � ,� ��� (13)
We define the H miltonian of  the associated 
maximizatio  pr b em:
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���'���' = ���'���' (10)
From Equati (8) we know that the agent's participation
co straint is binding, t at is, the information rent is s t to zero.
The sign in Equation (9) indicates that an optimum exists. At
last, Equation (10) means that the first-best contractual
harvesting is when the principal's and the agent's ratios of
marginal values equate.
T ecomplete information efficientharvesting level is such that:�∗ < � (1 )
Indeed, the principal can ot request to harvest outside the
sustainability interval, so that the agent harvests up to t e
minimu sustainable lev l. Besides, harvesting dimi ishes
the ri i l's marginal utility outside the sustain bility
i terv l.
The foll wing proposition ensues.
Proposition 1 In c se of a pe f ct information setting, the
Pareto-optimal c ntracting implies a level of harvest at least
eq al to the lower bo nd of -- and thus inside -- the
sustainability interval, such that the principal's value function
remains unc anged.
Pro f See the Ap dix.
Prop sition 1 unc vers the fact that the optimal contracting
does not affect the principal's value function, so t at the marginal
costs and benefits from harvestingcanceleach other.3
2.4 T Optimal Contract with Private Info mation
on the Sustainability Interval
I an imperfect information case, the principal does not
know what the sustainable harves i terval s. The
i formation is privately held by the agen . This time, the
agent n ou ce an nterval [�, �] to the pri cipal, whe e t
bounds depend n his ow optimal levels of h r st ng. The
privat knowledge of the sustainability int rv l ives the
agent a op ortun ty to ver-estimate t e m i um
harvesting lev l.4 This i turn stim lat s he princip l to
accept a more intensive level of harvesting.
Following[7], we assume that � ∙ is a continuous
distributi n function, with a positive den ity � ∙ , that
desc ibes the prior of the pri cipal over t e set of po en ial
minimum levels of sustainable har sting [0, �] .5 The
princ pal aximizes hi expected value function subject to
3 This property only holds because we study the case of renewable
natural res urces.
4 It is our only variable of interest, since we assume that the principal
is less willing to harvest than the agent.
5 The possible set of harvest goes from no harvesting (� = 0) to clear-
cutting of the whole stock (� = �), even if the latter is never reached.
the gent's i dividu l ra ion lity (IR) an incentive
comp tibility (IC) constraints:
,� 0� � , �� , � � (�)�� ����� �� � � � � , � � , � � ≥ 0� �� � � , � � , � � − �� � � , � � , � � ≥ 0
B sed on the above, the principal is maximizing h
rplus y integrating his payoff function over � . A though
this value i provi ed by the agent, the principal reveals his
preferences regarding �.
The risk is that the agent attempts t sign l a level of� which maximizes his payoff function at a cost to the
principal. Indeed, the agent sends a signal of the minimal
sustainable harvesting level, but t e principal ignores whether this
signal is an honest one. Since the agent knows that both players
disagree on t e harvest level, and that the interval defining the
sustainable harv st is is private information, he might want to
belie on � and cho se a level that an low r the pri cipal' payoff.
In co sequ nc , the pri cipal h s to maximize his value function
ov r density �(�) , knowing that the r al �(�) is somewher
between0 and s.
Two casesare possible:
In case ��∗ ≥ ��∗(�) , the principal and the agent implicitly
agree n the arvesting volume. Therefore, bo the pr ncipal and
the agent e ter into a contract that op imizes ir respective
payoff functions. Indeed, ��∗(�) saturat s the participation
constraint.
In case ��∗ < ��∗(�) , the pri cipal and the agent implicitly
d s gree on he arvesting volume. Given that ��∗(�) > 0, for the
natural resourc a agement include some non-null resource
m inten nc , we h ve 0 < ��∗ < ��∗ . This time, the harvesting
l veldoes n tgive theagentan inc ntive to contract.
The I constraint is a maximizing argument. Hence, we
have to lo k at the optim l conditions. The optimal condition
of th IC constraint, that is, �(�(�), �(�)) ≥ �(�(�),�(�))∀[0,�], is give by:
0=
�� � � ,� �� � � � = �(�)
T sec -ord r condition of e IC constraint is:
0≥ �2�(�( ), (�))��(�)2 � � = �(�)
define th Hamiltonian of the associated maximiz tion
problem:� = �� � � , �� , � (�)
+ ���[�� � � , � , � � ]
+ ��� ��� � ,� ,� ��� (13) (13)
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Contract variables q and r must satisfy:���� = ��� � � , �� � , � ��� �(�)+ ��� ��� � � , � � , � ���+ ��� ��� ��� � � ,� � ,� ��� = 0 (14)���� = ��� � � , �� � , � ��� �(�)+ ��� ��� � � , � � , � ���+ ��� ��� ��� � � ,� � ,� ��� = 0 (15)
The boundary at � = 0 is unconstrained, meaning that� could take any value on the interval. Hence the
transversality condition is ���(�) = 0 , that is, the shadow
price of � is zero.
Therefore, ������ = �(�) yields ���(�) = ������(�) = �(�)� ,
which gives:
��� =− ��� � � ,�� � ,� ��� �(�)+�2�� � � ,� � ,� ���2 �(�)��� � � ,� � ,� ��� (16)
The second-best optimal condition is therefore:���'���' − � = ���'���' (17)
where� = ����'' −����'' ���'���' �(�)�(�) (18)
In comparison to the perfect information case, an
additional term � arises. The optimal condition for
contracting is when the principal's and the agent's ratios of
marginal values equate modulo � . As the sustainability
interval is not known to the principal, the agent announces a
level which maximizes his own payoff. In this sense, �
represents the information rent captured by the agent or the
loss in the payoff inflicted to the principal.
The second-best optimal harvesting ��� induces the
following probability over �:�(�) = ���'���' − ���'���' ���' �(�)����'' −����'' ���' (19)
If �(�) = 0 , we fall on the perfect information case and�∗ = � . Should this not be the case, the consequential
proposition can be stated.
Proposition 2 In case of an imperfect information setting, the
Pareto-optimal contracting depends on the probability that
the level of harvest is less than or equal to the lower bound of
-- and thus outside -- the sustainability interval.
Proof See the Appendix.
The rent represents the agent's use of his private information on
the sustainability interval. It is increasing under the Jensen's
inequality [10,5]:����''����'' ≥ 1���' (20)
Corollary 1 Given the agent's preferences toward
contracting, there is an unavoidable information rent.
Proof See the Appendix.
On the assumption that �(�) ≠ 0, the only way to fall on the
perfect information case and thus to fall on the lower bound of the
sustainability interval is to set� = 0. This implies that the Jensen's
relative inequality becomes a strict equality. To get there, the
inverse of the agent's marginal value from harvesting should be
equal to his ratio ofcriticalpoints
over the revenue transfer and harvesting. In consequence,�� should be linear, be it a condition hard to meet in reality.6
3. Conclusions
The management of renewable natural resources often
takes the form of a delegation from the resource owner to the
resource manager. In presence of asymmetric information on
the sustainable harvesting interval, a principal-agent
formulation may be put to good use. In this note, we show
that if the renewable natural resource manager has a higher
propensity to harvest than the resource owner, he may be
tempted to manipulate, against the owner, his private
information on the true sustainability interval. Would it be the
case, the latter ends up accepting levels of harvesting that do
not match his preferences. Our model ultimately shows the
possibility of occurrence of an ecological deficit when the
renewable natural resource owner's fondness for
sustainability is concealed for profit motives.
The modelling outcomes give the insight that, in a world
where owners mandate agents holding private information to
manage their renewable natural resources, improving the
access to information is necessary and sufficient to decrease
the extend of moral hazard problems. Therefore, further
involving the natural resource owners in decision making
might be a sound way to guarantee the needed common-
knowledge perspectives.
6 Assuming the concavity of the agent's value function with respect to
q and ����'' > 0 would imply that � < 0.
 (14)
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Contract variables q and r must satisfy:���� = ��� � � , �� � , � ��� �(�)+ ��� ��� � � , � � , � ��+ ��� ��� ��� � � ,� � ,� ��� = 0 (14)���� = ��� � � , �� � , � ��� �(�)+ ��� ��� � � , � � , � ��+ ��� ��� ��� � � ,� � ,� ��� = 0 (15)
The boundary at � = 0 is unconstrained, meaning that� could take any value on the interval. Hence the
transversality condition is ���(�) = 0 , that is, the shadow
price of � is zero.
Therefore, ������ = �(�) yields ���(�) = ������(�) = �(�)� ,
which gives:
��� =− ��� � � ,�� � ,� ��� �(�)+�2�� � � ,� � ,� ���2 �(�)��� � � ,� � ,� ��� (16)
The second-best optimal condition is therefore:���'���' − � = ���'���' (17)
where� = ����'' −����'' ���'���' �(�)�(�) (18)
In comparison to the perfect information case, an
additional term � arises. The optimal condition for
contracting is when the principal's and the agent's ratios of
marginal values equate modulo � . As the sustainability
interval is not known to the principal, the agent announces a
level which maximizes his own payoff. In this sense, �
represents the information rent captured by the agent or the
loss in the payoff inflicted to the principal.
The second-best optimal harvesting ��� induces the
following probability over �:�(�) = ���'���' − ���'���' ���' �(�)����'' −����'' ���' (19)
If �(�) = 0 , we fall on the perfect information case and�∗ = � . Should this not be the case, the consequential
proposition can be stated.
Proposition 2 In case of an imperfect information setting, the
Pareto-optimal contracting depends on the probability that
the level of harvest is less than or equal to the lower bound of
-- and thus outside -- the sustainability interval.
Proof See the Appendix.
The rent represents the agent's use of his private information on
the sustainability interval. It is increasing under the Jensen's
inequality [10,5]:����''����'' ≥ 1���' (20)
Corollary 1 Given the agent's preferences toward
contracting, there is an unavoidable information rent.
Proof See the Appendix.
On the assumption that �(�) ≠ 0, the only way to fall on the
perfect information case and thus to fall on the lower bound of the
sustainability interval is to set� = 0. This implies that the Jensen's
relative inequality becomes a strict equality. To get there, the
inverse of the agent's marginal value from harvesting should be
equal to his ratio ofcriticalpoints
over the revenue transfer and harvesting. In consequence,�� should be linear, be it a condition hard to meet in reality.6
3. Conclusions
The management of renewable natural resources often
takes the form of a delegation from the resource owner to the
resource manager. In presence of asymmetric information on
the sustainable harvesting interval, a principal-agent
formulation may be put to good use. In this note, we show
that if the renewable natural resource manager has a higher
propensity to harvest than the resource owner, he may be
tempted to manipulate, against the owner, his private
information on the true sustainability interval. Would it be the
case, the latter ends up accepting levels of harvesting that do
not match his preferences. Our model ultimately shows the
possibility of occurrence of an ecological deficit when the
renewable natural resource owner's fondness for
sustainability is concealed for profit motives.
The modelling outcomes give the insight that, in a world
where owners mandate agents holding private information to
manage their renewable natural resources, improving the
access to information is necessary and sufficient to decrease
the extend of moral hazard problems. Therefore, further
involving the natural resource owners in decision making
might be a sound way to guarantee the needed common-
knowledge perspectives.
6 Assuming the concavity of the agent's value function with respect to
q and ����'' > 0 would imply that � < 0.
 (15)
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Contract variables q and r must satisfy:���� = ��� � � , �� � , � �� �(�)+ ��� ��� � � , � � , � �+ ��� �� ��� � � , � ,� ��� = 0 (14)���� = ��� � � , �� � , � �� �(�)+ ��� ��� � � , � � , � ��+ ��� ��� ��� � � , � ,� ��� = 0 (15)
The boundar � = 0 is unconstrained, meaning that� could take any value on the interval. Hence the
transversality condition is ���(�) = 0 , that is, the shadow
price of � is zero.
Therefore, ����� = �(�) yields ���(�) = ����(�) = �(�)� ,
which gives:
��� =− ��� � � ,�� � ,� ��� �(�)+ 2 � ,� � ,� ���2 �(�)��� � � ,� � ,� ��� (16)
The second-best optimal condition is therefore:
���' − � = ���' (17)
where� = ����'' −����'' ���'���' �(�) (18)
In comparison to the perfect information case, an
additional term � arises. The optimal condition for
contracting is when the principal's and the agent's ratios of
marginal values equate modulo � . As the sustainability
interval is not known to the principal, the agent announces a
level which maximizes his own payoff. In this sense, �
represents the information rent captured by the agent or the
loss in the payoff inflicted to the principal.
The sec nd-best optimal harvesting ��� induces the
following probability over :�(�) = ���' − ���' ���' �(�)����'' −����'' ���' (19)
If �(�) = 0 , we fall on the perfect information case and�∗ = � . Should this not be the case, the consequential
proposition can be stated.
Proposition 2 In case of an imperfect information setting, the
Pareto-optimal contracting depends on the probability that
the level of harvest is less than or equal to the lower bound of
-- and thus outside -- the sustainability interval.
Proof See the Appendix.
The rent represents the agent's use of his private information on
the sustainability interval. It is increasing under the Jensen's
inequality [10,5]:
���''����'' ≥ 1���' (20)
Corollary 1 Give the agent's preferenc s toward
contracting, there is an unavoidable information rent.
Proof S e the Appendix.
On the assumption that �(�) ≠ 0, the only way to fall on the
perfect information ca e and thus to fall on the lower bound of the
sustainability interval is to set� = 0. This implies that the Jensen's
relativ inequality becomes strict equality. To get t ere, th
inverse of the agent's m rginal value from harvesting should be
equal to his ratio ofcritic lpoints
over the rev nue transfer and harvesting. In cons quence,�� should be linear, be it a condition hard to meet in reality.6
3. Conclusions
The management of renewable natural res urc s ften
takes th form of a delegation from the resource wner to the
resource manag r. In pr e ce of asymmetric inform tion on
the sustainable harvestin interval, a principal-agent
formulation may e put to good se. In this note, we show
that if the renewable natural resource manager has a higher
propensity to h rvest than the resource owner, e may b
tempted to manipulate, gainst the owner, his privat
information on the tr e sustainability interval. Would it be the
case, the latter ends up accepting levels of harvesting that do
n t match his prefer s. Our model ultimately shows t
possibility of occurrenc f an ec logical deficit when the
renewable natural resource owner's fondness for
sustainability is concealed for profit motives.
The modelling outcom s give the insight that, in world
where own rs mandate agents holding private information to
manage their renewable natural resources, impr ving th
access to inf rmation is necessary and ufficient to decrease
the extend of mor l hazard problems. Th refore, further
involving the natural res urce own rs in d cision aki g
might be a sound way to guarantee the needed common-
knowledge perspectives.
6 Assuming the concavity of the agent's value function with respect to
q and ����'' > 0 would imply that � < 0.
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The prime consideration of this note is to understand how -
- when it comes to managing renewable natural resources --
the agent's private information may come into conflict with
the objective of a principal, be it a secondary topic that has
been neglected in the literature. We thus model the
contractual relationship between a principal and an agent as
regards the renewable natural resource management. In the
situation of an imperfect information setting, we find that the
Pareto-optimal contracting depends on the probability that the
level of harvesting stands outside the sustainability interval.
This puts the Pareto-optimal allocations in jeopardy. The
information rent held by the agent being unavoidable,
stepping outside the sustainability interval implies the
possibility of depletion of the renewable natural resource.
This potential ecological overshoot, which occurs when
human demand exceeds the regenerative capacity of a natural
ecosystem, puts the Earth on an unsustainable trajectory.
After this starting section, we describe the model in
Section 2, with a focus on the principal-agent relationship in a
perfect information setting (Subsection 2.3) and when the
agent owns private information on the sustainable level of
harvesting (Subsection 2.4). Section 3 concludes.
2. A Principal-agent Model in Renewable
Natural Resource Management
We consider a principal who delegates the management of
a renewable natural resource of stock s to an agent. The
principal and the agent have to agree upon a quantity to be
harvested q from the renewable natural resource levels owned
by the principal. Stock s is considered as a proxy of the
natural resource amenities, which are all non-market goods
and services related to the existence of this resource [8]. The
sustainable harvesting of renewable natural resources, such
that the stock remains unchanged or ���� = 0 , means that the
level of harvest matches with the level of the resource’s
natural growth. Unsustainable harvesting can be envisaged in
two ways. When ���� > 0 , the scenario corresponds to the
damages issued from the resource over-stocking [3]. The
absence of implementation of a management plan is one
possible way to envisage such a context. When ���� < 0 , the
scenario implies the over-harvesting of the stock and the
depletion of the renewable natural resource. Finally, the
principal gives revenue share r to the agent for the renewable
natural resource management, harvesting included, such that���� > 0.
The principal and the agent can have different preferences
on how to conduct the renewable natural resource
management. For instance, the agent could have stronger
preferences for income from harvesting, while the principal
could have stronger preferences for preserving the resource’s
natural and environmental amenities.
In the knowledge that the renewable natural resource
harvesting must not jeopardize its sustainability, i terval[�, �] defines the bounding minimum and maximum levels of
harvesting. It is the set of possible actions to be undertaken in
purpose of the sustainable resource management. In detail,
there is a maximum level of harvesting beyond which the
resource is depleted. As a result, the resource cannot be
renewed and no longer provides natural and environmental
amenities. There is also a minimum level of harvesting below
which amenities start to vanish. This can be explained by the
absence of a management plan. Therefore, q has to lie
somewhere within this interval. These assumptions implicitly
mean that, in a specific range of harvesting levels, resources
and natural and environmental amenities are complementary.
If we assume that the principal has stronger preferences for
the stock conservation than the agent, the objectives of the
parties should differ. The principal's harvesting objective will
tend to be a low level of h rvest, hence runni g th risk of
being below �. On the contrary, the agent will seek to harvest
beyond this level.1 The knowledge of the interval of the
sustainable lev ls f harvesting is crucial. The key issue of the
contract setting is the information gap as to this interval. We
will thus consider that this interval can correspond either to
common knowledg or to a private information.
2.1 The Principal: The Renewable Natural Resource
Owner
Let �� be the value function of a risk-neutral principal.
This value function is ecreasing in revenue transfer r paid to
the agent. However, the effect of renewable natural resource
stock s and harvesting q on the value function is ambiguous,
since harvesting generates revenues but, at the same time,
reduces utility by diminishing the levels of natural and
environmental amenities. While the principal is willing to
harvest less than the agent, the question is whether principal's
optimal harvest level ��∗ lies or not within sustainability
interval [�, �]. The principal's value function is defined by:�� = ��(� � , �� � , � � ) (1)
where �� � represents the principal's identity function such
that:�� � ≔ ��∗ > � �����' = ���(�,�,�)�� ≤ 0��∗ ≤ � �����' = ��� �,�,��� > 0 (2)
1 The opposite assumption yields symmetric results with respect to
maximum level �.
 could take ny value on t e inter al. Hence the 
transv rsality conditio  is 
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Contract variables q and r ust satisfy:���� = ��� � � , �� � , � ��� �(�)+ �� ��� � � , � � , � ��+ �� �� � � � , � ,� � = 0 (14)���� = ��� � � , �� � , � �� �(�)+ �� ��� � � , � � , � ��+ �� �� � � � � , � ,� ��� = 0 (15)
The bou at � = 0 is unco strained, eaning that� could take any value on the i t rv l. the
ransversalit iti n i �� (�) = 0 , th t is, shadow
price of � is zero.
T erefore, � � = �(�) yields �� (�) = � � (�) = �(�)� ,
which gives:
�� � � � � , � ,� �� �(�)+�2�� � � , � ,� �� 2 �(�)� � � � ,� � ,� �� (16)
The second-best opti al condition is th efore:��'��' − � = ���'��' (17)
where� = ��'' − �'' ��'��' �(�)�(�) (18)
In co parison to the perfect infor ation case, an
additional ter � arises. The opti al condition for
contracting is when the principal's and the agent's ratios of
arginal values equate odulo � . As the sustainability
interval is not known to the principal, the agent announces a
level which axi izes his own payof . In this sense, �
represents the infor ation rent captured by the agent or the
los in the payof inflicted to the principal.
The second- es pti al harvesting �� induces the
fol owing probability over :�(�) = ���'��' − ���'��' ��' �(�)��'' −��'' ��' (19)
If �(�) = 0 , we fal on the perfect infor ation case and�∗ = � . Should this not be the case, the consequential
proposition can be stated.
Proposition 2 In case of an imperfect information set ing, the
Pareto-optimal contracting depends on the probability that
the level of harvest is les than or equal to the lower bound of
- and thus outside - the sustainability interval.
Proof See the Appendix.
The rent represents the agent's use of his private information on
the sustainability interval. It is increasing under the Jensen's
inequality [10,5]:��''��'' ≥ 1��' (20)
C rol ary 1 Given the agent's prefere ces toward
contracting, there is an unavoidable information rent.
Proof Se the A pendix.
On the as u ption that �(�) ≠ 0, the only way to fal on the
perfect infor ation case and thus to fal on the lower bound of the
sustainability interval is to set� = 0. This i plies that the Jensen's
relative inequality beco es a strict equality. To get there, the
inverse of the agent's arginal value fro harvesting should be
equal to his ratio ofcriticalpoints
over the revenue transfer and harvesting. In co sequence,�� sh uld be l near, be it a condition hard to eet in reality.6
3. onclusions
The anage ent of renewable natural resources often
takes the for of a delegation fr the resource owner t the
resource a ager. In presence of asy etric infor ation o
the sustainable harvesting interval, a principal-agent
formulation may be put to good use. In this note, we show
that if the renewable natural resource anager has a higher
propensity to harvest than the resource o ner, he ay be
te pted to anipulate, against the owner, his private
infor ation on the true sustainability interval. ould it be the
case, the lat er ends up accepting levels of harvesting that do
not atch his preferences. Our odel ulti ately shows the
pos ibility of oc ur ence of an ecological deficit when the
renewable natural resource owner's fondnes for
sustainability is concealed for profit otives.
The odel ing outco es give the insight that, in a world
where owners andate agents holding private infor ation to
anage their renewable natural resources, i pr ving the
acces to infor ati n is neces ary and suf icient to decrease
the extend of oral hazard proble s. Therefore, further
involving the natural resource owners in decision making
might be a sound way to guarante the ne ded common-
knowledge perspectives.
6 As uming the c ncavity of the agent's value function with respect to
q and ���'' > 0 would imply that � < 0.
, that is, the shadow 
price of 
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The prime consideration of this note is to understand how -
- when it comes to managing renewable natural resources --
the agent's private information may come into conflict with
the objective of a principal, be it a secondary topic that has
been neglected in the literature. We thus model the
contractual relationship between a principal and an agent as
regards the renewable natural resource management. In the
situation of an imperfect information setting, we find that the
Pareto-optimal contracting depends on the probability that the
level of harvesting stands outside the sustainability interval.
This puts the Pareto-optimal allocations in jeopardy. The
information rent held by the agent being unavoidable,
stepping outside the sustainability interval implies the
possibility of depletion of the renewable natural resource.
This potential ecological overshoot, which occurs when
human demand exceeds the regenerative capacity of a natural
ecosystem, puts the Earth on an unsustainable trajectory.
After this starting section, we describe the model in
Section 2, with a focus on the principal-agent relationship in a
perfect information setting (Subsection 2.3) and when the
agent owns private information on the sustainable level of
harvesting (Subsection 2.4). Section 3 concludes.
2. A Principal-agent Model in Renewable
Natural Resource Management
We consider a principal who delegates the management of
a renewable natural resource of stock s to an agent. The
principal and the agent have to agree upon a quantity to be
harvested q fro the renewable natural resource levels owned
by the principal. Stock s is considered as a proxy of the
natural resource amenities, which are all non-market goods
and services related to the existence of this resource [8]. The
sustainable harvesting of renewable natural resources, such
that the stock remains unchanged or ���� = 0 , means that the
level of harvest matches with the level of the resource’s
natural growth. Unsustainable harvesting can be envisaged in
two ways. When ���� > 0 , the scenario corresponds to the
damages issued from the res urce over-stocking [3]. The
absence of implementation of a management plan is one
possible way to envisage such a context. When ���� < 0 , the
scenario implies the over-harvesting of the stock and the
depletion of the renewable natural resource. Finally, the
principal gives revenue share r to the agent for the renewable
natural resource management, harvesting included, such that���� > 0.
The principal and the agent can have different preferences
on how to conduct the renewable natural resource
management. For instance, the agent could have stronger
preferences for income from harvesting, while the principal
could have stronger preferences for preserving t e resource’s
natural and environmental amenities.
In the knowledge that the renewable natural resource
harvesting must not jeopardize its sustainability, interval[�, �] define the bounding minimum and aximum levels of
harvesting. It is the set of possible actions to be undertaken in
purpose of the sustainable resource management. In detail,
there is a maximum level of harvesting beyond which the
resource is depleted. As a result, the resource cannot be
renewed and no longer provides natural and environmental
amenities. There is also a minimum level of harvesting below
which amenities start to vanish. This can be explained by the
absence of a management plan. Therefore, q has to lie
somewhere within this interval. These assumptions implicitly
mean that, in a specific range of harvesting levels, resources
and natural and e vironmental amenities are complementary.
If we assume that the principal has stronger preferences for
the stock conservation than the age t, t objectives of the
parties should differ. The principal's harvesting objective will
tend to be a low level of harvest, hence running the risk of
being below . On th contrary, the agent will seek t harvest
beyond this level.1 The knowledge of the interval of the
sustainable levels of harvesting is crucial. The key issue of the
contract setting is the information gap as to this interval. We
will thus consider that this interval can correspond either to
common knowledge or to a private information.
2.1 The Principal: The Renewable Natural Resource
Owner
Let �� be the value function of a risk-neutral principal.
This value function is decreasing in revenue transfer r paid to
the agent. However, the effect of renewable natural resource
stock s and harvesting q on the value function is ambiguous,
since harvesting generates revenues but, at the same time,
reduces utility by diminishing the levels of natural and
environmental amenities. Wh l the princi al is willing to
harvest less han the age t, the question is whether princip l's
optimal harvest level ��∗ lies or not within sustainability
interval [�, �]. The princi al's value f nction is defin d by:�� = ��(� � , �� � , � � ) (1)
where �� � represents the principal's identity function such
that:�� � ≔ ��∗ > � �����' = ���(�,�,�)�� ≤ 0��∗ ≤ � �����' = ��� �,�,�� > 0 (2)
1 The opposite assumption yields symmetric results with respect to
maximum level �.
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Contract variables q and r ust satisfy:�� = � � � , � � , � �� ( )+ �� � � � , � � , � �+ �� �� � � � � ,� ,� ��� = 0 (14)��� = � � � , � � , � ��� �(�)+ � � � � , � � , � ��+ � � �� � � � ,� ,� ��� = 0 (15)
ndary at � = 0 is unconstrained, eaning that� could take any value o the interval. ence
t lity conditi n is �� (�) = 0 ,
r � is zero.
ref re, ��� = �(�) yields �� (�) = �� (�) = �(�)� ,
s:
� � � � � ,� � ,� ��� �(�)+�2� � � ,� � ,� ���2 �(�)� � � � ,� ,� ��� (16)
The second-best opti al condition is therefore:�'�' − � = �'�' (17)
where� = �'' −��'' �'�' �(�)�(�) (18)
In co parison to the perfect infor ation case, an
ad itional ter � arises. The opti al condition for
contracting is when the principal's and the agent's ratios of
arginal values equate odulo � . As the sustainability
interval is not known to the principal, the agent an ounces a
level which axi izes his own payoff. In this sense, �
represents the infor ation rent captured by the agent or the
loss in the payoff inflicted to the principal.
The second-best opti al harvesting �� induces the
following probability over �:�(�) = �'�' − �'�' �' �(�)�'' −�'' �' (19)
If �(�) = 0 , we fall on the perfect infor ation case and�∗ = � . Should this not be the case, the consequential
proposition can be stated.
Proposition 2 In case of an imperfect information setting, the
Pareto-optimal contracting depends on the probability that
the level of harvest is less than or equal to the lower bound of
-- and thus outside -- the sustainability interval.
Pro f Se the Ap endix.
The rent represents the agent's use of his private information on
the sustainability interval. It is increasing under the Jensen's
inequality [10,5]:�''�'' ≥ 1�' (20)
Corollary 1 Given the agent's preferences toward
contracting, there is an unavoidable information rent.
Pro f Se the Appe dix.
On the assu ption that �(�) ≠ 0, the only way to fall on the
perfect infor ation case and thus to fall on the lower bound of the
sustainability interval is to set� = 0. This i plies that the Jensen's
relative inequality beco es a strict equality. To get there, the
inverse of the agent's arginal value fro harvesting should be
equal to his ratio ofcriticalpoints
over the revenue transfer and harvesting. In consequence,� should be linear, be it a condition hard to e t in reality.6
3. onclusions
The anage ent of renewable natural resources often
takes the for of a delegation fro the resource owner to the
resource anager. In presence of asy etric infor ation on
the sustainable harvesting interval, a principal-agent
formulation may be put to go d use. In this note, we show
that if the renewable natural resource anager has a higher
propensity to harvest than the resource owner, he may be
tempted to manipulate, against the owner, his private
information on the true sustainability interval. ould it be the
case, the latter ends up ac epting levels of harvesting that do
not atch his preferences. Our odel ulti ately shows the
possibility of oc urrence of an ecological deficit when the
renewable natural resource owner's fondness for
sustainability is concealed for profit otives.
The odelling outco es give the insight that, in a world
where owners mandate agents holding private information to
manage their renewable natural resources, i proving the
ac ess to infor ation is necessary and sufficient to decrease
the extend of oral hazard proble s. Therefore, further
involving the natural resource owners in decision making
might be a sound way to guarante the ne ded com on-
knowledge perspectives.
6 Assuming the concavity of the agent's value function with respect to
q and �'' > 0 would imply that � < 0.
 (16)
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In co parison to t e perfect infor atio  case, an 
additional term σ arises. The opti al condition for 
contracting is wh n th  principal's and the agent's ratios 
of marginal values equate modulo σ. As the sustainability 
interval is not known to t e principal, the agent announces 
a lev l which maxi izes his own payoff. In this sense, σ 
represents the information rent captured by the agent or 
the loss in the payoff inflicted to the principal.
he second-best op i al harvesting 
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ontract variables q and r ust satisfy:��� � � � � , �� � , � �� �(�)��� � � � � , � � , � ���� �� ��� � � ,� � ,� ��� 0 (14)���� � � � � , �� � , � ��� ( )��� � � � � , � � , � ������ ��� ��� � � ,� � ,� ��� 0 (15)
he boundary at � 0 is unconstrained, eaning that� could take any value on the interval. ence the
transversality condition is ���(�) 0 , that is, the shado
pric of � is zero.
eref r , ������ �(�) yields ���(�) ������(�) (�)� ,
whic i s:
� ��� � � ,�� � ,� ��� (�) �2�� � � ,� � ,� ���2 �(�)��� � � ,� � ,� ��� (16)
he second t opti al condition is therefore:���'���' � ���'���' (17)
her� �� �'' −����'' ���'���' �(�)�(�) ( )
In co paris t the perfect infor ation case, a
ad itional ter � arises. he opti al conditi f r
contracti is en the principal's and the agent's ratios f
arginal values equate odulo � . s the sustainabilit
inter l is t t th rincipal, the agent an ounces a
level hich axi izes his o n payoff. In this se, �
repr t t e infor ation rent captured by the agent or the
loss in the payoff inflicted to the princi al.
he second- opt l h ting ��� induces the
follo ing probability over �:(�) ���'���' ���'���' ���' �(�)�� �'' −����'' ���' (19)
If (�) 0 , e fall on the perfect infor ation case and�∗ � . Should this not be the case, the consequential
proposition can be stated.
roposition 2 In case of an i perfect infor ation setting, the
areto-opti al contracting depends on the probability that
the level of harvest is less than or equal to the lo er bound of
-- and thus outside -- the sustainability interval.
ro f See the p endix.
he rent represents the agent's use of his private infor ation on
the sustainability interval. It is increasing under the Jensen's
inequality [10,5]:����''����'' 1���' (20)
orollary 1 iven the agent's preferences to ard
contracting, there is an unavoidable infor ation rent.
ro f See the ppe dix.
n the assu ption th t (�) 0, the only ay to fall on the
perfect infor ation case and thus to fall on the lo er bound of the
sustainability interval is to set� 0. his i plies that the Jensen's
relative inequality beco es a strict equality. o get there, the
inverse of the agent's arginal value fro harvesting should be
equal to his ratio ofcriticalpoints
over the revenue transfer and harvesting. In consequence,� should be linear, be it a condition hard to eet in reality.6
. cl si s
he anage ent of rene able natural resources often
takes the for of a delegation fro the resource o ner to the
resource anager. In presence of asy etric infor ation on
the sustainable harvesting interval, a principal-agent
for ulation ay be put to go d use. In this note, e sho
that if the rene able natural resource anager has a higher
propensity to harvest than the resource o ner, he ay be
te pted to anipulate, against the o ner, his private
infor ation on the true sustainability interval. ould it be the
case, the latter ends up accepting levels of harvesting that do
not atch his preferences. ur odel ulti ately sho s the
possibility of occurrence of an ecological deficit hen the
rene able natural resource o ner's fondness for
sustainability is concealed for profit otives.
he odelling outco es give the insight that, in a orld
here o ners andate agents holding private infor ation to
anage their rene able natural resources, i proving the
access to infor ation is necessary and sufficient to decrease
the extend of oral hazard proble s. herefore, further
involving the natural resource o ners in decision aking
ight be a sound ay to guarantee the needed co on-
kno ledge perspectives.
6 Assu ing the concavity of the agent's value function with respect to
q and ����'' 0 would i ply that � 0.
 s  
f  r a ilit  over 
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The prime consideration of this note is to understand how -
- when it c mes to managing renewable natural resources --
the agent's privat inf rmation may come into conflict with
th objective of principal, be it a secondary topic that has
been neglected in the literature. We thus model the
con ractu l relationship between a principal and an agent as
regards the ren wable natural r source management. In the
situation of an imperfect information setting, we find that the
Pareto-optimal contracting depends on the probability that t e
level of harvesting stands outside the sustainability interval.
This puts the Pareto-optimal allocations in j opardy. The
information rent held by the agent being unavoidable,
stepping outside th sustainability interval implies the
possibility f depletion of the renewable natural resource.
This potential ecological overshoot, which occurs when
human demand exceeds the regenerative capacity of a natural
ecosystem, puts the Earth on an unsustainable trajectory.
After this starting section, we describe the model in
Section 2, with a focus on the principal-agent relationship i a
perfect information setting (Subsection 2.3) and when
agent ow s private information on the sustainable level of
harv sting (Subs ction 2.4). Section 3 concludes.
2. A Principal-agent Model in Renewable
Natural Resource Management
We consider a principal who delegates the management of
a renewable natural resource of stock s to an agent. The
principal and the agent have to agree upon a quantity to be
harvested q from the renewable natural resource levels owned
by the principal. Stock s is considered as a proxy of the
natural resource amenities, which are all non-market goods
and services related to the existence of this resource [8]. The
sustainable harvesting of renewable natural resources, such
that the stock remains unchanged or ���� = 0 , means that the
level of harvest matches with the level of the resource’s
natural growth. Unsustainable harvesting can be envisaged in
two ways. When ���� > 0 , the scenario corresponds to the
damages issued from the resource over-stocking [3]. The
absence of implementation of a management plan is one
possible way to envisage such a context. When ���� < 0 , the
scenario implies the over-harvesting of the stock and the
depletion of the renewable natural resource. Finally, the
principal gives revenue share r to the agent for the renewable
natural resource management, harvesting included, such that���� > 0.
The principal and the agent can have different preferences
on how to conduct the renewable natural resource
management. For instance, the agent could have stronger
prefer ces for income from harvesting, while the principal
could have stronger preferences for preserving the resource’s
natural and environmental amenities.
In the knowledge that the renewable natural resource
harvesting must not jeopardize its sustainability, interval[�, �] defines the boundi g minimum and maximum l v ls of
harvesting. It is the set of possible actions to be undertaken in
purpose of the sustainable resource management. In detail,
there is a maximum level of harvesting beyond which the
resource is depleted. As a result, the resource cannot be
renewed and no longer provides natural and environ ental
amenities. Ther is also a minimum level of harvesting below
ich am nities start to vanish. This c be explained by the
abs ce of a management pl n. Therefore, q has to lie
somewhere within this interval. These assumptions implicitly
mean that, in a specific range of harvesting levels, resources
and natural and environmental amenities ar complementary.
If we assume hat the principal h s stronger preferences for
the stock conservation than the agent, the objectives of the
parties should diffe . The principal's harvesting objective will
tend to be a ow le l of harvest, hence running the risk of
e ng below �. On the contrary, the agent will seek to harvest
beyond this level.1 The knowledge of the interval of th
sustainable levels of harvesting is crucial. The key issue of the
contract setting is the information gap as to this interval. We
will thus c sid r that this interval can correspond either to
commo knowl dg or to a private i formation.
2.1 The Principal: The Renewable Natural Reso rce
Owner
Let �� be the value function of a risk-neutral principal.
This valu fun tion i decr asing in revenue transfer r paid to
the agent. However, the effect of renewable natural resource
stock s and harvesting q on the value function is ambiguous,
since harvesting generates revenues but, at the same time,
reduces utility by diminishing the levels of natural and
environmental amenities. While the principal is willing to
harvest less than the agent, the question is whether principal's
optimal harvest level ��∗ lies or not within sustainability
interval [�, �]. The principal's value function is defined by:�� = ��(� � , �� � , � � ) (1)
where �� � represents the principal's identity function such
that:�� � ≔ ��∗ > � �����' = ���(�,�,�)�� ≤ 0��∗ ≤ � �����' = ��� �,�,��� > 0 (2)
1 The opposite assumption yields symmetric results with respect to
maximum level �.
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Contract variables q n r ust satisfy:��� = ��� � � , �� � , � �� �(�)+ �� ��� � � , � � , � ���+ � �� ��� � � ,� � ,� ��� = 0 (14)��� = ��� � � , �� � , � ��� ( )+ �� ��� � � , � � , � ���+ �� ��� ��� � � ,� � ,� ��� = 0 (15)
he boundary at � = 0 is unconstrained, eaning that� could take any value on the interval. ence the
transversality condition is �� (�) = 0 , that is, the shadow
price of � is zero.
herefore, ����� = �(�) yi lds �� (�) = ���� (�) = �(�) ,
hich gives:
��� ��� � � ,� � ,� ��� ( )+�2�� � � ,� � ,� ���2 �(�)��� � � ,� � ,� ���
The second-best opti al condition is therefore:���'���' − = ���'���' (17)
wh r= ����'' −���'' ���'���' �(�)�(�) (18)
co ison t perf inf tion as ,
itional ter arises. The opti al con ion r
ting is when the principal's and the agent's ratios f
arginal values equate odulo . s sust i t
l is t no n to the principal, the agent announces a
level which axi izes his own payoff. In this sense,
nts the infor ation rent captured by the agent or the
loss i the payoff inflicted to the principal.
T sec est ti al esting �� induces the
fol owing probability over �:�(�) = ���'���' − ���'���' ��' �(�)����'' −���'' ���' (19)
If �(�) = 0 , we fal on the perfect infor ation case and�∗ = � . Should this not be the case, the consequential
proposition can be stated.
Proposition 2 In case of an imperfect information set ing, the
Pareto-optimal contracting depends on the probability that
the level of harvest is less than or equal to the lower bound of
-- and thus outside -- the sustainability interval.
Proof See the Appendix.
The rent represents the agent's use of his private information on
the sustainability interval. It is increasing under the Jensen's
inequality [10,5]:���''����'' ≥ 1���' (20)
Corol ary 1 Given the agent's preferences toward
contracting, there is an unavoidable information rent.
Proof See the Appendix.
On he assu ption that �(�) ≠ 0, the only way to fal on the
perfect infor ation case and thus to fal on the lower bound of the
sustainability interval is to set = 0. This i plies that the Jensen's
relative inequality beco es a strict equality. To get there, the
inverse of the agent's arginal value fro harvesting should be
equal to his ratio ofcriticalpoints
over the revenue transfer and harvesting. In consequence,�� should be linear, be it a condition hard to eet in reality.6
3. onclusions
The anage ent of renewable natural resources often
takes the for of a delegation fro the resource owner to the
resource anager. In presence of asy etric infor ation on
the sustainable harvesting interval, a principal-agent
formulation may be put to good use. In this note, we show
that if the renewable natural resource anager has a higher
propensity to harvest than the resource owner, he may be
tempted to manipulate, against the owner, his private
information on the true sustainability interval. ould it be the
case, the lat er ends up accepting levels of harvesting that do
not atch his preferences. Our odel ulti ately shows the
possibility of occur ence of an ecological deficit when the
renewable natural resource owner's fondness for
sustainability is concealed for profit otives.
The odel ing outco es give the insight that, in a world
where owners mandate agents holding private information to
manage their renewable natural resources, i proving the
access to infor ation is necessary and suf icient to decrease
the extend of oral hazard proble s. Therefore, further
involving the natural resource owners in decision making
might be a sound way to guarantee the needed com on-
knowledge perspectives.
6 ssuming the concavity of the agent's value function ith respect to
q and ����'' > 0 ould imply that � < 0.
 (
 
| | I | r
i t ibuted unde c eative co on licen e 4.020
r r r f, ,
, ,
� � � � ,� ,� ( ), ,, ,





r f r � �
i � , � ,� � ,� ,�
� ,� ,�
- r f r
��'��' ��
'��' ( )
��' ��' ��'��' ( )
I r o rf f r n
r r for









�' ��' �' ( )





r r r ' f r f r
r I r r '
[10,5]
�'�' ��' ( )
'
f
rf f r f r f
r '
r r r
r f ' r fr r
r f r
r r r f r r I
r r r 6
. l i
f r r r r f
f r f fr r r r
r r r I r f r f r
r r r -
f r I
f r r r r r r
r r r r r
r r
f r r r
r f r
r f r r
f rr f f
r r r r r' f f r
f r r f
r
r r r f r
r r r r r r
f r r ff r
f r r r r f r f r r
r r r r
r -
r
ss 's s��' .
  l on the perfect information c se 
and 
Research in Ecology | Volume 03 | Issue 04 | Dec mber 2021
Distributed under creative commons license 4.020
13
Contr ct variables q and r must satisfy:���� = � � � , �� � , � ��� �(�)+ ��� � � , � � , � ���+ � ��� � � � � ,� � ,� ��� = 0 (14)���� = � � � , �� � , � ��� �(�)+ � � � � � , � � , � ���+ ��� ��� � � � � ,� � ,� ��� = 0 (15)
The bound r at � = 0 is unco st ained, meaning that� could take any value on the interval. Hence the
tran versality condition is ��(�) = 0 , that is, t e shadow
price of � is zero.
Therefore, ������ = �(�) yields ��(�) = ������(�) = �(�) ,
which gives:
��� =− � � ,� � ,��� �( )+�2 � � � ,� � ,���2 �(�)� � � � ,� � ,� ��� (16)
The second-best optimal condition is therefore:���'���' − � = ���'���' (17)
wher� = � �'' −���'' � �'���' �(�)�(�) (18)
In comparison to th rfect information case, an
additio al term � arises. The optimal ond tion for
co racting is when the princip l's a d th agent's rat os of
m rgin l values equat m dulo � . As he susta nability
interval is not k own to the principal, th agent an ounces a
l v l w ich maximize his own payoff. In this ns , �
repre ents the informa io rent ca tured by th age t the
loss o inflicted to the principal.
The second-best optimal harvesting ��� induces the
following probability over �:�(�) = ��'��' − ���'' ��' �( )� �'' −����'' ���' (19)
If �(�) = 0 , we fall on the perf ct information case and�∗ = � . Should this not b the case, the consequential
prop sitio can be stated.
Prop s tio 2 In case of an imperfect information setting, the
Paret -optimal contracting depends on the pro ability that
th level of harvest i le s th n or equal to the lower bound of
-- and th outside -- the sustainability interval.
Proof S the Appendix.
The nt repres nts the agent's use of his private information on
the sustainability interval. It is increasing under the Jensen's
inequality [10,5]:����''����'' ≥ 1���' (20)
Corollary 1 Given the agent's preferences toward
contracting, there is an unavoidable information rent.
Proof See the Appendix.
On the ssumption that �(�) ≠ 0, the onl way to fall on the
perfect information case and thus to fall on the lower bound of the
sustainability interval is to set� = 0. This implies t at the Jensen's
relative inequality become a strict equality. To g t ther , the
inverse of th agent's m rginal value from harvesting should be
equal to his ratio ofcriticalpoints
ov r the revenue transfer and harvesti g. I consequence,�� should b linear, be it a condition hard to meet in reality.6
3. Conclusions
The anagement of renewable natural resources often
tak s the f rm of a delegation fro the resource owner to the
resource manager. In presence of asymmetric information on
the sustainable harvesting interval, a principal-agent
formulation may be put t good use. In this not , we show
that if the renewable natural resource manager has a higher
propensity to harvest than the resource owner, he may be
te pted to manipulate, against the owner, his private
information on th tr e sustainability interval. Would it be the
cas , the latter ends up accepting levels of harvesting that do
not match his preferences. Our model ultimately shows the
possibility of occurrence of an ecological deficit when the
renewable natural resource owner's fondness for
sustainability is concealed f r profit motives.
The modelling utcomes give the insight that, in a world
where owners mandat agents holding private information to
manag their renewable natural resources, improving the
access to informatio is necessary and sufficient to decrease
the extend of mor l hazard problems. Therefore, further
involving the natural resource owners in decision making
might be a sound way to guarante th needed common-
knowledge rspectives.
6 Assuming the concavity of the agent's value fu ction with respect to
q and ����'' > 0 would imply that � < 0.
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Proof See the Appendix.
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Contract variables q and r must satisfy:���� = ��� � � , �� � , � ��� �(�)+ � � � � � , � , ��+ ��� ��� �� � � ,� � ,� ��� = 0 (14)���� = ��� � � , �� � , � � �(�)+ ��� � � , � � , � �+ ��� �� �� � � , � ,� ��� = 0 (15)
The boundary at � = 0 is unconstrained, meaning that� uld take any value on the inter al. Hence the
transversality condition is ���(�) = 0 , th t is, the shadow
price of � i zero.
Therefore, ������ = �(�) yields ���(�) = ������(�) = �(�)� ,
wh h giv s:
��� =− ��� � � ,�� � , ��� �(�)+�2� � ,� � ,� ���2 (���� � � ,� � ,� ��� (16)
The secon -best optimal conditi n is therefore:���'���' − � = ���'���' (17)
where� = ����'' −��'' ��'���' �(�)�(�) (18)
In comparison to the perfect information case, an
additional term arises. The optimal condition for
contracting is when the principal's and the agent's ratios of
marginal values equate modulo � . As the sustainability
interval is ot known to the principal, the ag nt an ounces a
le el ich max mizes his own payoff. In thi sense, �
represents the information rent captured by the age t r th
loss in the payoff i flict d to the princi l.
The second-best optimal harves ing ��� induces the
following probability over �:�(�) = ���'���' − ���'���' ���' �( )����'' −����'' ���' (19)
If �(�) = 0 , we fall on the perfect information case and�∗ = � . Should this not be the case, the consequential
proposition can be stated.
Proposition 2 In cas of an imperfect information setting, the
Pareto-optimal contracting depends on the probability that
the level of harvest is less th or equal to the lower bound of
-- and thus outside -- the sustainability interval.
Proof Se the App nd x.
The rent represents the agent's use of his private information on
the sustainability interval. It is increasing under the Jense 's
i equality [10,5]:����''����'' ≥ 1���' (20)
Corollary 1 Given the agent's preferences toward
contracting, there is an unavoidable information rent.
Proof See the Appendix.
On the assumption that �(�) ≠ 0, he only way to fall on the
perfect informa ion ca e d thus to fa l o the lower bou d of the
sustainability int rval s to set� = 0. This implies th t the Jense 's
relative inequality becomes a strict equality. To get there, the
inv rs of the ge t's margi al value from arvesting shoul be
eq al to his rat o ofcrit calpoints
over th revenue transf r nd harvesting In consequ nce,�� should be linear, be it co dition hard to me t reality.6
3. Conclusio s
The managem nt of renewable atural resources of en
takes the f rm of a delegation from the resource owner to the
resource manager. In presence of asymmetric information on
the sustain ble harvesting interval, a principal-agent
formulation ay be put to g od use. In this note, show
that if th re ewable atural res urce anager has a higher
propensity to harvest than the resource owner, he m y b
tempted t nipulate, against th owner, his private
informa ion o the tru sustainability interv l. Would it be t
case, the latter ends up accep ing levels of harvesting th t do
not atch his preferenc s. Our model ultimat ly s ows the
possibility f ccurrence of ecological deficit when the
renewabl natural resource owner's fondness for
sustain bility concealed for profit tives.
The modelling o tcom s give the insight that, in a world
wher own rs m nd te ag nts holding private inf rmation t
manage their renewab natural resourc , improving the
access to informati n is necessary and sufficient to decrease
the extend of oral h zard pr blems. Therefore, further
involvin t e natural resource own r in decision making
might be a s und way to guar ntee the need d c mmon-
knowl dge perspectives.
6 Assuming th concavity of the agent's value function with respect to
q and ����'' > 0 would imply that � < 0.
 ( 0)
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Contract variables q and r mu t satisfy:���� = � � , �� , � ��� �(�)+ �� � � , , � ���+ ��� � � � � � ,� � ,� ��� = 0 (14)��� = � � , � , � � �(�)+ �� � � , , � ��+ ��� � ��� � ,� � ,� ��� = 0 (15)
T e boundary t = 0 is unconstrain d, meaning that� could ake any value on th interval. Hence the
transv rsality c dition is ���(�) = 0 , that is, the s dow
price of � is zero.
Th refore, ������ = �(�) yields ���( ) = ������(�) = �(�)� ,
which giv s:
��� =− �� ,� � ,� ��� �(�)+�2 � � � ,� � ,� ���2 �(�)��� � � , � ,� ��� (16)
The second-best optimal c diti is th refore:���'���' − � = ���'���' (17)
where� = '' −����'' ���'���' �(�)�(�) (18)
In comparison to the perfect information c se, an
additional term � arises. The optimal c dition for
o tracting is when t rincipal's and the agent' ratios of
marginal values equat modulo � . As the sustainability
interval is not k wn to the rincipal, the gent ann unces a
lev l which maximizes his ow payoff. In thi sense, �
eprese ts th information rent captured by the age t or the
loss in t e p yoff inflicte t the rincip l.
The s cond-best optimal harvesting ��� i duc s the
following probability over �:�(�) = �'' − ���' �' ��' �(�)���'' −� ��'' ���' (19)
If ( ) = 0 , we fall on th perfect informati n case and∗ = � . Should this not be th case, the onsequential
propositi n can be stated.
Proposition 2 In case of an imperfect informatio setting, the
Pareto-optimal contracting epe ds on the probability that
the level of harv t is less than or equal t the lower b und of
-- and thus outsid -- the sustainability interval.
Proof See th Appendix.
The rent repres nts t e agent's use of his private inf rmation on
the sustainability interval. It is increasing under the Jensen's
inequality [10,5]:����''���'' ≥ 1���' (20)
Corollary 1 Given th agent's preferences toward
contracting, there is n un voidable information rent.
Proof See the Appendix.
On the assumption t at �(�) ≠ 0, the only w y f ll on the
per ect inf rm tion case and thus to fall on the lower bound of the
sustain bility interval s to set� = 0. This implies that the Jensen's
relative inequality becomes a strict equality. To g t t re, the
inverse of he ag nt's marginal va ue from ha vesti g should be
equal to h s ratio ofcriticalpoints
ov r the r v nu t n fe nd h rvesting. In cons qu nce,�� should be linear, be it a c diti n rd to me t in reality.6
3. Conclusions
The ma agem nt of ren wable natural resourc s often
takes the f rm of a delegation from the res urc owner to the
resource manage . In presence of asymmetric information on
t sust inable ha v sti g i terv l, a incipal-agent
formulation m y b put to good us . In this not , we show
that if the r n w bl atural re ourc ma age as a higher
propensity to ar es than th esource ow er, he may be
tempted to m nipulate, against the own r hi private
in ormation on the true sustainability i terval. Would it be the
ca e, the latte nds up acc pting l vels of harv sting that do
not match his references. Our model ultimately shows the
poss bility of oc urrence of an e ological defic w en the
ren w bl nat l resourc wner's fondness for
sus ainab lity is co aled for pr fit motives.
The m delling outcom s give the insight th t, i a world
her ow ers mandate agents h lding private i formati n to
m nage their ren wable natural resources, improving the
access to i forma i n i nec ssary and sufficie t to d crease
the extend of mor l hazar problems. Th e o e, further
i volving th n tural resource w ers in decis on making
might be a s u d way to gu rantee th eede ommon-
knowledge perspectives.
6 Assuming the concavity of the agent's value function with respect to
q and ����'' > 0 would imply that � < 0.
 th  o ly way to 
fall on the perfect informat on case and hus to fall on 
the l wer bound of the sustainability interval is to set 
σ=0. T is implies that the Jensen’s re ative inequali y 
becomes a strict equality. To get there, the inverse of the 
agent’s marg al value from harvesting should b  qual 
to his atio of criti l points ov r the revenu  ransf r 
and arves ing. In consequence, Va sh uld b  linear, be it a 
conditi n a d t  meet in reali y.g
3. Conclusio s
The management of ren wable natural r s f n 
takes the form of a delegation fro  the resou ce wner 
to the r so rc  age . In pr se ce of a ymmetric 
information on the sust able harv sti g nterval, a 
principal-age t fo mulatio  m y be put to go d use. In 
this note, we show t t if t e re ewab e natural resourc  
man ger as a high r pr pen ity to arvest than t e 
resource ow er, h  m y be tempted to manipulate, 
against the wner, his private inf rmatio  on the t ue 
ustainabil ty interval. Wo ld it e the case, the latter ends 
up ccepting levels of harvesting that do not match his 
preferenc s. Our model ultimately shows the possibility 
of occurrence of an ecological deficit when the renewable 
nat ral r ource wner’s fondness for sustainability is 
conceal d f r profit motives.
Th  mod lling ou comes give the insight that, n a 
world wher  ow rs ma date agents holding private 
infor ati n to nage their renew ble natural resourc s, 
improving the access to information is n c ssary and 
sufficient to d crease the extend f m ral hazard probl ms. 
Therefore, further involving the atural resource owners 
in decision maki g might be a so nd way to guarantee the 
needed common-knowledge perspectives.
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Con ract variables q and r ust satisfy:���� = � � � , �� � , � ��� �(�)+ �� ��� � � , � � , ���+ �� ��� � � ,� � ,� �� = 0 (14)���� = � � , � ,�� ( )+ �� ��� � , � � , � ���+ �� �� ��� � � ,� � , �� = 0 (15)
The boundary at � = 0 is nconstrained, mea ing that� could take any value on the interval. Hence the
transversality conditi n is �� (�) = 0 , that is, the shadow
price of � is zero.
The efore, ������ = �(�) yields �� (�) = ������(�) = �(�)� ,
which gives:
�� =− �� � � ,�� � ,� �� �(�)+�2�� � � ,� � ,� �� 2 �(�)� � ,� � ,��� (16)
The second-best optimal condition is therefore:��'��' − � = ��'��' (17)
where� = �� �'' −�� �'' ��'' �(�)�(�) (18)
In comparison to the perfect information case, an
additional term arises. The optimal conditio for
contractin is when the principal's and the agent's ratios of
margin l values equate modulo � . As the sust inability
interval is not known to th principal, the agent announces a
level which maximizes his wn payoff. In this sense, �
represents the information rent captured by the agent or the
loss in the payoff inflicted to the principal.
The second-best optimal harvesting ��� induces the
following probability over :�(�) = ��'��' − ��'��' ��' �(�)�� �'' −�� �'' �' (19)
If (�) = 0 , we fall on the perfect information case and�∗ = � . Should this not be the case, the consequential
proposition can be stated.
Proposition 2 In case of an imperfect information setting, the
Pareto-optimal contracting depends on the probability that
the level of harvest is less than or equ l to the lower bound of
-- and thus outside -- the sustainability interval.
Proof See t e Appendix.
The rent represents the agent's use of his private information on
the sustainability interval. It is increasing under the Jensen's
inequality [10,5]:�� �''�� �'' ≥ 1��' (20)
Corollary 1 Given the agent's preferences toward
contracting, there is an unavoidable i formation t.
Pro f See the App ndix.
O the assumption th t �(�) ≠ 0, the only way to fall on t e
perfect information case and thus to fall on the lower bound of the
sustainability interval is to set� = 0. This implies that the Je sen's
relative inequality becomes a strict equality. To get there, the
inverse of the agent's marginal value from harvesting should be
equal to his ratio ofcriticalpoints
over the revenue transfer a d harvesting. In consequence,�� should be lin ar, be it a condition rd to meet in reality.6
3. onclusio s
The management of renewable natural resources often
takes the form of a d legation from th resource owner to the
resource manager. In pr sence of asymmetric information n
the s stainable harvesting interval, a principal- ge t
formulatio ay be put to good use. In this note, we show
hat if the re ew ble nat ral resource ma ager has a higher
propensi y to harvest than the r r ow er, he may be
t mpted to manipulate, against the owner, his priv t
inf r ation on the true sustain bility interv l. Would it be the
ca e, the lat er e ds up accepting levels of harvesting that do
not matc his preferences. Our mod l ultimately shows t e
os ibility of occurrenc of an ecol gical deficit when the
renewable natur l resource owner's fondn ss for
ustainability is once led for profit motives.
The modelling outcom s give the insight that, in a world
wh re owners ma date agents holding private information t
manage their renewable natural resources, improving the
ac ess to information is necessary and uffi ient to decrease
the extend of moral hazard problems. Therefore, further
involving the natural resource owners in decision making
might be a sound way to g arantee the nee d c mmon-
knowledge perspectives.
6 As uming the concavity of the agent's value function with respect to
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Appendix
Appendix A -- Proof of Lemma 1
The total differentiation of Vp with respect to q yields:
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and − ���' ���� > 0 . When ���� < 0 , we have ���' < 0 for���' <− ���' ����.
Appendix B -- Proof of Lemma 2
We are interested in the variation of �� with respect to q.
Hence:��� � � ,� � ,� ��� ���� + ��� � � ,� � ,� ��� ���� +��� � � ,� � ,� ��� ����=0
Ceteris paribus, the relationship between the natural resource
stock and harvesting can be analyzed. From the total
differentiation, we obtain:���� =− ���' ���� + ���' �������'
As in the case of the principal, sustainable
harvesting corresponds to ���� = 0 . We fall on−���' ���� = ���' ����.
Conversely, ���� > 0 is verified for ��∗ < � and ���� < 0
for ��∗ > � . When ���� > 0 , we have ���' > 0 for −���' ���� >���' ����. When ���� < 0, we have���' < 0 for−���' ���� < ���' ����.
Appendix C -- Proof of Proposition 1
By Lemma 1, we know that ���' =− ���' ���� . Equation (10)
can thus be written as− ���� = ���'���' . Given that r and q vary in a
complementary way, their MRTS equals zero, which implies
that− ���� = 0 = ���.
Appendix D -- Proof of Proposition 2
Straightforward from equation (18). We know that � = 0 if�(�)�(�)=0 or ����'' −����'' ���'���' = 0. If one of these two conditions were
verified, Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 complete the proof.
Appendix E -- Proof of Corollary 1
The Jensen's inequality is verified when �� is convex over
both of its arguments. From equation (20), we have����''����'' ≥ 1���' ⇔ ����'' ≤ ���' ����'' ⇔ ����''����'' ≤ ���'
Through complementarity, we know that ����'' > 0. When���' > 0, the opening relative inequality implies that����'' ≥ 0.
Ergo, both arguments give the convexity of �� , which ends
the proof. When ���' < 0, the information rent is useless, for
the agent does not wish to harvest more than what has been
fixed, as a lower sustainability bound, in the management
plan. In that stance, the only risk involved is an insufficient
level of harvesting.
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Appendix E -- Proof of Corollary 1
The Jensen's inequality is verified when �� is convex over
both of its arguments. From equation (20), we have� ��''� ��'' ≥ 1�' ⇔ � ��'' ≤ � �' � ��'' ⇔ � ��''� ��'' ≤ � �'
Through complementarity, we know that � ��'' > 0. When� �' > 0, the opening relative inequality implies that� ��'' ≥ 0.
Ergo, both arguments give the convexity of �� , which ends
the proof. When � �' < 0, the information rent is useless, for
the agent does not wish to harvest more than what has been
fixed, as a lower sustainability bound, in the management
plan. In that stance, the only risk involved is an insufficient
level of harvesting.
 i en that r and q vary 
in a complementary way, their MRTS equals zero, which 
implies that 
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and − ���' ���� > 0 . When ���� < 0 , we have ���' < 0 for���' <− ���' ����.
Appendix B -- Proof of Lemma 2
We are interested in the variation of �� with respect to q.
Hence:� � � � ,� � ,� ��� ���� � � � � ,� � ,� ��� ���� +� � � � ,� � ,� ��� ����=0
Ceteris paribus, the relationship between the natural resource
stock and harvesting can be analyzed. From the total
differentiation, we obtain:���� =− ���' ��� + ���' �������'
As in the case of the principal, sustainable
harvesting corresponds to ��� = 0 . We fall on−���' �� = ���' ����.
Conversely, ��� > 0 is verified for �∗ < � and ���� < 0
for ��∗ > � . When ���� > 0 , we have ���' > 0 for −���' ���� >���' ����. When ���� < 0, we have���' < 0 for−���' ���� < ���' ����.
Appendix C -- Proof of Proposition
By Lemma 1, we know that ���' =− ���' ���� . Equation (10)
can thus be writt n as− ��� = ���'���' . Given th t r and q vary in a
complementary way, their MRTS equals zero, which implies− ���� = 0 = ���.
Appendix D -- Proof of Proposition 2
Straightforward from equation (18). We know that � = 0 if�(�)�(�)=0 or ����'' −����'' ���'���' = 0. If one o these two conditions were
verified, Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 complete the proof.
Appendix E -- Proof of Corollary 1
The Jens 's inequality is verified when �� is convex over
both of its arguments. From equation (20), we have����''���'' ≥ 1��' ⇔ �� �'' ≤ ��' � �'' ⇔ ���''����'' ≤ ���'
Through compleme tarity, we know t t ���'' > . When���' > 0, the opening relative inequality implies that����'' ≥ 0.
Ergo, both arguments give the c v xity of �� , which ends
the proof. When ���' < 0, the information rent is useless, for
the agent doe not wish to harvest more than what has been
fixed, as a lower sustainability bound, in the ma agement
pl n. In that stance, the only risk involved is an insufficient
level of harvesting.
Appendix D -- Pro f of Proposition 2
Straightforward from equati  (18). We know that σ=0 if 
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and − ��' ��� > 0 . When ���� < 0 , we have ���' < 0 for���' <− ���' ����.
Appendix B -- Proof of Lemma 2
We are interested in the variation of �� with respect to q.
Hence:��� � � ,� � ,� ��� ���� + ��� � � ,� � ,��� ���� +��� � � ,� � ,� ��� ����=0
Ceteris p ribus, the relationship between the atural resource
stock and harvesting can be analyzed. From the total
differentiation, we obtain:��� =− ���' ���� + ��' �������'
As in the cas f the principal, sustainable
harvesting corresponds to ���� = 0 . We fall on−���' ���� = ��' ����.
Conversely, ���� > 0 is verified for ��∗ < � and ��� < 0
for ∗ > � . When ��� > 0 , we have ��' > 0 for −���' �� >���' ����. When ���� < 0, we have���' < 0 for−���' ���� < ���' ����.
Appendix C -- Proof of Proposition 1
By Le ma 1, we know that ��' =− ���' ���� . Equation (10)
can thus be written as− ���� = ���'���' . Given that r and q vary in a
complementary way, their MRTS equals zero, which implies
that− �� = 0 = ���.
Appendix D -- Proof of Proposition 2
Straightforward from equation (18). We know that � = 0 if�(�)�(�)=0 or ����'' −���'' ���'���' = 0. If one of these two conditions were
verified, Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 complete the proof.
Appendix E -- Proof of Corollary 1
The Jensen's inequality is verified when �� is convex over
both of its arguments. From equation (20), we have�� �''����'' ≥ 1��' ⇔ ����'' ≤ ���' ����'' ⇔ �''����'' ≤ ���'
Through complementarity, we know that ����'' > 0. When���' > 0, the opening relative inequality m lies that����'' ≥ 0.
Ergo, both arguments give the convexity f �� , which nds
the proof. Wh n ���' < 0, the information rent is useles , for
the agent does not wish to harvest more than what has been
fixed, as a lower sustainability bound, in the management
plan. In that stance, the only risk involved is an insufficient
level of harvesting.
 or 
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and − ��' ���� > 0 . When ��� < 0 , we have ��' < 0 for��' <− ��' ����.
A pendix B -- Pr of of Lemma 2
W are interested in the variation of � with respec to q.
Hence:� � � , � ,� �� �� + � � � , � ,� �� �� +� � � , � ,� �� ��=0
C teris paribus, the relationship betw en the n ural res urce
stock and harvesting can be analyzed. From the total
differentiation, we obtain:
� =− ��' �� + ��' ����'
As in the case of the principal, sust inable
harvesting corresponds to �� = 0 . We fall on− ��' �� = ��' ��.
Conversely, ���� > 0 is ver fied for �∗ < � and ���� < 0
for ��∗ > � . When ��� > 0 , we have ��' > 0 for − ��' ���� >��' ����. When ���� < 0, we have ��' < 0 for− ��' ���� < ��' ����.
A pendix C -- Pr of of Proposition 1
By Le ma 1, we know that ��' =− ��' ���� . Equation (10)
can thus be written as− ���� = ��'���' . Given that r and q vary in a
complementary way, their MRTS equals zero, which implies
that− ��� = 0 = �.
A pendix D -- Pr of of Proposition 2
Straightforward from equation (18). We know that = 0 if(�)(�)=0 or ����'' − �' ���'���' = 0. If one of these two cond tions were
ver fi d, Le ma 1 and Le ma 2 compl te the pr of.
A pe dix E -- Pr of of Corollary 1
The Jensen's inequality is v r fied when � is convex over
both of its arguments. From equation (20), we have
���''���'' ≥ 1��' ⇔ � �'' ≤ ���' ���'' ⇔ ���''���'' ≤ ��
Through complementarity, we know that ���'' > 0. When��' > 0, the ope i g relative inequali y implies that ���'' ≥ 0.
Ergo, b th arguments give convexity of � , which ends
t pr of. Whe ��' < 0, t e infor ation rent is us less, for
the agent does not wi h to harvest more than what h s b
fixed, as a lower sustainab lity bound, in the ma agement
plan. In that stance, the only risk involved is an insufficient
level of harvesting.
 If one of th se tw  co ditions 
were verified, Lemma 1 and Lem a 2 complete the proof.
App ndix E -- Proof of Corollary 1
The Jensen’s inequality is verified when Va is convex over 
both of its arguments. From equation (20), we have
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and − ��' ��� > 0 . When ��� < 0 , we have ���' < 0 for���' <− ���' ���.
Appendix B -- P oof of Lemma 2
We are interested in the variation of �� with respect to q.
Hence:� � � � ,� � ,� � ��� + ��� � � ,� � ,� ��� ��� +��� � � ,� � ,� ��� ����=0
Ceteris pa bus, he relati nsh p between the natural r source
stock and harvesting can be analyzed. From the total
differentiation, we obtain:���� =− ��' ���� + ���' �������'
A i the case of th principal, sustainable
harvesting corresponds to ��� = 0 . We fall on−���' ���� = ���' ����.
Conversely, ��� > 0 is verified for ��∗ < and ��� < 0
for �∗ > � . When ��� > 0 , we have ��' > f r −���' �� >���' ���. When ��� < 0, we have���' < 0 for−���' ��� < ���' ���.
Appendix C -- Proof of Proposition 1
By Lemma 1, w know that ���' =− ��' ��� . Equation (10)
can thus be written as− ��� = �'���' . Given that r nd q vary in a
complementary way, their MRTS equals zero, which implies
that− ���� = 0 = ���.
App ndix D -- Proof of Proposition 2
Straightforward from equation (18). We know that � = 0 f�(�)�(�)=0 or ����'' −����'' ���'���' = 0. If one of these two conditions were
ve ified, Lemma 1 nd Lemma 2 complete the proof.
Appendix E -- Proof of Corollary 1
The Jensen's inequality is verified when �� is convex over
both of its argu ents. From equation (20), we have����''����'' ≥ 1���' ⇔ ����'' ≤ ���' ����'' ⇔ ����''����'' ≤ ���'
Through complementarity, we know that ����'' > 0. When���' > 0, the opening relative inequality implies that����'' ≥ 0.
Ergo, b th arguments give t c nvexity of �� , which ends
the proof. Wh n ���' < 0, the information rent is useless, for
the age t doe not wish t harvest more than what has be
fixed, as lower sustainability bound, in the management
plan. In that stance, the only risk involved is an insufficient
level of harvesting.
Thr  co plementarity, we know that 
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and − ��' ���� > 0 . When ���� < 0 , we have ���' < 0 for���' <− ���' ����.
Appendix B -- Proof of Lemma 2
We are interested in the variation of �� with respect to q.
Hence:� � � � ,� � ,�� ���� + � � � � ,� � ,� ��� ���� +� � � � ,� � ,� ��� ����=0
Ceter s paribus, the relationship b tween the natural resource
stock and harvesting can be analyzed. From the total
differentiation, we obtain:���� =− ���' ���� + ��' �������'
As in the case of the principal, sustainable
harvesting corresponds to ���� = 0 . We fall on−���' � = ���' ����.
C nv rsely, ���� > 0 is verifi d for �∗ < � and ���� < 0
for ��∗ > . When ���� > 0 , we have ���' > 0 for − ��' ���� >���' ����. When ���� < 0, we have���' < 0 for−���' ���� < ���' ����.
Appendix C -- Proof of Proposition 1
By Lemma 1, we know that ���' =− ���' ���� . Equation (10)
can thus b written as− � = ���'���' . Given that r and q vary in a
complementary way, their MRTS equals zero, which implies
that− ���� = 0 = ���.
Appen ix D -- Pro f of Propositi 2
Straightforward fr m equation (18). We know that � = 0 if�(�)�(�)=0 or ���'' −����'' ���'���' = 0. If one of these two conditions were
verified, Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 complete the proof.
Appendix E -- Proof of Corollary 1
The Jens 's inequality is verified hen �� is convex over
both of its arguments. From equation (20), we have����''����'' ≥ 1���' ⇔ ����'' ≤ ��' ����'' ⇔ ����''���'' ≤ ��'
Through co plementarity, we know that ���'' > 0. When���' > 0, the opening r lative inequality implies that����'' ≥ 0.
Ergo, both arguments gi he conv xity of �� , which ends
the pro f. When ���' < 0, the information re t is us l ss, for
the gent doe not wish to harvest more than what has been
fixed, a a lower sustainability bound, i the ma agement




esear i col gy | olu e 03 | Issue 04 | ece ber 2021
istributed und r creative co ons license 4.020
a ��' ���� . e ���� , e a e ��' f r��' ��' ����.
i -- r f f
e ar i teres e i t e ariati f � it res ect t .
e ce:� � , � , �� �� � ,� � , �� ���� � � , �� ��
eteris ri s, t e relati s i et ee t e at ral res rce
st c ar esti ca e a al ze . r e t tal
ffere tiati , e tai :� ��' � ���'��'
i t s f t ri i l, s st i l
r sti rr s t �� . f ll��' �' ��.
ers l , ��� is erifi f r �∗ a ����
f r ∗ . e ��� , e a e ��' f r ��' �����' ����. e ���� , e a e ��' f r ��' ���� ��' ����.
i -- r f f siti
e a , e t at ��' ��' ���� . ti ( )
ca t s ritte as ��� ���'���' . i e t at a ar i a
c le e tar a , t eir e als zer , ic i lies
t at ���� �.
di -- r of f sition
trai tf r ar fr e ati ( ). e t t if�(�)�(�) r ����'' ����'' ���'���' . I e f t ese t c iti s ere
erifie , e a a e a c lete t e r f.
i -- r f f ll
e Je s 's i e alit is erifie e � is c e er
t f its ar e ts. r e ati ( ), e a e
���''��'' ��' ��'' ���' ���'' ���''����'' ���'
r c le e tarit , e t at ���'' e��' , t e i r lati e i alit i lies t at ���'' .
r , t ar e ts i t c it f � , ic e s
t e r of. e ��' , t e i f r ati rent i seless, f r
t e e t s is t ar st r t a at as ee
i e , as a l er s stai a ilit , i t e a a e e t
la . I t at sta ce, t e l ris i l e i a i s fficie t
le el f ar esti .
, th  opening relat v  inequality implies 
that 
Research in Ecology | Volume 03 | Issue 04 | December 2021
Distributed under creative commons license 4.020
15
and − ���' ���� > 0 . When ���� < 0 , we have ���' < 0 for���' <− ���' ����.
Appendix B -- Proof of Lemma 2
We are interested in the variation of � with respect to q.
Hence:��� � � ,� � ,� ��� ���� + ��� � � ,� � ,� ��� ���� +��� � � ,� � ,� ��� ����=0
Ceteris paribus, the relationship between the natural r ource
stock and harvesting can be analyzed. From the total
differentiation, we obtain:���� =− ���' ���� + ���' �������'
As in the case of the principal, sustainable
harvesting corresponds to ���� = 0 . We fall on−���' ���� = ���' ����.
Conversely, ���� > 0 is verified for ��∗ < � and �� < 0
for ��∗ > � . When ���� > 0 , we have ���' > 0 for − ��' ���� >���' ����. When ���� < 0, we have���' < 0 for−���' ���� < ���' ����.
Appendix C -- Proof of Proposition 1
By L mm 1, we know that ���' =− ���' ���� . Equation (10)
can thus be written as− ���� = ���'���' . Given that r and q vary in a
complementary way, their MRTS equals zero, w ich implies
that− ��� = 0 = ���.
Appendix D -- Proof of Proposition 2
Straightforward from equation (18). We know that � = 0 if�(�)�(�)=0 or ����'' −����'' ���'���' = 0. If one of these two c nditions were
verified, Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 complete the pro f.
Appendix E -- Proof of C rollary 1
The Jensen's inequality is verifi d when �� is convex over
both of its arguments. From equation (20), we have����''���'' ≥ 1���' ⇔ ����'' ≤ ���' ����'' ⇔ ����''����'' ≤ ���'
Through complementarity, we know that ����'' > 0. When��' > 0, the open ng elative inequality implies that����'' ≥ 0.
Ergo, both arguments give the convexity of �� , which nds
the proof. W en ���' < 0, the information rent is usel ss, f r
the agent does not wish to harvest more than what has been
fixed, as a lower sustainability bound, in the management
plan. In that stance, the only risk involved is an insufficient
level of harvesting.
. Ergo, both arguments give the convexity of 
Va , w ich ends he proof. When 
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and − ���' � > 0 . When ���� < 0 , we have ���' < 0 for�' <− ���' ����.
Appendix B -- Proof of Lemma 2
W ar ter sted in the variation of � with respect t q.
Hence:� � , ,� �� ��� + �� � ,� � ,�� ��� +�� � ,� � ,� ��� ����=0
Cet ris p ribus, the r la ionship betw en th natural resou ce
st ck and harvesting c n be analyzed. Fr m t e total
differentiatio , we obtain:��� =− ��' ���� + ���' ������'
As in the c s of the principal, sustainable
harvesting corresponds to ���� = 0 . We fall on− = ���' ����.
Conversely, ��� > 0 is verifi d for ∗ < � and ���� < 0
for ��∗ > � . W en � > 0 , we h ve ��' 0 for −���' ���� >���' ��. Wh n ���� 0, we have���' < 0 for− ��' ���� < ���' ����.
Appendix C -- f of Proposition 1
By Lemma 1, we know that ��' =− ���' ���� . Equation (10)
can thus be ritten as− ���� = ���'���' . Given th t r a d q vary in a
compl mentary way, th ir MRTS equals zero, which implies
that− ���� = 0 = ���.
Appendix D -- f of Proposition 2
Straightforward fr m quation (18). We know th t � = 0 if( )�(�) 0 or ����'' −����'' ���'���' = 0. If one f these two conditions were
verified, Lemma 1 nd Lemma 2 complete the proof.
Appendix E -- Pr f of Corollary 1
The Jensen's nequal ty is v rifi d whe � is convex over
both of it argu ts. From equation (20), we have
�''����'' ≥ 1���' ⇔ ��' ≤ ���' '' ⇔ ����''����'' ≤ ���'
Through complem t rity, we know that ���'' > 0. When' > , the opening rel tiv nequa i y implies that����'' ≥ 0.
Er o, bo argumen s gi he convexity f �� , which e s
the proof. ���' < 0, t information ent is useless, for
th ag nt does n t wish to harvest mor than what has been
fixed, as a lower sustai ability bound, i the management
plan. In that stance, the only risk involv d is an insufficient
level of harvesting.
, the information 
rent is u eless, for the age t does not wish to harvest more 
th  what as b n fix d,  a lower ust in bili y bound, 
in the management plan. In that stance, the only ri k 
involved is an insufficient level of harvesting.
